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ABSTRACT
YIMIN WANG: Essays On Supply Risk In Global Operations.
(Under the direction of Brian Tomlin and Wendell Gilland)
The prevalence of globalization has created significant operational risks in firms’ supply
networks. It is, therefore, essential for firms to adopt effective risk management strategies to
mitigate supply risks. Of the many operational challenges that globalization poses, this re-
search focuses on the operational risk associated with emerging economies. These operational
risks include, for example, leadtime risk, capacity risk, quality risk, intellectual property risk,
political risk, regulatory risk, exchange risk, and so on. In this dissertation, we consider three
of these risks, namely, leadtime risk, capacity risk, and regulatory trade barrier risk. In the
first chapter, we examine the supplier random leadtime issue. In deciding when and how much
to order, firms must consider lead time risk and demand risk, i.e., the accuracy of their de-
mand forecast. We characterize a firm’s optimal timing and quantity policy. We prove that a
firm’s optimal procurement time is independent of the demand forecast but that the optimal
procurement quantity is not. In the second chapter, we examine the supplier random capacity
issue. We relax the assumption that supplier reliability is exogenous and consider a case where
a firm may have the opportunity to improve a supplier’s reliability. We characterize a firm’s
optimal procurement policy for both its diversification strategy and its process improvement
strategy. We prove that a firm’s procurement strategy is significantly influenced by the oppor-
tunity for process improvement. In the third chapter, we examine a firm’s sourcing strategy
under regulatory trade barriers. We contrast four procurement strategies in their effectiveness
to mitigate supply risk due to trade barriers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Motivated by my own significant professional experience in Asia and North America, this
dissertation focuses on global operations management. This is an important area of research
in today’s business environment because of the significant operational risks associated with
global operations, especially in connection with emerging economies. For example, Boston
Consulting Group reported that “risks [from low cost countries] have multiple sources. Some,
such as shipping delays, unavailability of shipping capacity, and customs issues, are related to
the physical transport of goods. Others are linked to procurement issues. Examples include
high numbers of rejects, inability of vendors to scale up, and disruption in delivery schedules”.
Other operational risks include regulatory risk, supply-information risk, technology-transfer
risk, and exchange-rate risk etc. The aim of this research is to develop theoretical insights to
help companies effectively manage the operational risks associated with global operations.
Of the many operational challenges that globalization poses, this research focuses on the
operational risk associated with emerging economies. These operational risks include, for exam-
ple, leadtime risk, capacity risk, quality risk, intellectual property risk, political risk, regulatory
risk, exchange risk, and so on. In this essay, we focus on three risks: leadtime risk, capacity
risk, and regulatory trade barrier risk. These three risks are each addressed in subsequent
chapters.
Leadtime risk refers to random leadtimes associated with long and uncertain global supply
networks, and capacity risk refers to random quantities associated with unreliable suppliers.
While always present, the importance and magnitude of these two forms of uncertainty have
increased as a result of some distinct characteristics of emerging economies. First, many sup-
pliers in emerging economies have less stable operational capabilities due to reasons such as
energy and raw material shortage, less efficient infrastructure, and less developed technologies.
“They [suppliers] have explicitly chosen designs and processes that sacrifice quality for the sake
of speed and cost savings” (China’s Five Surprises, 2006.) Less stable operational capabilities
can lead to uncertainty in production/delivery quantities. Second, long and congested logistics
networks can lead to random leadtimes (Agarwal, 2006).
Regulatory trade barriers pose significant threat to the continuity of the firm’s supply
network. Regulatory trade barriers, such as voluntary export restrictions, are some of the most
frequently encountered risk facing firms operating in a global environment.
This dissertation research consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 studies the leadtime risk,
Chapter 3 studies the capacity risk, and Chapter 4 studies the regulatory trade barriers risk.
All proofs can be found in the appendices (Chapter 5.3). In what follows, we briefly describe
each chapter in sequence.
2
1.1 Leadtime Risk
This chapter investigates the interplay of demand risk and leadtime risk in global sourcing.
Specifically, leadtime risk refers to the uncertain supply leadtime associated with the often
long and unreliable supply networks in global sourcing and demand risk refers to the accuracy
of a firm’s demand forecast. In deciding when and how much to procure, firms must consider
the trade-off between leadtime risk and demand risk. To improve the accuracy of its demand
forecast, a firm may allow customers to place orders before the selling season. It can then use
these pre-season orders to update its forecast of overall demand as the selling season approaches.
The longer the firm waits before procuring the product, the more information it has on pre-
season orders, and, therefore, its demand risk decreases. However, it’s leadtime risk, i.e., the
chance of not receiving its supply on time, increases as the firm waits closer to the selling
season. Thus, the firm faces a trade-off: order earlier to reduce supply risk or order later to
reduce demand risk. This research fills the gap in the existing literature by investigating this
important trade-off.
We model the firm’s pre-season orders as an autoregressive, continuous time-series process
with correlated shocks, and we allow for correlations between pre-season and in-season orders.
The firm thus faces an optimal stopping problem with a joint timing and quantity decision. We
characterize the firm’s optimal timing and quantity decision with and without pre-season orders,
and characterize the directional effects (on time and cost) of supply and market attributes. We
prove that the firm’s expected cost decreases as the ratio of pre-season orders to in-season orders
increases. We prove that a firm might strictly prefer a leadtime with a higher probability of
delay (chance of the delivery not arriving on time) to one with a lower probability of delay.
However, we show that the firm becomes less sensitive to lead-time variability as the fraction
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of pre-season orders increases. In other words, as a firm increasingly utilizes pre-season orders,
it becomes increasingly more resilient to the uncertainty in the supply leadtime. Therefore,
a firm can use demand-signal techniques, such as pre-season orders, to partially mitigate the
effect of supply uncertainty.
1.2 Capacity Risk
The second chapter investigates a firm’s optimal sourcing strategies when they can influence its
supply uncertainty. Recent evidence from several industries suggests that supply uncertainty
can often be influenced by management practices (GLSCS, 2005). This potential benefit of
influencing supplier’s reliability is particularly important because virtually every firm seeking
to establish operations in emerging economies faces unreliable third party suppliers. A static
view of the suppliers’ reliability would severely limit the potential range of the firm’s risk
mitigation strategies.
In contrast to the first chapter of my dissertation, which, as in the existing literature, treats
supply uncertainty as exogenous, this chapter introduces another dimension, i.e., operational
improvement, to the firm’s supply-risk mitigation strategy. To mitigate the supply risk, a firm
can either diversify its supplier base or invest in supplier-reliability improvement efforts. The
diversification strategy mitigates the supply risk because of the risk pooling benefit. On the
other hand, the improvement strategy mitigates the supply risk by directly influencing the
supplier’s reliability.
This chapter characterizes the firm’s optimal procurement quantity under both diversifica-
tion strategy and improvement strategy. We prove that with diversification strategy, the firm
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may, nevertheless, prefer to single source when the demand risk is low. However, the presence of
improvement opportunities can influence the firm’s preferred supplier. We prove that the firm
may make improvement in a supplier that it would not have used if there were no improvement
opportunity.
When the firm has the option of either diversification or improvement strategy, the firm’s
preference of one strategy relative to the other strategy is generally not monotonic in system
parameters. While the firm may strictly prefer one strategy over the other, depending on
system parameters, we observe that the diversification strategy is more likely to be preferred
when the unit procurement cost is very low or very high, but the improvement strategy is more
likely to be preferred when the unit procurement cost is moderate.
We found that the volatility of demand has a significant impact on the attractiveness of
the improvement strategy. In extreme cases where demand is highly volatile or very stable,
the improvement strategy is less likely to be preferred to the diversification strategy. On the
other hand, the improvement strategy is more likely to be preferred when demand volatility is
moderate. This result is due to the interplay of effective demand and effective supply.
We observed that the distributional shape of the capacity loss has important implications
for the attractiveness of the diversification and improvement strategies. We found that the
improvement strategy is more likely to be preferred when the unit procurement cost is high
and the volatility of the capacity loss is high. A higher unit cost reduces the effective demand
which mitigates the capacity disadvantage of the improvement strategy. A higher volatility of
capacity loss results in a higher marginal return for the improvement strategy while exerting
higher pressure on the diversification strategy.
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1.3 Regulatory Trade Barriers Risk
The third chapter investigates the firm’s procurement strategy when supply may be subject
to regulatory trade barriers. In particular, we consider the situation where the product from
the most efficient suppliers is subject to voluntary export restraints1 (VER). There are several
strategies the firm can use to mitigate the negative effect of VER. In particular, the firm may
adopt a split procurement strategy by sourcing from two different countries, where one of the
countries is not subject to VER. In addition, the firm may take advantage of outward processing
agreements2 (OPA) to eliminate the VER risk.
In this chapter, we contrast four mitigation strategies the firm may use to cope with quota
uncertainties. The direct procurement strategies and the split procurement strategies do not
eliminate quota uncertainty, while the direct and indirect OPA strategies remove quota un-
certainty. We analytically characterize the firm’s optimal procurement policies for all four
strategies. In addition, we prove that, for the direct procurement and the split procurement
strategy, the firm’s optimal expected cost is decreasing in the quota cost in terms of the first
order stochastic dominance. We also prove that, in the special case of a normally distributed
quota cost, the firm’s optimal expected profit decreases in the expected quota cost but increases
1“Voluntary export restraints (VER) are arrangements between exporting and importing countries in which
the exporting country agrees to limit the quantity of specific exports below a certain level in order to avoid
imposition of mandatory restrictions by the importing country. The arrangement may be concluded either at
the industry or government level.” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Available
at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2882. See Chapter 4 for details.
2Different entities, such as the US, Hong Kong, and the EU, have somewhat different definitions and proce-
dures of outward processing agreements. This chapter most closely follows the Hong Kong and the EU practices.
Here is an excerpt from the EU definition. “Outward Processing is an EU customs duty relief scheme provided for
under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 and implementing Commission Regulation 2454/93 (amended).
It allows Community goods to be temporarily exported from the customs territory of the Community in order
to undergo processing operations or repair and the compensating products resulting from these operations to be
released for free circulation in the customs territory of the Community with total or partial relief from import
duties. Outward processing enables businesses to take advantage of cheaper labour costs outside the EC, while
encouraging the use of EC produced raw materials to manufacture the finished products. Goods may be also
temporarily exported to undergo processes not available within the Community.” See Chapter 4 for details.
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in the variance of the quota cost.
We characterize the optimal procurement policies for the direct OPA strategy and we prove
that the firm’s optimal expected profit is non-decreasing in the leadtime difference, which is
the leadtime advantage associated with the domestic production. We capture this leadtime
advantage through a general framework of forecast updating process. Furthermore, we char-
acterize the firm’s first stage optimal procurement decisions under a general framework of the
martingale forecast updating process.
We conducted an extensive numeric study to investigate the relative attractiveness of dif-
ferent mitigation strategies as system parameters change. We observed that, consistent with
our analytical results, the firm’s optimal expected cost decreases in stochastically increasing
quota costs. We also observed that, with the direct OPA strategy, the firm’s optimal expected
cost increases convexly in the leadtime advantage. We found that an increase in the expected
demand does not shift the rankings of different mitigation strategies, but an increase in the
demand coefficient of variation (CV) may significantly shift the rankings of the different miti-
gation strategies. In particular, we found that the direct OPA strategy becomes less attractive
as the demand CV increases, if the leadtime difference is small. In this case, an increase in the
demand CV can make the direct procurement strategy more appealing than the direct OPA
strategy. If, however, the leadtime advantage for the direct OPA strategy is large, then an
increase in the demand CV can make the direct OPA strategy significantly more attractive and
it can become the preferred strategy, especially when the low cost country unit production cost
is relatively high. See chapter 4 for detailed discussions of different mitigation strategies.
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Chapter 2
Leadtime Risk
2.1 Introduction
The pressure to reduce direct manufacturing costs has led many firms to outsource production
to lower-cost countries such as China. As a result, North American and European firms are
faced with longer procurement leadtimes. Moreover, the procurement leadtimes are often
uncertain. Delays can occur for many reasons, including transportation-infrastructure issues in
rapidly-developing economies, such as China, congestion in foreign and domestic ports, customs
inspections, and logistical issues involving export quotas.
Oftentimes, there are two aspects to supply uncertainty. An order might be delayed or not,
and if it is delayed, the length of delay may be uncertain. For example, a shipment might be
selected for customs inspection and the resulting time spent in inspection might be uncertain.
Similarly, a shipment might be delayed due to a port disruption (such as the 2002 US west-coast
disruption) and the resulting delay might be uncertain.
Long and uncertain leadtimes are especially problematic for firms with short selling seasons.
My previously work experience in the custom-design drawnwork (textile) industry indicates
that, for reasons of cost, U.S. drawnwork wholesalers source from Chinese suppliers. The
typical leadtime is on the order of three months but there is significant uncertainty around this
for the reasons cited above. The U.S. wholesalers sell the product to domestic customers in the
fall but, because of the leadtime, have to source the drawnwork before their customers place
orders. In essence, the U.S. wholesalers face a newsvendor-type problem with an uncertain
leadtime.
Firms from many industries face a similar problem. The issue of supply uncertainty is of
growing managerial concern, as evidenced from the following excerpts from reports by the The
Economist and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG):
Last autumn some 80m items of clothing were impounded at European ports and
borders because they exceeded the annual import limits that the European Union
and China had agreed on only months earlier. Retailers had ordered their autumn
stock well before that agreement was signed, and many were left scrambling. (When
the Chain Breaks. The Economist. 2006.)
In the run up to Christmas 2004, grid-lock hit the Los Angeles-Long Beach ports,
the entry point for almost half the goods coming into the United States. Nearly
100 ships floated around, cooling their keels and waiting to be unloaded - a process
that was taking up to twice as long as usual. The results of the dock jam were
serious and far reaching. The Sharper Image, for one, claimed that November sales
had been adversely affected by reduced inventory resulting from congestion at the
ports. Now companies are ordering earlier. (Avoiding Supply Chain Shipwrecks.
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BCG. 2005)
Ordering earlier may reduce the risk associated with uncertain leadtimes but it also increases
the firms’ demand risk, i.e., the potential mismatch between the quantity procured and the
realized demand. In industries with short selling-seasons, firms sometimes allow customers to
place pre-season orders, that is place orders before the selling season, e.g., Fisher and Raman
(1996). This enables the firm to improve the accuracy of its forecast of overall demand (the
sum of pre-season and in-season customer orders). The longer the firm waits before procuring
the product, the more information it has on pre-season orders, and, therefore, its demand risk
decreases. Thus, the firm faces a trade-off: order earlier to reduce supply risk or order later to
reduce demand risk. A primary purpose of this research is to investigate this trade-off.
In this chapter, we characterize the optimal procurement timing-and-quantity decision with
and without pre-season orders. We also determine how supply attributes (e.g., procurement
cost, delay probability, mean delay and delay variability) and market attributes (e.g., pre-
season and in-season order volatilities, order correlations and tardiness cost) influence the firm’s
optimal procurement time and optimal expected cost. This leads to a number of interesting
findings.
We prove that the firm can determine its optimal procurement time before receiving any
pre-season orders but that its optimal procurement quantity will depend on pre-season order
realizations. One might expect that a firm that allows pre-season orders would procure closer
to the selling season to take advantage of increasing demand-forecast accuracy. In fact, we
prove that this is not necessarily true. There are situations in which, all else being equal, a
firm that allows pre-season orders will place its order earlier than a firm allowing only in-season
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orders. We prove that this can only occur if the leadtime is uncertain. We show that a firm
that allows pre-season orders is less sensitive to lead-time variability than is a firm that allows
for in-season orders only. One might also predict that the firm’s expected cost should decrease
as the probability of delay decreases. Such intuition is only partially correct. It is true that
a firm prefers a perfectly reliable leadtime, i.e., a zero probability of delay, to an unreliable
leadtime. However, it is not necessarily true that the firm prefers a leadtime with a lower
delay probability to a leadtime with higher delay probability. We characterize when a marginal
decrease in delay probability benefits the firm and show that whether a firm benefits or not is
largely driven by the variability of the delay distribution.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in §2.2.
Section 2.3 describes the model. In §2.4 we characterize the optimal solution for the model
with no pre-season orders. We consider the model with pre-season orders in §2.5. In §2.6 we
present a comprehensive numeric study. Concluding remarks are presented in §2.8. Proofs are
contained in the appendix.
2.2 Literature
This chapter connects two important streams of literature in supply chain management, namely,
the uncertain-supply and dynamic-forecasting streams. We first review the relevant literature
on uncertain supply and then turn our attention to the dynamic-forecasting literature. In the
end, we briefly discuss the literature on advanced demand information.
Generally speaking, the uncertain-supply literature can be divided into three different but
related categories; supply-disruption models, random-yield models, and stochastic lead-time
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models. The disruption literature typically models a supplier as alternating between up and
down phases, e.g., Meyer et al. (1979), Parlar and Berkin (1991), Gupta (1996), Song and
Zipkin (1996), Arreola-Risa and DeCroix (1998) and Tomlin (2006). Orders placed when the
supplier is up are received on time and in full. No order can be placed when the supplier is
down. The random yield literature considers settings in which the quantity received varies in
a random fashion from the quantity ordered. We refer the reader to Yano and Lee (1995) for
a review of the random-yield literature. We note that the distinction between disruptions and
random yield is less sharp from a manager’s perspective, in that stochastically-proportional
Bernoulli random-yield models are appropriate models for supply failures, e.g., Anupindi and
Akella (1993), Swaminathan and Shanthikumar (1999), Tomlin (2005a,b), and Tomlin and
Wang (2005).
This chapter is in the stochastic lead-time category. Stochastic leadtimes have typically
been studied in a recurring-demand setting rather than in a newsvendor setting. For the
recurring-demand setting, Bagchi et al. (1986) and Song (1994), for example, investigate the
impact of leadtime variability in a single-item inventory model. They focus on quantifying the
impact of leadtime uncertainty on metrics such as the risk of stock out and the optimal cost.
Chu et al. (1994), Mauroy and Wardi (1995), Fujiwara and Sedarage (1997) and Proth et al.
(1997) investigate stochastic leadtimes in a multi-item, recurring-demand context. We refer
readers to Zipkin (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of stochastic leadtimes in the context
of recurring demand.
A question arises in the newsvendor setting that does not arise in the recurring-demand
setting; when should the order be placed? This optimal timing decision has been studied in
the context of a newsvendor that assembles multiple components into a finished product, e.g.,
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Yano (1987), Kumar (1989), Hopp and Spearman (1993), Shore (1995), and Song et al. (2000).
We note that, except for Song et al. (2000), these papers assume deterministic demand. This
chapter is closely related to Song et al. (2000); the primary difference is that we allow for
demand updating (based on pre-season orders) in the context of a single-component product,
whereas, they consider the multi-component problem without pre-season orders or demand
updating. Our focus on a single-component product allows us to characterize the optimal
timing decision with and without pre-season orders. We also introduce the notion of the delay
probability, which refers to the probability of a stochastic delay occurring. This gives us a more
general model of leadtime uncertainty.
We now turn our attention to dynamic forecast (demand) updating. There is a vast litera-
ture on inventory management with forecast updating, but to the best of our knowledge, this
research is the first to consider demand updating in an uncertain-supply setting.
A paper that is particularly relevant to our setting is Fisher and Raman (1996), which
investigates the value of early-order information. In their model, customer orders are placed
in two discrete periods: an early-season period and a primary-season period. Orders not filled
by the second period are subject to a shortage cost. Total demand (early- and primary-season
orders) is correlated with early-season orders. Our model also allows for two phases of orders.
As we will discuss in the model section (§2.3), the demand model of Fisher and Raman (1996)
can be viewed as a special case of our demand model. We note that the intent of our work
differs from that of Fisher and Raman (1996). We focus on the procurement timing-and-
quantity problem under lead-time uncertainty, whereas they focus on the benefit of a second
procurement opportunity in a deterministic-supply setting.
The forecast-updating literature can be broadly classified into three categories. The first
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category is the Markovian forecast revision approach, as developed by Hausman (1969), Heath
and Jackson (1994), and Graves et al. (1998), and recently followed by Gu¨llu¨ (1996), Toktay
and Wein (2001), Chod et al. (2004), Chod and Rudi (2005), and Milner and Kouvelis (2005).
The second category is the statistical and time series approach, which includes Miller (1986),
Lovejoy (1990), Aviv (2003), Kim and Ryan (2003), and references discussed therein. The
last category takes a Bayesian approach, which was developed by Scarf (1959) and Iglehart
(1964), and followed by Azoury and Miller (1984), Azoury (1985), Fisher and Raman (1996),
Eppen and Iyer (1997), and Milner and Kouvelis (2005). This research uses an auto-correlated,
continuous time-series approach, where the forecast of total demand (pre-season and in-season
orders) is updated based on the evolution of pre-season orders.
Kaminsky and Swaminathan (2004) presents a novel forecast-updating approach by con-
structing a forecast upper and lower band which narrows as time passes. A number of game-
theoretic papers, Gurnani and Tang (1999), Ferguson (2003), and Ferguson et al. (2005), in-
vestigate forecast updating in a manufacturer-supplier setting. Their forecast-updating models
do not fit naturally into the above categorization. In essence, they assume a second ordering
opportunity at which time some of the initial forecast uncertainty has been resolved.
Our work is somewhat related to the literature on advanced demand information. One
stream of that literature focuses on the coordination of operations and marketing decisions,
i.e., the optimal ordering quantity and level of price discount, respectively. That stream of
literature includes Weng (1995), Weng and Parlar (1999), and Tang et al. (2004). Another
stream focuses on the operational decision. Hariharan and Zipkin (1995) and Gallego and
O¨zer (2001) focus on the optimality of base stock or (s,S) policies when customer orders do
not require instantaneous fulfilment. Therefore, the firm, effectively, has advanced demand
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information. Using a queuing model, Lu et al. (2003) investigates an assembly system in which
customer orders do not require instantaneous fulfilment.
In closing, we note that while there is an extensive literature on stochastic leadtimes and on
demand updating, to the best of our knowledge no existing paper links these two literatures.
A key contribution of this research is to provide one such link.
2.3 Model
We consider a firm that sells a seasonal product. Both supply and demand for the product is
uncertain. We adopt the convention that 0 is the starting time, the selling season occurs at a
known time T , and that t ≥ 0 measures the distance in time starting from 0. Therefore, T − t
represents the remaining time until the selling season. The problem facing the firm is when to
procure and what quantity to procure. Before formulating the firm’s problem, we describe the
demand model, the supply model and the relevant costs.
2.3.1 Demand
Although the selling season occurs at time T, the firm may allow customers to place pre-season
orders between 0 and T. Total demand is then the sum of pre-season orders and in-season
orders, where in-season orders are those placed at time T.
In modeling the evolution of customer orders, there is the question as to whether the number
of orders at a given point in time should depend on past orders. There is ample evidence in
the marketing and operations literatures, e.g. Bass (1969), Fisher and Raman (1996) and
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Kurawarwala and Matsuo (1996), that customer demand at a given point in time does depend
on past orders. In particular, demand often depends on the cumulative number of customers
who have ordered the product up to that point of time.
We first discuss pre-season orders and then discuss in-season orders. Let x0 > 0 denote the
number of pre-season orders at time 0. We assume that pre-season orders occur continuously
between 0 and T. Let Xt′ denote the cumulative number of pre-season orders placed up to but
not including the instant t. Let Zt denote the instantaneous rate of orders placed at time t.
We assume that, ZtXt′ = ∆t − 1, or equivalently,
Xt
Xt′
= ∆t, where ln∆t is a continuous-time
autoregressive time series of order 1, i.e, ∆t = ∆
φ
t′ξ
1−φ
t , where 0 ≤ φ < 1 is the autocorrelation
parameter and the ξt are iid lognormally distributed with parameter µ and σ. We note that
(Xt,∆t) is a continuous-time Markov processes. The total quantity of pre-season orders just
before the season is XT . In-season orders occur at time T. Let ZI denote the quantity of
in-season orders. Let XD = XT + ZI denote the total demand, i.e., the sum of pre-season and
in-season orders. It is reasonable to assume that the quantity of in-season orders will depend on
the total number of pre-season orders. In other words, in-season demand will depend on how
“hot” the product is. In particular, we assume that, ZIXT = ∆D − 1, or equivalently,
XD
XT
= ∆D,
where ∆D = ∆
φD
T ξ
1−φD
D , 0 ≤ φD < 1 is the between-season correlation parameter, and ξD is
log-normally distributed with parameters µD and σD. We note that setting φ = 0 results in
uncorrelated pre-season orders. Similarly, setting φD = 0 results in the in-season orders being
uncorrelated with pre-season orders.
We note that a two-period discrete-time analog of our model (see Appendix A1.1) would
recover the demand model of Fisher and Raman (1996), with the exception that their demand
is assumed to be bi-variate normal, whereas ours would be bi-variate lognormal. Fisher and
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Raman (1996) note on page 95, however, that “a distribution with fatter tails [than a normal
distribution] ... might be more appropriate”. We note that the lognormal distribution is such
a fat-tailed distribution (Sigman, 1999).
Our formulation implicitly allows customers to cancel previously placed orders. (We note
that Fisher and Raman (1996) also implicitly allow this.) However, if µ > 1, then, in expecta-
tion, the cumulative number of pre-season orders grows over time. In fact, if µ > 1, then the
growth accelerates. However, depending on the relative size of µD to µ, the growth of total
demand may slow at time T (reminiscent of the S curve in demand diffusion models) or further
accelerate.
We use lower case letters, xt and δt, to denote the realizations, at the time t, of the cumu-
lative pre-season order and pre-season order ratio random variables Xt and ∆t. Let ft(·|xt, δt)
denote the conditional pdf of XD, given Xt = xt and ∆t = δt at time t. From the above
description of the pre-season and in-season order evolution, we have (see Appendix A1.1)
ft(x|xt, δt) = 1√
2piψσ(t)x
exp
(
− (lnx− ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)− lnxt)2
2ψσ(t)
)
, (2.1)
where
ψσ(t) =
(
(T − t)− (1− φT−t)( φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
T−t
1 + φ
))
σ2 + (1− φD)2σ2D,
ψµ(t) =
(
(T − t)− (1− φT−t)( φ
1− φ − φD
))
µ+ (1− φD)µD,
ψδ(t) =
(
φDφ
T−t +
φ
1− φ
(
1− φT−t)) ln δt.
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In particular, substituting t = 0, X0 = x0, and ∆0 = δ0 into (2.1), we have
f0(x|x0, δ0) = 1√
2piψσ(0)x
exp
(
− (lnx− ψµ(0)− ψδ(0)− lnx0)2
2ψσ(0)
)
. (2.2)
Equation (2.2) describes, at time 0, the pdf of the firm’s total future demand, i.e., the sum of
pre-season and in-season orders.
2.3.2 Supply
We now describe the supply system. With probability 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 the leadtime is L ≥ 0. With
probability 1− θ the leadtime is L+ω, where ω represents a stochastic, nonnegative delay. For
example, a shipment might get selected for inspection by customs with a probability θ and the
time spent in inspection might be uncertain. Hereafter we refer to L as the standard leadtime,
1− θ as the delay probability, and ω as the delay.
Let G(·) be the distribution function for the delay and g(·) be the density. We assume that
G(·) is continuous and has a real, non-negative domain. Define ωˆ = sup{ω : G(ω) = 1}. Note
ωˆ = ∞ if the domain of G(·) covers R+. We assume that E[ω] is positive and bounded. Our
model collapses to a constant leadtime case when θ = 1.
If the firm orders at time t, the planned leadtime is defined as z = T − L − t. See Figure
2.1. Let z+ = max{z, 0} and z− = max{−z, 0}. Define
A(z) = θz+ + (1− θ)
∫ z+
0
(z+ − ω)g(ω)dω, (2.3)
B(z) = z− + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
z+
(ω − z+)g(ω)dω, (2.4)
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where A(z) and B(z) are expected earliness and tardiness respectively. In other words, A(z)
is the expected duration that the order spends in inventory before the season and B(z) is the
expected duration by which the order is late.
t + L T
Planned leadtime zStandard leadtime L
Starting time 0 Procurement time t
Figure 2.1: Procurement time, leadtime, and planned leadtime illustration.
2.3.3 Costs and Problem Formulation
Let c, h, s, r, and p represent the unit purchasing cost, holding cost, salvage value, revenue,
and tardiness penalty respectively. We assume the same tardiness penalty structure as in Song
et al. (2000), that is, the incurred tardiness cost is linear in the realized delay. The tardiness
penalty might be a tangible cost imposed by customers if the firm sells to corporate customers,
e.g., Wal-Mart levies penalties on firms that do not fill its demand on time. Alternatively, the
tardiness penalty can be viewed as a proxy to represent the fact that the firm might lose some
of its realized demand if its order does not arrive by time 0, i.e., customers might be unwilling
to wait or the firm may have to reduce its price to induce customers to wait.
The firm is allowed to procure only once in the horizon. This differs from Fisher and Raman
(1996) who assume the existence of a second quick-response supplier. Oftentimes, however,
firms that source from emerging economies do not have a contingent domestic supplier that
could provide this type of quick response. The firm’s problem is to determine the procurement
policy that minimizes its expected total cost. A procurement policy specifies, for any pre-season
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order evolution, when to procure and the quantity to procure. The order evolution information
is fully contained in (Xt,∆t) because of the Markov property. If the firm procures at time t,
then the expected cost, conditional on the realized pre-order level and ratio being (xt, δt), is
given by
v(t, xt, δt) = min
y≥0
{
cy + rE[(XD − y)+|xt, δt]− sE[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]
+hA(T − L− t)y + pB(T − L− t)E[XD|xt, δt]
}
, (2.5)
where y is the procurement quantity. Note that (2.5) is a classic newsvendor formulation with
two additional time-based terms that reflect the holding and tardiness costs: the expected
holding cost is hA(T − L − t)y and the expected tardiness cost is pB(T − L − t)E[XD|xt, δt].
It is straightforward to show that (2.5) is equivalent to
v(t, xt, δt) = min
y≥0
{
(hA(T − L− t)− (r − c))y + (r − s)E[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]
+ (r + pB(T − L− t))E[XD|xt, δt]
}
. (2.6)
Let J(x0, δ0) = E[v(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0]. The firm’s problem is to determine the procurement
policy that minimizes J(x0, δ0).
We note that our model is somewhat related to Song et al. (2000), which does not allow for
pre-season orders (or demand updating) nor a leadtime delay probability (i.e., θ = 0 in their
model) but does consider a product with multiple components. Song et al. (2000) investigate a
number of heuristic solutions to the timing-and-quantity problem. The special case of our model
in which there is no pre-season orders and in which θ = 0 is similar to the single-component
case of Song et al. (2000). Note that, as in Song et al. (2000), we ignore discounting so as to
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focus on the primary trade off between supply and demand risks.
2.3.4 Optimum Procurement Quantity
We introduce a useful theorem for the optimal procurement quantity for any given procurement
time t and xt.
Theorem 1. For any given procurement time t and realized cumulative pre-season orders xt
and pre-season order ratio δt, the optimal order quantity is given by
y∗(t, xt, δt) = F−1t
(
r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s
)
, (2.7)
where Ft(·|xt, δt) is the distribution function of XD at time t.
This theorem establishes that, for any given procurement time t, realized cumulative pre-
season orders xt and realized pre-season order ratio δt, the optimal procurement quantity is
given by a newsvendor-type expression with an appropriately defined distribution function.
Note that y∗(t, xt, δt) in (2.7) reduces to the standard newsvendor solution if t ≥ T −L, i.e., if
the firm does not procure until it is within a standard leadtime of the selling season. Hereafter,
for notational convenience we use y∗(t) rather than y∗(t, xt, δt), i.e., we suppress the dependence
on (xt, δt).
We conclude this section by introducing the following assumptions. These are made for
expositional clarity and are assumed to hold throughout the rest of the chapter.
A1 Without loss of generality, we scale x0 = 1 and δ0 = 1.
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A2 We restrict attention to T > L, i.e., the starting point is at least a standard leadtime
before the selling season.
A3 We assume ωˆ > z¯ for h > 0, where z¯ = A−1((r − c)/h) and A(·) is given by (2.3).
We note that we have solved the case in which assumption A2 does not hold, i.e., T ≤ L.
However, this case is quite straightforward (with the optimal solution being to either order
immediately or wait until T .) Assumption A2 allows us to focus on the more interesting case,
i.e., T > L. We note assumption A3 is a very mild one as any distribution with R+ support,
such as normal, lognormal, exponential, gamma, and Weibull, satisfies this condition. Using
Theorem 1, one can establish that y∗(z) = 0 if and only if z ≥ z¯. Thus, z¯ represents the
maximum planned leadtime above which the firm would not order a positive quantity of the
product. If the firm chooses a planned leadtime z ≥ z¯, then this is equivalent to the firm
deciding not to stock/sell the product. In that case, we say the firm does not participate.
2.4 In-season Orders Only
In this section, we consider the special case where the firm does not allow pre-season orders.
This is obtained from our general model by setting µ = σ = 0, i.e, no pre-season orders, and
φD = 0. Therefore, using (2.2), and recalling that (x0, δ0) is scaled to (1, 1) [see Assumption
A3], we obtain
ft(x) = f0(x) =
1
σD
√
2pix
e
−(ln x−µD)2
2σ2
D , (2.8)
which is independent of the time t. Because of this independence, J(x0, δ0) = v(t, x0, δ0).
Therefore, the firm can determine its optimal procurement time and quantity at time 0.
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For presentational clarity, we work directly with the planned leadtime z = T −L− t in this
section (but revert back to the order time t in subsequent sections). Using (2.6), the expected
cost if the firm uses a planned leadtime of z, is
v(z) = (hA(z)− (r − c))y∗(z) + (r − s)E[(y∗(z)−XD)+] + pB(z)E[XD], (2.9)
where, using Theorem 1, y∗(z) = F−10
(
r−c−hA(z)
r−s
)
.
We first briefly discuss the case in which the unit holding cost h = 0 and then focus on the
h > 0 case. Recall that ωˆ = sup{ω : G(ω) = 1}.
Theorem 2. If h = 0, then any planned leadtime z ≥ ωˆ is optimal.
The above theorem says that, when there is no holding cost, the firm orders as early as
possible. This is intuitive because the firm’s uncertainty about XD is independent of the time
t.
We now focus on the h > 0 case. The following theorem restricts the possible range for the
firm’s optimal planned leadtime z∗. Recall that z¯ = A−1((r − c)/h).
Theorem 3. The optimal planned leadtime satisfies 0 ≤ z∗ ≤ z¯.
We can therefore restrict attention to a nonnegative planned leadtime z ≥ 0. The following
theorem proves an important timing-and-level separation result: one can determine the optimal
order time regardless of the expected level of the demand.
Theorem 4. The optimal procurement time t∗ is independent of the expected demand E[XD].
Even equipped with Theorems 3 and 4, characterizing the optimal procurement time t∗
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is not straight forward because (2.9) is in general not unimodal in the planned leadtime z.
For certain classes of the delay distribution function G(·), however, we can exploit structural
properties of (2.9) and characterize the optimal time t. We assume that the delay distribution
satisfies the following condition throughout the rest of this section.
A4 The density of delay distribution is non-increasing, i.e., G′′(·) ≤ 0,
Note that (A4) is a reasonably mild assumption and is satisfied by a number of distributions,
including the uniform, exponential, and certain classes of Weibull and Gamma distributions.
In addition, our numeric studies indicate that our later results in the section hold true when
(A4) is not satisfied.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal planned leadtime.
Theorem 5. (i) If θ = 1, then z∗ = 0. In other words, if the supply is perfectly reliable, then
the optimal planned leadtime is zero. (ii) For θ < 1, define
H(z) = y∗(z)
θ + (1− θ)G(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z)) .
(a) If sup (H(z)) < phE[XD], then the optimal planned leadtime z
∗ = z¯, i.e., the firm does not
participate. (b) If H(0) > phE[XD], then z
∗ = 0. (c) Otherwise, define Z = {z : v′(z) = 0},
then Z = {z1, z2}, 0 ≤ z1 ≤ z2 < z¯, and z∗ = z1. In other words, the objective function v(z)
has exactly two stationary points, and the optimal planned leadtime is the smaller of the two.
Given assumption (A4), Theorem 5, combined with Theorem 1, completely characterizes
the firm’s optimal timing and quantity decisions. Furthermore, it establishes the importance
of the ratio of the tardiness penalty cost to the holding cost. Part (a) of Theorem 5 says
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that if this ratio is very high, then the firm uses a planned leadtime of z∗ = z¯, i.e., it does
not participate. Part (b) says that if this ratio is very low, then the firm uses a zero planned
leadtime, that is, the firm orders a standard leadtime L in advance of the selling season. For
intermediate ratios (part (c)), the firm uses a planned leadtime between these two extremes.
We can use Theorem 5 to investigate how various supply and demand characteristics affect
the firm’s optimal planned leadtime z∗. For example, it follows directly from Theorems 1 and
5 that a firm chooses a planned leadtime of zero, i.e., z∗ = 0, if
F−10
(
r − c
r − s
)
>
(
1− θ
θ
)(p
h
)
E[XD].
This condition implies that, as one would expect, a firm is more likely to set a zero planned
leadtime if the unit holding cost h is large, the unit tardiness penalty cost p is small, and the
delay probability 1− θ is low.
In the following analysis, we first focus on the sensitivity of the firm’s timing decision and
then discuss the firm’s optimal expected cost.
Theorem 6. Consider case (c) of Theorem 5, i.e., the interior case where the firm’s optimal
procurement time is not dominated by either the tardiness penalty cost or the holding cost, and
so 0 < z∗ < z¯. (a) ∂z
∗
∂p ≥ 0. (b) ∂z
∗
∂c ≥ 0. (c) ∂z
∗
∂s ≤ 0. (d) ∂z
∗
∂r ≤ 0. (e) ∂z
∗
∂L = 0.
The above theorem tells us that the firm procures earlier as the tardiness penalty cost p or
the purchasing cost c increases. On the other hand, the firm procures later, i.e., closer to the
selling season, as the salvage value s or the unit revenue r increases. Because z∗ is independent
of L, the standard leadtime L has no impact on the optimal planned leadtime. We will show in
the next section that the standard leadtime can affect the planned leadtime when pre-season
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orders are allowed.
Intuitively, one might expect that as the holding cost h increases, the firm would order
closer to the season so as to reduce the expected duration over which inventory is held. While
we are unable to establish this analytically, our numeric studies indicate that this intuition is
indeed correct.
We now turn our attention to the firm’s optimal expected cost. The following theorem
proves that the optimal expected cost is increasing in the unit cost c, in the holding cost h,
and in the penalty cost p; is decreasing in the unit revenue r and in the salvage value s; and is
independent of the standard leadtime L. These directional results are quite intuitive.
Theorem 7. (a) ∂v(z
∗)
∂c ≥ 0. (b) ∂v(z
∗)
∂h ≥ 0. (c) ∂v(z
∗)
∂p ≥ 0. (d) ∂v(z
∗)
∂r ≤ 0. (e) ∂v(z
∗)
∂s ≤ 0. (f)
∂v(z∗)
∂L = 0.
The directional effect of the delay probability, however, is more nuanced. The following
theorem proves that a firm always (at least weakly) prefers a perfectly reliable leadtime, i.e.,
θ = 1, to an unreliable leadtime, i.e., θ < 1.
Theorem 8. Everything else being equal, the optimal expected cost for θ = 1 is never higher
than the expected cost for θ < 1, i.e., v(z∗|θ = 1) ≤ v(z′|θ < 1), where z∗ and z′ represent the
optimal planned leadtime with θ = 1 and θ < 1 respectively.
While the firm always prefers a perfectly-reliable leadtime, a marginal decrease in the delay
probability does not always benefit the firm: the firm’s optimal expected cost v(z∗) is not
necessarily increasing in the delay probability 1 − θ. The following theorem proves that the
firm’s optimal expected cost can, in fact, decrease in the delay probability.
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Theorem 9. Assume XD = 1 with probability 1. The optimal expected cost v(z∗) is strictly
increasing in the delay probability, i.e., 1− θ, if G(·) satisfies
KE[ω]− (1−K)G−1[K] ≤
∫ G−1[K]
0
ωg(ω)dω, (2.10)
where K = pp+h . Otherwise v(z
∗) is a convex function of the delay probability, initially decreas-
ing and then increasing in the delay probability.
Note that (2.10) always holds if G ∼ exp(·) but never holds if G ∼ U(0, b), unless h = 0.
For the deterministic demand case, Theorem 9 states that a moderate decrease in the delay
probability can increase the firm’s overall cost. While surprising, this result can be explained
as follows. A decrease in the delay probability reduces the mean leadtime and this benefits
the firm. However, a decrease in the delay probability can increase the leadtime variance and
this hurts the firm. In fact, one can show that the leadtime variance increases in the delay
probability if and only if the delay coefficient of variation (CV ) is greater than or equal to
√
1− 2θ. Therefore, a decrease in the delay probability benefits the firm if the delay CV is
high but may not benefit the firm if the delay CV is low.
We note that there are other possible definitions of leadtime reliability, for example, the
delay CV , the leadtime CV , and the probability of the leadtime being less than a certain
threshold (PLT). For certain problem instances, the PLT measure largely depends on the
delay probability. As such, one can create instances in which the firm’s optimal expected cost
increases as the PLT lead-time reliability measure improves. The directional effects of the delay
CV and the leadtime CV are discussed in §2.6.2.
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2.5 Pre-season and In-season Orders
In this section, we consider the general model in which the firm allows both pre-season and
in-season orders. Supply uncertainty motivates the firm to procure earlier so as to reduce its
expected tardiness penalty. As mentioned in the introduction, firms that allow pre-season orders
might wish to delay their procurement order so as to take advantage of increasing accuracy
of the forecast for total demand. Recall that xt and δt are the realized cumulative pre-season
order and pre-season order ratio at time t ≥ 0, and σ is the underlying volatility of pre-season
orders.
For a given procurement time t, the optimal procurement quantity is given by Theorem 1.
Using (2.1), then y∗(t) is given by
ln y∗(t)− lnxt − ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)√
2ψσ(t)
= erf−1
(
2
r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s − 1
)
, (2.11)
where erf(·) is the standard error function. Using (2.11), the firm’s expected cost in (2.6) can
be simplified (see Lemma A3) to
v(t, xt, δt) = xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
·(
r + pB(T − L− t)− 1
2
(r − s)
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
)))
. (2.12)
where
k(t) = erf−1
(
2
r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s − 1
)
.
Using (2.12), we first establish an important property of the optimal procurement policy.
Theorem 10. t∗ is independent of the pre-season order evolution (Xt,∆t).
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We have now characterized the structure of the optimal procurement policy: (i) the optimal
time is independent1 of the pre-season order evolution (Xt,∆t), and (ii) the optimal quantity
depends on the pre-season order evolution and is given by (2.7). This result has an important
managerial implication: the firm can determine its optimal procurement time in advance but
it must wait until that time to determine its procurement quantity. The fact that the firm can
determine its procurement time in advance is very beneficial from a planning perspective.
Using Theorem 10, we can then state the firm’s problem as mint J(x0, δ0) where, as before,
J(x0, δ0) = E[v(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0]. We denote the optimal expected cost as J∗(x0, δ0). Before
characterizing the optimal procurement time, we first explore how the firms’ optimal cost is
influenced by order volatility and by the mix of pre-season to in-season orders.
Theorem 11. (a) J∗(x0, δ0) is non-decreasing in the pre-season order volatility σ. (b) J∗(x0, δ0)
is non-decreasing in the in-season order volatility σD.
The above theorem states that the firm’s optimal expected cost increases in the pre-season
order volatility σ as well as the in-season order volatility σD, because a higher order volatility
reflects a higher degree of demand uncertainty.
The following theorem characterizes how pre-season orders affect the firm’s optimal expected
cost.
Theorem 12. Let µN and σN denote the parameters for the initial forecast, i.e., at time 0, of
the total demand. If σµ =
σD
µD
, then define the demand-mix parameter λ, as the unique solution
1This independence result relies on the fact that the firm procures the optimal quantity y∗(t) as given by
(2.7). We note that y∗(t) does depend on the pre-season order realization (xt, δt).
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to
(
T − (1− φT )
(
φ
1− φ − φD
))
µ = λµN ,(
T − (1− φT )
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
T
1 + φ
))
σ2 = λσ2N ,
(1− φD)µD = (1− λ)µN , (1− φD)2σ2D = (1− λ)σ2N . (2.13)
Then, v∗(t, xt, δt) is non-increasing in λ.
We first note that λ reflects the relative magnitude of pre-season to in-season orders. At
λ = 0, there are no pre-season orders (which is studied as a special case in §2.4); at λ = 1, there
are no in-season orders; and at 0 < λ < 1, there are both pre-season and in-season orders. The
above theorem tells us that the firm’s optimal expected cost decreases as the fraction of pre-
season orders increases. The reason is that pre-season orders allow the firm to more accurately
estimate the total season demand. As time progresses, a firm without pre-season orders, i.e.,
λ = 0, retains the same demand forecast. In contrast, the forecast uncertainty reduces over
time for a firm with pre-season orders. (In the case of λ = 1, there is no demand uncertainty
by time T .)
Theorem 13. Define
M(t) =
2p
r − sB(T − L− t)− erf
(
k(t)−
√
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
. (2.14)
The optimal procurement time t∗ = argminM(t).
The above theorem establishes that the optimal procurement time can be found simply
by searching over the M(t) function for the minimum point. We note that M(t) is in gen-
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eral not well behaved and can assume very complex shapes. The following theorem partially
characterizes the optimal procurement time.
Theorem 14. If φ = φD = 0, then (i) The firm’s optimal procurement time t∗ < T − L if
B(0)−B(T −L) > r−sp , i.e., the firm uses a strictly positive planned leadtime. (ii) For x > 0,
define
Λ(x) = Φ
(√
x+
1√
x
)
,
where Φ denote the standard normal cdf. If (a) (T−L)σ2+σ2D ≤ 1 and r−cr−s ≤ Λ
(
(T − L)σ2 + σ2D
)
,
or (b) (T − L)σ2 + σ2D > 1, σ2D ≤ 1 and r−cr−s ≤ Λ(1), or (c) σ2D > 1 and r−cr−s ≤ Λ
(
σ2D
)
, then
t∗ > T − L⇒ t∗ = T . In other words, if it is not optimal to procure by time T − L, then it is
optimal for the firm not to procure until time T .
Corollary 1. (a) If φ = φD = 0 and r−cr−s < Φ (2), then t
∗ > T − L ⇒ t∗ = T . (b) It can be
optimal for the firm to use a negative planned leadtime.
Part (i) of the above theorem states that, as one would expect, the firm procures early in
the planning horizon if the tardiness cost p is large relative to the marginal revenue r− s. Part
(ii) of the above theorem and Corollary 1 establish that, under very mild conditions, the firm
does not procure between T − L and T . If procurement at T − L is better than procuring
earlier, then the firm either procures at T −L, i.e., uses a planned leadtime of 0, or procures at
T , i.e., uses a planned leadtime of −L. This is in sharp contrast with the case of no pre-season
orders, in which the firm always uses a non-negative planned leadtime. We note that r−cr−s is
the classic newsvendor critical fractile. Therefore, this result holds as long as the salvage s is
not extremely high relative to the procurement cost c.
To further characterize the optimal procurement time, we make the following additional
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assumptions for Theorem 15, 16, and Corollary 2.
A5 The delay distribution function G(·) is uniform.
A6 η′′(t) is monotonic in t, where η(t) = erf (k(t)− ρ(t)) and ρ(t) =
√
1
2ψσ(t).
We note that sets of sufficient conditions that guarantee η′′(·) to be monotonic increasing or
monotonic decreasing are given by Lemma A5 in the appendix. We found that the set of
sufficient conditions readily hold for reasonable parameter values, and that η′′(t) is very often
monotonic even if the sufficient conditions do not hold. As the unit holding cost h increases,
η′′(·) changes from being monotonically increasing to monotonically decreasing. However, there
can exist an intermediate range of h for which η′′(·) is not monotonic.
The following theorems characterize potential optimal procurement times.
Theorem 15. If η′′(·) is monotonically increasing, then the optimal procurement time t∗ ∈
{T, tˆ}, where
(i) η′′(T − L) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)g(0)⇒ tˆ ∈ {0, T − L}.
(ii) If η′′(0) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)g(0), then
(a) η′(0) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T − L))⇒ tˆ = 0.
(b) η′(T − L) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)⇒ tˆ = T − L.
(c) Otherwise, tˆ = te, where te is the unique solution to η′(te) = 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T −
L− te)).
(iii) Otherwise,
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(a) η′(ts) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T − L− ts))⇒ tˆ = T − L.
(b) η′(0) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)⇒ tˆ ∈ {0, T − L}.
(c) Otherwise, tˆ ∈ {te2, T − L}, where te2 is the unique solution to η′(te2) = 2pr−s(1 −
θ)(1−G(T −L− te2)) in the region [0, ts], where ts is the unique solution to η′′(ts) =
2p
r−s(1− θ)g(T − L− ts).
The following theorem considers the alternative case where η′′(·) is monotonically decreas-
ing.
Theorem 16. If η′′(·) is monotonically decreasing, then the optimal procurement time t∗ ∈
{T, tˆ}, where
(i) η′′(T − L) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)g(0)⇒ tˆ ∈ {0, T − L}.
(ii) If η′′(0) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)g(T − L), then
(a) η′(0) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T − L))⇒ tˆ = 0.
(b) η′(T − L) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)⇒ tˆ = T − L.
(c) Otherwise, tˆ = te, where te is the unique solution to η′(te) = 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T −
L− te)).
(iii) Otherwise,
(a) η′(ts) ≤ 2pr−s(1− θ)(1−G(T − L− ts))⇒ tˆ = 0.
(b) η′(T − L) ≥ 2pr−s(1− θ)⇒ tˆ ∈ {0, T − L}.
(c) Otherwise, tˆ ∈ {0, te2}, where te2 > ts is the unique solution to η′(te2) = 2pr−s(1 −
θ)(1−G(T − L− te2)) in region [ts, T − L], where ts is defined in Theorem 15.
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Theorem 15 and 16 establish potential candidates for the optimal order time: 0, te, te2, or
T −L. They also specify the conditions for which each can be optimal. One can therefore solve
for the optimal order time very efficiently.
Corollary 2. Let t∗ denote the optimal procurement time. Suppose the firm has not procured
by time t > t∗.
(i) If η′′(t) is monotonically increasing, then it is optimal to procure immediately at time t if
and only if v(t, xt) < max{E[v(T−L,XT−L)|xt], E[v(T,XT )|xt]}. Otherwise it is optimal
to procure either at time T − L or time T .
(ii) If η′′(t) is monotonically decreasing, then it is optimal to procure immediately at time t
if and only if v(t, xt) ≤ E[v(T,XT )|xt]. Otherwise it is optimal to procure at time T .
Corollary 2 establishes that, depending on the system parameter values, knowing the fact
that the firm should have made the procurement decision at time t∗ does not necessarily imply
the firm should procure immediately at time t > t∗.
Intuitively, one might expect that given the same starting demand forecast, the optimal
procurement time with pre-season orders would be later than that without pre-season orders,
because pre-season orders enable the firm to reduce its demand risk by delaying its procurement.
This intuition, however, is not true in general. When the unit purchasing cost is low, a firm
with pre-season orders may in fact procure earlier than a firm without pre-season orders.
Theorem 17. For identical initial forecasts of total demand, let t∗P and t
∗
N denote the optimal
order time with and without pre-season orders, respectively. (a) If supply is perfectly reliable,
i.e., θ = 1, then t∗P ≥ t∗N . (b) If there is no holding cost, i.e., h = 0, then t∗P ≥ t∗N . (c) If
supply is unreliable, i.e., θ < 1, and h > 0, then t∗P can be smaller than t
∗
N .
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In the case of deterministic leadtime, therefore, the intuition is correct. A firm that allows
pre-season orders will procure later than a firm that does not. However, in a stochastic-leadtime
setting, the firm with pre-season orders may procure earlier than the no pre-season order firm.
The reason lies in the interplay of the demand and supply risk. Starting with the same total
demand forecast, the pre-season ordering firm’s demand risk, i.e., demand uncertainty, reduces
over time. For certain cost parameters, a lower demand variance results in a lower procurement
quantity for a given procurement time. A lower order quantity reduces the earliness component
of the supply risk, i.e., the inventory-related cost of an early arrival is decreasing in the order
size. Because of this, it can be optimal under certain circumstances for the pre-season ordering
firm to procure earlier than the no pre-season order firm.
Although we can use the Implicit Function Theorem to analytically sign the directional
effect of certain system parameters on the firm’s optimal timing decision, e.g., ∂t
∗
∂p ≤ 0, the
directional effect for most parameters is analytically ambiguous. We investigate the optimal
timing sensitivity in the numeric study in §2.6.2.
2.6 Numeric Study
The goal of our numeric study is fourfold: (1) to investigate the directional effects of the demand
and supply characteristics on the optimal procurement time and optimal expected cost; (2) to
investigate the value of pre-season orders; (3) to investigate the value of forecast updating; and,
(4) to explore the performance of simple heuristics (see Appendix A1.2).
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2.6.1 Study Design
In our model, the supply system is characterized by the standard leadtime L, the delay proba-
bility 1−θ, and the delay distribution G(·). We refer to the expectation, variance and coefficient
of variation of G(·) as the mean delay, the delay variance, and the delay CV respectively. In
this numeric study, we assume that G(·) has a Weibull distribution, with a shape parameter α
and scale parameter β. A higher value of α is associated with a lower delay CV .
One goal of our numeric study is to investigate the value of pre-season orders, i.e., to
evaluate the optimal expected cost as the mix of pre-season to in-season orders changes. To
ensure a fair comparison, we hold the initial forecast of total demand constant as the mix λ
changes (see Theorem 12.) The initial total-demand forecast is parameterized by µN and σN .
Recall that the forecast is lognormally distributed. Therefore, the mean and CV of the initial
forecast are eµN+0.5σ
2
N and
√
eσ
2
N − 1 respectively. We then set the pre-season and in-season
parameters (µ, σ) and (µD, σD) according to (2.13).
We now specify the base case scenario used for our numeric study. We set T = 6, which
should be interpreted as six months. The revenue, cost and leadtime parameters were set as
follows: the unit revenue r = 3, the unit cost c = 1, the unit salvage value s = .05, the unit
tardiness penalty cost p = 0.3, the unit holding cost h = 0.02, the standard leadtime L = 2,
the delay probability 1 − θ = 0.25, the mean delay equal to 1 and the delay variance equal
to 1. We set the demand-mix parameter λ = 0.2 (See Theorem 12). The initial forecast, i.e.,
at t = 0, of the total demand had an expected value of 100 and a CV of 0.8. Given T = 6,
this equates to µN = 4.358 and σ2N = 0.495 for the no pre-season order case and µ = 0.145,
σ2 = 0.016, µD = 3.486, and σ2D = 0.396 for the partial pre-season order case. We set the
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pre-season autocorrelation parameter φ = 0.05 and the between-season correlation parameter
φD = 0.05.
2.6.2 Directional Effects
In §2.4 and §2.5, we established a number of theoretical results for the directional effects (on
the optimal procurement time and expected cost) of many of the system parameters. In this
section, we investigate the robustness2 of these earlier results and also explore the directional
effects of some parameters, e.g., the delay CV , not considered earlier. Given the Weibull
assumption in our numeric study, the delay distribution is completely characterized by the
mean delay and the delay CV .
To explore the directional effect of a given parameter, we solved a set of problem instances
in which the parameter of interest was changed but all other parameters remained constant at
the base-case values specified earlier. We then repeated this exercise by setting r = 1.5 or 20,
h = 0.01 or 0.04, and λ = 0 or 0.8 for eight different combinations. This gave additional eight
sets of parameter values in addition to the base case. The numeric observations were consistent
with all of the analytical results established earlier (see Theorems 6, 7, 11, and 12), indicating
that our theoretical results are indeed robust. Table 2.1 summarizes the directional effects of the
various model parameters on the optimal procurement time and associated optimal expected
cost.
2When analytically characterizing the optimal procurement time, we, at times, assumed that the delay
distribution satisfied G′′(·) ≤ 0 (for both the pre-season order and no pre-season order cases) and that η′′(·)
was monotonic (for certain results in the pre-season order case). Both of these assumptions are relaxed in our
numeric study.
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Optimal order time t∗ Optimal expected cost
Parameters No PSO With PSO No PSO With PSO
Unit cost c D I or D I I
Holding cost h I I I I
Penalty cost p D D I I
Salvage value s I I or D D D
Unit revenue r I I D D
Standard leadtime L D D C I
Delay probability 1− θ I I I or D I or D
Delay mean D D I I
Delay CV I or D I or D I I
Autocorrelation φ C I or D C D
Correlation φD C I or D C I
Demand CV I or D I or D I I
Table 2.1: Sensitivity of the optimal order time t∗ and expected cost (I = increasing, D =
decreasing, C = constant, PSO = pre-season order).
Optimal Procurement Time. Our analytical results regarding the optimal procurement time
did not characterize the effect of the mean delay, the delay CV , the leadtime CV , the initial
variance of demand forecast, the pre-season order volatility, or the correlation parameters φ
and φD. We now discuss these effects.
• Mean delay: As one would expect, the optimal procurement time is decreasing in the
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mean delay, i.e., the firm orders earlier as the mean delay increases.
• Delay CV and leadtime CV : We first note that one can prove that an increase in the
delay CV increases the leadtime CV . We therefore focus our discussion on the delay
CV , with the understanding that the same observations hold for the leadtime CV . The
effect of the delay CV is not straightforward. We observed the optimal procurement time
to be increasing or decreasing in the delay CV , with it typically being decreasing for a
low CV and increasing for a high CV . At a high delay CV , a marginal increase in the
delay CV serves to increase the already-high probability of the delay being small, and
this allows the firm to further postpone procurement, i.e., the optimal procurement time
increases. At a low delay CV , the probability of a small delay is low and the probability
of a moderate or large delay is high. A marginal increase in the CV , while increasing
the probability of a small delay, also increases the probability of a large delay, and this
large-delay effect appears to dominate, with the result that the firm orders earlier.
• Initial variance of demand forecast: We observed the optimal procurement time to be
increasing or decreasing in the initial forecast variance. For reasonable cost and revenue
parameters, the critical fractile for the order quantity is to the right of the demand distri-
bution’s mode, and so an increase in the demand variance results in a larger procurement
quantity (for the same procurement time.) A larger quantity increases the expected earli-
ness cost of inventory, with the result that an increase in the demand variance causes the
firm to delay its order, i.e., the order time increases. If the product’s per-unit revenue is
low relative to the purchase cost, then the critical fractile for the procurement quantity
can be to the left of the demand’s mode and the reverse effect occurs.
• Pre-season order volatility: We observed the optimal procurement time for a firm that
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allows pre-season orders to be, typically, increasing in the pre-season order volatility.
That is, the firm procures closer to the selling season as the pre-season order volatility
increases. While this is intuitive, the result did not always hold, and we observed cases
where the order time decreased in the volatility. We believe that this can occur because
the shape of the distribution is also affected by the pre-season order volatility, and this
shape effect can also play a role through the order-quantity fractile.
• Pre-season correlation parameter φ. We observed the optimal procurement time to be
increasing in φ for very large values of φ. In other words, when pre-season orders are
highly correlated, the firm orders closer to the season. As φ becomes smaller, i.e., pre-
season orders are less and less correlated, the firm orders earlier.
• Between-season correlation parameter φD: As φD decreases, the optimal procurement
time typically increased. The reason is as follows. As in-season orders become less
correlated with pre-season orders, the total demand becomes less predictable. The firm
must wait closer to the selling season if it wants a more accurate estimation of the total
season demand.
Optimal Expected Cost. With regard to optimal expected cost, we focus our discussion on
six parameters of particular interest, the leadtime delay probability 1 − θ, the leadtime CV ,
the delay CV , the standard leadtime L, and the correlation parameters φ and φD.
• leadtime delay probability: In §2.4, we established that, while a firm prefers a perfectly
reliable leadtime to an unreliable leadtime, the firm does not necessarily benefit from a
marginal decrease in the delay probability. In fact, the firm’s optimal expected cost can
decrease in the leadtime delay probability. We provided a characterization for when this
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can occur in the case of deterministic demand. Our numeric investigation revealed that
even in the case of stochastic demand and/or pre-season orders, the firm’s optimal ex-
pected cost can decrease in the leadtime delay probability. Furthermore, the investigation
showed that our earlier observation regarding the delay distribution remains valid, that
is, a decrease in the delay probability benefits the firm if the delay CV is greater than or
equal to 1 but can hurt the firm if the delay CV is less than 1. As we discussed previously,
this effect is linked to the overall leadtime variability. At a high delay CV , a decrease in
the leadtime delay probability decreases the leadtime variability, but at a low delay CV ,
a decrease in the leadtime delay probability can increase the leadtime variability.
• Delay CV (leadtime CV ): In contrast to the effect of the delay probability, the optimal
expected cost was increasing in the delay CV , regardless of whether or not the firm
utilizes pre-season orders. We note, however, that as the fraction of pre-season orders
increases, the optimal expected cost becomes less sensitive to the delay CV . This is
further discussed in §2.6.3.
• Standard leadtime: In §2.4, we proved that the optimal expected cost was independent
of the standard leadtime L in the no pre-season order case. This is not true in pre-season
order case. With pre-season orders, a reduction in the standard leadtime allows the firm
to order later, i.e., when its demand forecast is more accurate. The forecast variance
is concave increasing in the distance from the selling season. We observed the optimal
expected cost to be concave increasing in the standard leadtime. Therefore, when pre-
season orders are allowed, leadtime reduction efforts becomes increasingly valuable as the
standard leadtime decreases.
• Correlation parameters φ and φD. The optimal expected cost was decreasing in φ. The
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reason is that the more correlated pre-season orders are, the more information early orders
contain about total demand. We observed the magnitude of φD on the optimal expected
cost to be very small in our problem instances.
2.6.3 Value of Pre-season Orders
We now turn our attention to the value of pre-season orders, that is, we investigate the difference
in the optimal expected cost as the mix between pre-season and in-season orders changes. In
particular, we investigate how the value of pre-season orders is influenced by supply, product,
and market characteristics. We explored this question using the following study design. We
varied the mix of pre-season orders versus in-season orders, i.e., the demand-mix parameter λ,
from 0 to 1 using a step size of 0.5. In addition, we varied the correlation parameters φ and φD
from 0 to 0.5 using a step size of 0.25. We varied the mean delay from 1 to 3 using a step size
of 1, the delay CV from 0.2 to 1.8 using a step size of 0.4, and the leadtime delay probability
1 − θ from 0.0 to 1.0 using a step size of 0.25 . We varied the product’s unit profit margin
by varying the unit purchasing cost c from 0.5 to 2.5 using a step size of 0.5. We varied the
demand CV from 0.4 to 2 using a step size of 0.4. We conducted a full factorial study with
16,875 instances.
On average, the cost with only pre-season orders, i.e., λ = 1, and partial pre-season orders,
i.e., λ = 0.5, was 9.90% and 3.09% lower than the cost with no pre-season orders, respectively.
The maximum cost reduction was 39.97% and 16.72% respectively. A detailed review of the
data revealed the following observations. As one might expect, the value of pre-season orders
(i.e., the relative cost reduction) was increasing in the pre-season order volatility. The value was
also increasing in the delay CV , but decreasing in the leadtime delay probability and the mean
42
delay. As the leadtime delay probability decreases, the firm can better afford to order later
and this increases the value of pre-season orders. In contrast, as the mean delay increases, the
firm needs to order earlier and this reduces the value. The value of pre-season orders increases
in the delay CV primarily because, while the cost without pre-season orders increases in the
delay CV , the cost with pre-season orders is quite insensitive to the delay CV .
To further investigate the value of pre-season orders, we conducted an additional study in
which we varied the pre-season to in-season mix parameter λ from 0 to 1, keeping all other
parameters at the base case setting. See Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal expected cost as a function of the demand-mix parameter λ.
As expected, we observed that as the demand mix shifts towards pre-season orders, the
optimal expected cost decreases because the firm has less uncertainty about the final demand.
Two further observations are noteworthy. (1) The optimal expected cost decreases more rapidly
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as the demand mix becomes more weighted towards pre-season orders. Thus, a marginal
increase in the relative fraction of pre-season orders has a larger benefit if the mix is already
dominated by pre-season orders. (2) The optimal expected cost becomes less sensitive to the
leadtime CV as the demand mix shifts towards pre-season orders. Therefore, a firm with a
demand mix dominated by pre-season orders is more robust to variability in the lead-time
delay.
2.6.4 Value of Forecast Updating
Pre-season orders enable the firm to update its forecast of the total demand as time progresses.
How beneficial is it for the firm to avail of this pre-season order information? To answer
this question, we compare the expected cost of two different identical-parameter firms facing
identical pre-season and in-season order processes. One firm (U) updates its forecast based on
the pre-season order evolution while the other firm (N) does not, i.e., N retains the same total-
demand forecast over time. Both the updating firm (U) and the non-updating firm (N) start
at time 0 with identical forecasts of total demand, i.e., they have the same initial probability
density function for the total demand. Firm U follows the optimal procurement policy (time
and quantity) for a firm that updates its forecast over time, whereas firm N follows the optimal
procurement policy for a firm that retains a static demand forecast. Firm N will have a higher
expected cost than firm U because firm N’s policy does not take advantage of the information
contained in the pre-order stream. We measure the value of forecast updating as the relative
difference in expected cost between N and U.
We conducted a numeric study in which we varied the pre-season to in-season mix parameter
λ from 0 to 1 and the correlation parameters φ and φD from 0.1 to 0.9, keeping all other
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parameters at the base case setting as described in §2.6.1. For each instance of λ and (φ, φD),
we evaluated the expected cost for firms U and N. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relative difference
in expected cost between firms N and U, i.e., the relative cost increase for not updating the
demand forecast. The cost of not updating can be very significant. The cost increases as the
demand mix shifts towards pre-season orders. This is to be expected. The more pre-season
orders dominate total demand, the more information about total demand is contained in the
pre-season order stream. Therefore, there is a larger cost to not availing of this information. The
cost of not updating also increases in the correlation parameters φ and φD. This is because
pre-season orders contain more information about the future as the correlation parameters
increase.
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Figure 2.3: Relative cost increase for not updating the demand forecast.
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2.7 Extensions - An Alternative Model of Tardiness Penalty
Cost
Throughout this chapter, we have adopted the penalty cost function similar to that in Song
et al. (2000), where the penalty cost depends on the expected demand. One may argue, however,
that the tardiness penalty cost should depend on the minimum of the expected demand and
the firm’s procurement quantity. After all, why the firm should be held liable for the tardiness
penalty cost when it is not the firm’s intention to satisfy all the demand? A key argument from
this point of view is that the lost sales as represented by the unit revenue already captures
the penalty from not satisfying all the demand. While it is debatable whether the firm should
bear the tardiness penalty cost for unsatisfied demand, we nevertheless explore whether the
alternative model of the tardiness penalty cost will substantially change the insight from this
chapter, namely, the separability of the optimal timing decision. In what follows, we prove
that the main result of the chapter still holds with the alternative model. Needless to say, the
optimal procurement time as well as the optimal procurement quantity will depart from our
original model, but these deviations are of secondary concern because they can be computed
easily given the main result still holds.
We can rewrite the firm’s expected cost function under the alternative tardiness penalty
cost model. If the firm procures at time t, then the expected cost, conditional on the realized
pre-order level and ratio being (xt, δt), is given by
v(t, xt, δt) = min
y≥0
{
cy + rE[(XD − y)+|xt, δt]− sE[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]
+hA(T − L− t)y + pB(T − L− t)E[min{XD, y}|xt, δt]
}
, (2.15)
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where y is the procurement quantity. Note that the last term of (2.15) is different from that
of (2.5). From (2.15), we have
v(t, xt, δt) = min
y≥0
{
cy + rE[(XD − y)+|xt, δt]− sE[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]
+ hA(T − L− t)y + pB(T − L− t)E[XD − (XD − y)+|xt, δt]
}
= min
y≥0
{
cy + (r − pB(T − L− t))E[(XD − y)+|xt, δt]− sE[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]
+ hA(T − L− t)y + pB(T − L− t)E[XD|xt, δt]
}
.
Simplifying, we have
v(t, xt, δt) = min
y≥0
{
− (r − pB(T − L− t)− c)y + (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)E[(y −XD)+|xt, δt]+
(r − pB(T − L− t))E[XD|xt, δt] + hA(T − L− t)y + pB(T − L− t)E[XD|xt, δt]
}
= min
y≥0
{
(hA(T − L− t)− (r − pB(T − L− t)− c))y+
(r − pB(T − L− t)− s)E[(y −XD)+|xt, δt] + rE[XD|xt, δt]
}
= min
y≥0
{
(hA(T − L− t) + pB(T − L− t)− (r − c))y+
(r − pB(T − L− t)− s)E[(y −XD)+|xt, δt] + rE[XD|xt, δt]
}
. (2.16)
The following theorem characterize the firm’s optimal procurement quantity for any given
procurement time t and realize xt and δt.
Theorem 18. For any given procurement time t and realized cumulative pre-season orders xt
and pre-season order ratio δt, the optimal order quantity is given by
y∗(t, xt, δt) = F−1t
(
r − c− hA(T − L− t)− pB(T − L− t)
r − s− pB(T − L− t)
)
, (2.17)
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where Ft(·|xt, δt) is the distribution function of XD at time t.
Note that under the alternative tardiness penalty cost model, the optimal procurement
quantity explicitly depends on both the earliness and tardiness cost, whereas the optimal pro-
curement quantity explicitly depends only on the earliness cost. Clearly, with this alternative
model, the optimal procurement quantity is, every thing else being equal, less than that under
our original model.
We next prove that the separability result still holds in this case. From (2.16), we have
v(t, xt, δt) = (hA(T − L− t) + pB(T − L− t)− (r − c))y∗(t)+
(r − pB(T − L− t)− s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
(y∗(t)− ξ)ft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ + rxt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + 12ψσ(t)).
We can simplify the above equation as follows.
v(t, xt, δt) = (hA(T − L− t) + pB(T − L− t)− (r − c))y∗(t) + rxt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + 12ψσ(t))
+ (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)y∗(t)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
− (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
= (hA(T − L− t) + pB(T − L− t)− (r − c))y∗(t) + rxt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + 12ψσ(t))
+ (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)y∗(t)r − c− hA(T − L− t)− pB(T − L− t)
r − s− pB(T − L− t)
− (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
= rxt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t))
− (r − pB(T − L− t)− s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ.
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But we know
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ = 12xt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t))
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)
2
))
.
Substitute the above equation into the previous equation, we have
v(t, xt, δt) = xt exp(ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t))·(
r − 1
2
(r − s− pB(T − L− t))
)(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)
2
))
.
Clearly, the separation result still holds, although the optimal procurement time function is
slightly different. Therefore, whether the penalty cost depends only on the expected demand
or the minimum of the expected demand and the procurement quantity do not affect the
fundamental insight for this chapter.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigate a key trade-off that will be faced by an increasing number of
firms as more goods are sourced from distant suppliers. In particular, we study the optimal
timing-and-quantity problem for a newsvendor-type firm facing supply and demand risk. The
supply risk, i.e., leadtime uncertainty, motivates the supplier to order earlier. In contrast, the
opportunity to reduce its demand risk through pre-season orders motivates the firm to order
later. We study this timing-and-quantity problem in a quite general setting and establish a
number of interesting technical and managerial results.
We prove an important timing-and-level separation result. In the no pre-season order case,
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the optimal procurement time is independent of the expected demand. In the pre-season order
case, the optimal procurement time is independent of the realization of pre-season orders (but
the optimal quantity is not.) We characterize the optimal procurement time and quantity
in both cases and analytically establish the directional effect of many important supply and
market attributes. While, one might expect that, all else being equal, a firm with pre-season
orders would procure closer to the selling season (to take advantage of increasing demand-
forecast accuracy) than would a firm without pre-season orders, this is not necessarily true.
We prove that this intuition is correct in the case of a deterministic leadtime. However, in a
stochastic-leadtime setting, the firm with pre-season orders may procure earlier than the no
pre-season order firm. The reason lies in the interplay of the demand and supply risk. One
might also expect that a firm should benefit from a decrease in the leadtime delay probability,
that is, the firm’s expected cost should decrease as the probability of delay decreases. We
prove that this intuition is only partially correct. While the firm prefers a perfectly reliable
leadtime to an unreliable leadtime, it does not necessarily prefer a leadtime with lower delay
probability to a leadtime with higher delay probability. In fact it may strictly prefer a leadtime
with higher delay probability. We prove that the firm’s optimal expected cost decreases as the
demand mix shifts towards pre-season orders. We show that the marginal value of pre-season
orders increases as the demand-mix shifts from in- to pre-season orders. That is, the firm
realizes increasingly significant cost savings as it encourages more pre-season orders. We show
that pre-season orders makes the firm less sensitive to the variance of the leadtime delay.
The research in this chapter can be expanded in several directions. The most immediate
extension is the incorporation of the supplier leadtime information updating. As the firm
updates its demand, it is also possible for the firm to learn about the supplier’s leadtime over
time. Such additional information on the supplier leadtime uncertainty may also affect the
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firm’s decision process. Another interesting direction for extension is the interaction between
the firm and its customers. As the firm encourages its customers to place pre-season orders,
the customers may not necessarily be truth telling in the order size. In other words, if the
customers anticipate a potential shortage of the product, they may inflate their orders, which
will dilute the firm’s ability to learn the real demand from its pre-season orders. In addition,
it is also interesting to investigate how the potential price fluctuation affects the firm’s optimal
timing decision. Finally, one may explore the situation when the firm has multiple procurement
opportunities. It is of interest to understand, for example, whether multiple procurement
opportunities will affect the firm’s optimal procurement decisions.
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Chapter 3
Capacity Risk
3.1 Introduction
Global sourcing has created unprecedented opportunities for firms to reduce procurement cost
by sourcing from developing economies. At the same time, however, increased competition and
heightened complexity of the global supply chain network present significant challenges for firms
to maintain competitive advantage. Among many different challenges of managing a complex
global supply chain, ensuring a consistent and stable supply network is one of the top challenges
facing many firms. A recent survey by McKinsey indicates that “Executives believe they face
growing risks from disruption to their supply chains - yet many are unprepared to manage those
risks.” (McKinsey Quarterly. Global survey of business executives. 2006.) In fact, reliability of
suppliers is ranked in the survey as one of the top three supply chain risks facing firms across
the globe. Many factors can influence the reliability of a particular supplier, but one important
common factor that influences supplier reliability is the supplier’s operational capability.
As mentioned in the introduction, many suppliers in developing economies have less stable
operational capabilities due to reasons such as energy and raw material shortages, less efficient
infrastructure, and less developed technologies. Less stable operational capabilities can often
lead to uncertainty in production/delivery quantities. Oftentimes, significant uncertainty in
production/delivery quantities can have a detrimental effect on the firm’s performance, which
can offset any cost savings the firm may have achieved through global sourcing in the first
place. In this research, we explore potential strategies that the firm can use to mitigate the ad-
verse effect of uncertain production quantities associated with global sourcing due to suppliers’
operational capability.
One common strategy that firms use to mitigate supply related risk is to diversify the
supplier base. While a large supplier base can help the firm to mitigate its supply risk, such
an arrangement introduces significant complexities to managing the supplier base, especially
in a global setting. In addition, the practice of having a large supplier base can be at odds
with the lean and agile supply chain structure. On the other hand, having a single supplier
generally puts the firm under significant risk exposure due to supply uncertainty. Therefore, as
a compromise, many firms adopt a dual sourcing strategy to mitigate their supply risk. Much
industry evidence suggests, however, that dual sourcing does not have to be the only strategy
for firms to mitigate supply uncertainty.
As firms become increasingly dependent on key suppliers in their supply chain, many firms
start to adopt the practice of supplier relationship management (SRM) (Sako, 2004). SRM
practice allows the firm to better communicate with suppliers and therefore can significantly
reduce procurement cost and improve product availability. For a more detailed discussion
of supplier relationship management, see Krause et al. (1998) and the references mentioned
therein. Early SRM practice emphasized the communication and monitoring activities between
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the firm and suppliers, such as establishing shared information exchange platforms and efficient
monitoring systems in terms of inventory level, production rate, and sales forecast. Recent
evidence suggests that firms are making strategic decisions to assist their suppliers to achieve
better supply chain performance. The following quote is from the Toyota’s supplier support
website1.
Toyota is committed to helping our suppliers ... . We dispatch experts to work with
suppliers who ask for assistance in devising and implementing necessary improve-
ments.
Similarly, Valeo, one of the largest auto parts suppliers, “helps suppliers to make progress”
as one of the four key strategic priorities2. “We are developing a continuous improvement
approach with our suppliers in order to meet world-class standards of competitiveness and
quality.”
Recently, many firms have started to consider monitoring and helping suppliers to be a
key risk mitigation strategy. United Technologies, one of the largest manufacturers of a wide
range of industrial and commercial products, for example, adopts supplier insight strategy to
mitigate its supply risk.
UTC’s lean experts also guided the supplier through several opportunities for new
efficiencies in manufacturing, order processing and logistics. ... Within a year of
UTC’s intervention, the supplier ... experienced vastly improved quality and on-
time delivery performance.
1http://www.toyotasupplier.com/sup guide/sup compete.asp.
2http://www.valeo.com/automotive-supplier/Jahia/pid/1113.
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Through the supplier monitoring and supporting initiative, UTC gained three key advantages:
cost reductions, effective deployment of resources and risk mitigation (GLSCS, 2005). This
trend is also echoed by Agarwal (2006), who notes that “Many companies today are leveraging
their supply base. ... They seek to help their suppliers implement Six Sigma quality efforts.”
Clearly, helping a supplier to improve its process capabilities can be a cost effective alternative
to mitigate supply risk. In fact, “When firms can procure from proven alliances [suppliers] they
conduct single sourcing as much as possible” (Agarwal, 2006).
Therefore, besides using dual sourcing to mitigate supply uncertainty, the firm may adopt
an alternative approach by improving the suppliers’ reliability. We note that the firm may
not necessarily limit itself to procuring from the supplier where it has made process improve-
ment efforts. There are four canonical structures that the firm can use to mitigate its supply
uncertainty. See Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Four mitigation structures under supply uncertainty
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Note that the top left structure is the classical dual-sourcing approach to mitigate supply
risk. In this case, there is no improvement effort involved and the firm simply diversifies
its supply uncertainty. On the other hand, the top righthand structure is the improvement
strategy where the firm makes an improvement effort first and then procures from this particular
supplier. The bottom two structures are extensions of the basic improvement strategy. The
bottom left structure extends the basic improvement strategy by considering the option of dual
sourcing after improvement effort. Clearly, this strategy dominates both classical dual-sourcing
strategy and the basic improvement strategy. The bottom right structure is the most general
structure. In fact, all the other three structures can be seen as special cases of this general
structure. It is important to recognize that our focus is on short term improvement efforts and
therefore we do not consider the time lag of the improvement decision. In essence, we assume
that the time for the improvement effort is sufficiently short as compared with production time.
The classical dual-sourcing strategy implicitly treats suppliers’ reliability as exogenous. The
above mentioned evidence indicates, however, that suppliers’ reliability need not be exogenous.
A firm could make investment in its suppliers to improve their process reliability. The opera-
tional improvement strategy can be an effective alternative to mitigate the supply uncertainty.
A key focus of this research is to contrast the diversification (dual-sourcing) versus improve-
ment strategies. In particular, we seek to understand under what circumstances one strategy
is preferred to the other, and which supplier the firm prefers to make the improvement effort.
We also seek to understand how the opportunity for an improvement effort alters the firm’s
optimal procurement strategy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the relevant literature. In
§3.3, we describe the model setup. Section 3.4 and 3.5 establish the optimality structure of the
56
diversification strategy and improvement strategy, respectively. We contrast the diversification
and improvement strategy in §3.6. Section 3.7 discusses various extensions to the model, and
§3.9 provides concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Literature
Our research extends the diversification literature by relaxing the implicit assumption that
supplier reliability is exogenous. From this perspective, our research is related to the supplier
development as well as the process improvement literature, although our focus is quite different
from the main thrust of either the supplier development or the process improvement literature.
In what follows, we discuss the diversification literature first and then briefly discuss the supplier
development and process improvement literature.
The relevant diversification literature studies the firm’s optimal procurement problem when
suppliers are unreliable. The reliability of suppliers has been modeled in three contexts: random
capacity (Ciarallo et al., 1994; Erdem, 1999), random yield (Gerchak and Parlar, 1990; Parlar
and Wang, 1993; Anupindi and Akella, 1993; Agrawal and Nahmias, 1997; Swaminathan and
Shanthikumar, 1999), and random disruption (Parlar and Perry, 1996; Gu¨rler and Parlar, 1997;
Tomlin, 2006). Note that Dada et al. (2007) investigate a more general construct of supplier
unreliability, where the random capacity and random yield models can be viewed as special
cases of the general reliability construct. All these papers, however, treat supplier reliability as
exogenous and therefore the improvement strategy is not relevant.
A central contribution of our research is that by relaxing the exogenous assumption for
supplier reliability, we provide insights into the relative attractiveness of diversification versus
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improvement strategy. In addition, our model of supplier reliability allows us to explicitly
consider the supplier capacity constraint, which is an important aspect in the context of global
sourcing where supplier capacity is often limited and scarce. Note that in the context of random
capacity, the firm’s procurement problem is in general not concave (convex) in the procurement
quantity. The current literature establishes that the firm’s procurement problem is unimodal
in procurement quantity when there is a single supplier. Ours is the first study to establish the
joint-unimodality property in situations where there are two suppliers and their capacities are
explicitly constrained.
There is a large stream of literature on supplier development, most of which is concerned
with inter-organizational cooperation between the buyer and the suppliers. A detailed discus-
sion of the relevant literature can be found in the literature survey in Krause et al. (1998).
Note that most of the above literature consists of case-studies or empirical based research, in-
vestigating the relative benefits and trade-offs of various supplier relationship programs. This
literature establishes a concrete basis for viability of the supplier development program. Our
research builds upon this literature, but our focus lies in the relative attractiveness of supplier
improvement to the diversification strategy when suppliers are unreliable.
Our research is also somewhat related to the process improvement literature. Process im-
provement in normative analysis has been studied in terms of cost improvement (Fine, 1986;
Fine and Porteus, 1989; Li and Rajagopalan, 1998) and effective capacity improvement (Spence
and Porteus, 1987; Carrillo and Gaimon, 2000, 2004). A detailed review of the process improve-
ment literature can be found in Carrillo and Gaimon (2002). Note that the above literature
investigates the trade-off between unit cost reduction or effective capacity improvement and
process improvement efforts. These papers focus on the relative effectiveness of particular pro-
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cess improvement efforts or a particular policy for process improvement efforts. This research
treats process improvement as a viable option for firms to mitigate supply uncertainty, and we
focus on the relative attractiveness of the diversification versus the improvement strategy. Ours
is the first study to bridge the gap between the diversification and the process improvement
literature.
3.3 Model
We study a firm that needs to procure a single product from unreliable suppliers to satisfy
a future stochastic demand. Suppliers are unreliable in their realized capacity because of
various operational disruptions, which can be attributed to less efficient process management
or insufficient technical expertise. Demand is uncertain when the firm makes its procurement
decision. Therefore, the firm faces both supply and demand uncertainty when deciding the
procurement quantity. To mitigate such supply uncertainty, a firm may procure from multiple
sources, i.e., diversify across suppliers.
With the diversification strategy, the firm’s decision is to determine the optimal procurement
quantity from each unreliable supplier. With the improvement strategy, the firm’s decision is to
determine 1) with which supplier to invest in process improvement, 2) the amount of investment
efforts, and 3) the optimal procurement quantity. In what follows, we first describe the supplier
model and then describe the firm’s procurement problem. Note that we use y˜ to signify that
y is a random variable and ~y to signify that y is a (random) vector. In addition, we adopt the
notation y+ = max(0, y). We use ∇x to denote the partial derivative with respect to x.
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3.3.1 Supplier Model
3.3.1.1 Capacity and Reliability
Suppliers can differ in their capacity and reliability. Let Ki denote the supplier i’s total ca-
pacity. The supplier i’s total capacity Ki can be unreliable due to various disruptions in the
production process. Let S˜i denote the total capacity loss due to process disruptions; then the
supplier i’s effective capacity is given by
(
Ki − S˜i
)+
. We assume that S˜i is a non-negative
random variable, which depends on the supplier i’s process capabilities, such as competence in
production technology and process management. Now, let ui denote the supplier i’s process
capabilities; then the distribution function of S˜i can be expressed by Gi(·) = G(·, ui), with
the density function gi(·) = g(·, ui). Note that ui can be viewed as a composite process capa-
bility index, where a higher value is associated with a more competent process capability. If
two suppliers have different capability indices, e.g., ui > uj , then S˜i ≤st S˜j , i.e., supplier i is
stochastically more reliable than supplier j. To explicitly express the dependence of S˜i on ui,
we define S˜i = S˜(ui).
3.3.1.2 Capability Improvement
Oftentimes, the firm may have the opportunity to improve the supplier i’s process capability
by investment and/or knowledge transfer. To have a firm grasp on the concept of process
improvement, it is important to consider various dimensions of process improvement.
Naturally, one may consider that a process is improved if the random shock / capacity loss
is reduced. Therefore, one may be tempted to consider that either a reduction in the mean or
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variance is an improvement. It is, however, questionable whether such measurement is indeed
coherent. For example, if the variance of a random shock is reduced but the mean is kept at the
same level, do we consider the process improved? The answer is in general considered no, and
at the least this is not appealing. This is because before the “improvement,” the process may
incur a small or large capacity loss, but after the “improvement” the process is guaranteed to
have a medium level of capacity loss. This resulting phenomenon should hardly be considered
as an improvement. On the other hand, a reduction in the mean of the capacity loss is almost
always considered good, because in expectation the capacity loss is reduced. A reduction in
mean, however, is in general accompanied by a reduction in variance. It is in fact difficult to
conjecture a situation where the mean is reduced but the variance is kept at the same level.
A parsimonious approach to model the process improvement is to use the concept of stochas-
tic dominance. One variable is stochastically dominated by another variable if the first variable
is less random then the second variable. The appeal of this approach lies in the fact that it
allows us to model a variety of different concepts of process improvement. For example, if the
stochastic loss is exponentially distributed, then the stochastic dominance improvement implies
that both the mean and the variance are improved, which is a very natural and appealing feature
in process improvement. On the other hand, if the stochastic loss is normally distributed (trun-
cated), then the stochastic dominance improvement implies that the mean (approximately) is
reduced, which also at least agrees with our common perception of improvement. In fact, the
stochastic dominance approach allows us to model a large family of distributions, which makes
our model very general and yet appealing in a variety of different scenarios.
Let ui(0) represent the supplier i’s current process capability and let ui(z) represent the
process capability after z ≥ 0 units of improvement efforts. We assume that the resulting
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capability after improvement, ui(z), is a function of ui(0) and z, i.e.,
ui(z) = h (ui(0), z) , (3.1)
where h(·) satisfies the following conditions:
T1. h(ui(0), 0) = ui(0),
T2. ∇zh (ui(0), z) ≥ 0,
T3. ∇zzh (ui(0), z) ≤ 0.
Note that the above conditions are readily satisfied by many functions. For example, h(ui(0), zi) =
ui(0)(1 +
√
zi), or h(ui(0), zi) = ui(0) +
√
zi, or h(ui(0), zi) = ui(0) + ln(1 + zi), h(ui(0), zi) =
ui(0)(1+ ln(1+ zi)). Note that the above three conditions guarantee that the resulting process
capability is non-decreasing in improvement efforts and the marginal return on improvement
efforts is non-increasing. These conditions are consistent with the existing process improvement
literature.
The process improvement effort may not always be successful and hence the outcome of
the process improvement may not be certain. We therefore assume that with probability θ,
the improvement effort is successful and with probability 1− θ, the improvement effort is not
successful. It follows that
ui(z) =

h (ui(0), z) , w.p. θ;
ui(0), w.p. 1− θ.
(3.2)
Let m denote the unit cost of the process improvement efforts; then, given the firm having
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committed z unit of improvement efforts, the total improvement cost incurred is m · z. Note
that although the total improvement cost is linear in the process improvement efforts, the
cost is non-linear in the capability improvements because of conditions T1 - T3. In fact, these
conditions imply that the improvement cost is convex increasing in the capability improvements.
3.3.1.3 State Space
It is convenient to think of ~u(0) = (u1(0), u2(0), . . .) as the initial state space of the supplier
system. The firm’s process improvement effort can be viewed as an attempt to alter the initial
state space of the system. For a given supplier i and z units of improvement efforts, we
have S˜(ui(z)) ≤st S˜(ui(0)). Equivalently, we have G(x, ui(z)) ≥ Gi(x, ui(0)) for any x. It
follows immediately that E
[
S˜(ui(z))
]
≤ E
[
S˜(ui(0))
]
, that is, process improvement leads to,
in expectation, a larger effective capacity. Recall that we define S˜i = S˜(ui(·)). When there is
no ambiguity, we at times suppress the state variable ui(·) and simply write S˜i.
3.3.2 Procurement Cost
Let yi denote the order quantity placed with supplier i. The delivered quantity y˜i is limited by
the minimum of the order quantity and the supplier’s effective capacity, i.e., y˜i = min{yi, (Ki−
S˜i)+}. Note that y˜i implicitly depends on the firm’s operational capability level ui(·) and may be
strictly less than the order quantity yi. The firm therefore faces a supplier-specific procurement
risk, i.e., the probability of not receiving its full ordered quantity from a particular supplier.
The supplier-specific procurement risk may be partially offset by paying the supplier only
for the quantity delivered. Oftentimes, however, the firm incurs some procurement cost even
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if a fraction of the order is not delivered because of the significant cost incurred with the
procurement process. Such a situation arises frequently in global sourcing, when the suppliers’
production capability may be unreliable and the shipping and custom clearance processes are
costly. Therefore, the firm’s procurement cost will in general depend on the ordered quantity
yi and the delivered quantity y˜i.
Let ci denote the unit procurement cost associated with supplier i. Then the firm pays
a fraction 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1 of the unit procurement cost for the ordered quantity, and a fraction
(1− ηi) for the delivered quantity. It follows that the firm’s total procurement cost associated
with supplier i is given by
C˜(yi) = (ηiyi + (1− ηi)y˜i) ci. (3.3)
Note that if ηi = 0, then the procurement risk is transferred to the supplier. Consequently,
the cost of the procurement risk associated with any undelivered quantity is fully born by the
supplier. On the other hand, if ηi = 1, then the procurement risk stays with the firm. For
0 < ηi < 1, the procurement risk is shared between the supplier and the firm. We note that even
at ηi = 0, the firm may still have incentive to mitigate its procurement risk through alternative
sourcing strategies. The firm may find it desirable to minimize any undelivered quantity to
maximize its expected profit. Note that here we do not explore the contracting/negotiation
issue between the firm and the supplier. We therefore treat ηi as exogenous for a given supplier
i.
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3.3.3 Problem Formulation
When making the procurement decision, the firm faces a stochastic future demand D˜, of which
we denote the distribution and the density function as F (·) and f(·), respectively. Let r, v,
and p represent the product’s unit revenue, salvage value and penalty cost, respectively. The
firm’s decision problem is to decide, given the supplier’s process capability, the procurement
quantity from each supplier so as to maximize the total expected profit.
3.3.3.1 Diversification
The firm may choose to source from different suppliers to mitigate its procurement risk. For any
given procurement quantity ~y = (y1, y2, . . .) and supplier process capability ~u = (u1, u2, . . .),
the firm’s profit function is given by
p˜i(~y, ~u) = −
∑
k
C˜(yk) + rmin
{
D˜,
∑
k
y˜k
}
+ v
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
− p
(
D˜ −
∑
k
y˜k
)+
, (3.4)
where C˜(·) is given by (3.3). Note that y˜k, the delivered quantity, depends on the process
capability uk.
Define ψk :=
−ηkck
r+p−v and φk :=
r+p−(1−ηk)ck
r+p−v ; then (3.4) can be simplified (see Lemma A9)
into a more compact form.
p˜i(~y, ~u) = (r + p− v)
(∑
k
ψkyk +
∑
k
φky˜k −
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+)
− pD˜. (3.5)
Note that the terms (r + p − v) and pD˜ in (3.5) do not affect the optimization problem. For
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simplicity, we scale p = 0 and r + p− v = 1 such that
p˜i(~y, ~u) =
∑
k
ψkyk +
∑
k
φky˜k −
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
.
Therefore, the firm’s expected profit function is
pi(~y, ~u) =
∑
k
ψkyk + E~S
[∑
k
φky˜k
]
− E~S,D
[(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+]
. (3.6)
For a given supplier process capability vector ~u, the firm’s decision problem is to find an optimal
procurement quantity vector ~y to maximize (3.6), i.e.,
pi∗(~u) = max
~y≥0
pi(~y, ~u). (3.7)
3.3.4 Process Improvement
The firm may make investment to improve a supplier i’s process capability from ui(0) to ui(z)
with z ≥ 0 units of efforts. After the realization of the supplier’s process capability, the firm
decides the procurement quantity from each supplier. Therefore, the firm’s problem can be
formulated as a two-stage stochastic program.
In the second stage, after the realization of the state space vector ~u(z), the firm decides
the optimal procurement quantity from each supplier. This second-stage decision problem is
identical to (3.7), but optimized over a different state space vector.
In the first stage, the firm chooses the amount of process improvement effort ~z to maximize
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the objective function
g(~z, ~u(0)) = max
~z≥0
{
−m
∑
k
zk + Eθ˜ [pi
∗ (~u(~z))]
}
. (3.8)
Note that the optimization in (3.8) is over all different suppliers, i.e., the firm needs to decide
among all suppliers how much process improvement effort to invest in.
3.4 Diversification Strategy With Two Suppliers
In this section, we characterize the structure of the firm’s optimal procurement policy for
any given supplier state ~u = (u1, u2). Many structural results in this section also provide
important building blocks for characterizing the process improvement policy. In what follows,
we first derive the necessary conditions for the optimal ordering quantity (y1, y2). We then
show that the objective function is submodular in (y1, y2), which makes it difficult to obtain a
global optimum procurement quantity (y1, y2). Nevertheless, we prove that the expected profit
function is jointly unimodal in y1 and y2, such that the optimal solution can be efficiently
obtained.
3.4.1 The Optimum Procurement Quantity
Using (3.6), we have
∇yipi(~y, ~u) = ψi + φiE~S
[
∂y˜i
∂yi
]
− E~S
[
∂y˜i
∂yi
F
(
2∑
k=1
y˜k
)]
. (3.9)
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Recall that the delivered quantity y˜i = min{yi,Ki − S˜i}. It then follows that
∂y˜i
∂yi
=

1, Ki − S˜i ≥ yi;
0, Ki − S˜i < yi.
(3.10)
Substitute (3.10) into (3.9), we have
∇yipi(~y, ~u) = ψi + φiGi(Ki − yi, ui)− E~S
∫ Ki−yi
0
F
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dGi(si, ui)

= ψi +Gi(Ki − yi, ui)
φi − E~S
F
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 . (3.11)
Using (3.11), we have
∇yiyipi(~y, ~u) =− gi(Ki − yi, ui)
φi − E~S
F
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k

−Gi(Ki − yi, ui)E~S
f
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 , (3.12)
and
∇yiyjpi(~y, ~u) = −Gi(Ki − yi, ui)Gj(Kj − yj , uj)E~S
f
yi + yj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k

= −Gi(Ki − yi, ui)Gj(Kj − yj , uj)f (yi + yj) . (3.13)
Note that (3.11) indicates that the optimal ordering quantity from supplier i is not separable
from the ordering quantity from supplier j. In addition to this non-separability problem, the
following lemma further proves that the expected profit function is submodular in y1 and y2.
Lemma 1. The firm’s expected profit function (3.6) is submodular in y1 and y2. That is, for
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any given i 6= j, ∇yipi(~y, ~u)−∇yjpi(~y, ~u) is decreasing in yi and is increasing in yj.
The above lemma tells us that, everything else being equal, an increase in the procurement
quantity from supplier i will result in a decrease in the optimal procurement quantity from
supplier j. The firm’s expected profit function, therefore, is in general not jointly concave in
the procurement quantity yi and yj . The following lemma demonstrates, however, that the
expected profit function is component-wise unimodal in the procurement quantity yi.
Lemma 2. The firm’s expected profit function (3.6) is component-wise unimodal in the pro-
curement quantity yi. That is, for any given i, ∇yiyipi(~y) < 0 if ∇yipi(~y) = 0.
The component-wise unimodality property helps to obtain the optimal procurement quan-
tity from supplier i - given that the procurement quantity from the other supplier has been de-
termined. In what follows, we shall establish that the above result can be further strengthened,
which allows us to obtain global optimum conditions for the procurement quantity problem.
Theorem 19. (a) There exists a unique vector ~y = (y1, y2) such that ∇yipi(~y, ~u) ≤ 0 and
yi∇yipi(~y, ~u) = 0 for i = 1, 2. (b) This unique vector ~y maximizes pi(·, ~u).
Theorem 19 proves that the firm’s expected profit function is jointly unimodal in the pro-
curement quantity y1 and y2. This guarantees that the first order condition is sufficient to
ensure a global optimum solution. If follows from Theorem 19 that the optimal procurement
quantity satisfies
ψ1 +G1(K1 − y1, u1)
(
φ1 − ES˜2 [F (y1 + y˜2)]
)
= 0,
ψ2 +G2(K2 − y2, u2)
(
φ2 − ES˜1 [F (y2 + y˜1)]
)
= 0. (3.14)
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3.4.2 The Distribution of Procurement Risk
Recall that even if the firm can shift the procurement risk to its suppliers by paying only for
what is delivered, the firm may still have incentive to further mitigate its procurement risk by
sourcing from multiple suppliers. Such is the case when there is economic incentive to utilize,
for example, a cheaper supplier. Note that the procurement risk is composed of two important
components: the cost risk and the variance risk. The cost risk is captured by the fraction of
the procurement cost incurred for non-delivered quantity. The variance risk is the reduction
in the expected profit caused by the uncertainty in the delivered quantity. A natural question
arises as to how these two distinct aspects of procurement risk are distributed across suppliers.
Note that in (3.14), the procurement risk is interrelated with the demand risk. It is therefore
difficult to directly compare the procurement risk distributed between the two suppliers. To
elucidate the balance of the procurement risk across different suppliers, we remove the demand
risk by assuming a deterministic demand. Note that we relax this assumption and explore the
more general case in §3.7.1 . For notational clarity, we suppress the state space vector ~u in the
distribution function G(·).
When the demand is deterministic, denoted as D, the optimality condition (3.14) can be
simplified as follows. If y1 + y2 ≤ D, then we have
(r − (1− η1)c1)G1(K1 − y1) = c2 − c1 + (r − (1− η2)c2)G2(K2 − y2), (3.15)
where G(·) = 1−G(·). Note that Gi(Ki−yi) is the probability that the firm will not get the last
unit from supplier i. In other words, the Gi(Ki− yi) function measures the firm’s procurement
risk exposure from supplier i. The left hand side of (3.15) therefore measures the underage cost
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of not being able to get the last unit from supplier 1. Similarly, the right hand side measures
the underage cost from supplier 2, adjusted by the unit cost differential between supplier 1 and
2. Note that if c1 = c2 and η1 = η2, then the firm’s procurement risk is equally split between
the two suppliers. On the other hand, if c1 6= c2 and/or η1 6= η2, then the firm faces a higher
level of procurement risk from the cheaper supplier. However, as the procurement cost risk,
i.e., η, increases, the firm’s procurement risk becomes increasingly balanced between the two
suppliers.
Now if y1 + y2 > D, then we have
G2(K2 − (D − y1)) = r − c1 (1 + η1H1)[r − v] ,
G1(K1 − (D − y2)) = r − c2 (1 + η2H2)[r − v] ,
where Hi =
Gi(Ki−yi)
Gi(Ki−yi) , i.e., Hi measures the odds that the supplier i will not fully deliver the
ordered quantity. Note that the above equations collapse to the standard newsvendor result
when ηi = 0. For example, with probability G2(K2− (D−y1)), supplier 2 is sufficiently reliable
such that the last unit from supplier 1 incurs an overage cost of (c1 − v). On the other hand,
with probability 1 − G2(K2 − (D − y1)), supplier 2 is unreliable such that the order quantity
from supplier 1 incurs an underage cost of (r − c1). Combine the above equations, we have
[r − v]G1(K1 − (D − y2)) = c2 (1 + η2H2)− c1 (1 + η1H1) + [r − v]G2(K2 − (D − y1)),
(3.16)
Note that the distribution of procurement risk is balanced by both the underage and overage
cost in (3.16), while the distribution of procurement risk is only balanced by the underage
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cost in (3.15). This is intuitive because there are possibilities of both overage and underage
in (3.16), whereas there is no possibility of overage in (3.15). Consistent with (3.15), the firm
faces a higher procurement risk exposure from the cheaper supplier. In addition, an increase
in the procurement cost risk η makes the procurement risk more equally balanced between the
two suppliers.
3.4.2.1 The Case of Pure Procurement Risk
When η1 = η2 = 0, the firm pays only for what is delivered. In this section, we assume that,
without loss of generality, φ1G1(K1) ≥ φ2G2(K2). Recall that we assume that demand is
deterministic and we denote demand as D.
Theorem 20. Assume φ1G1(K1) ≥ φ2G2(K2). If η1 = η2 = 0, then (a) The optimal procure-
ment quantity satisfies y∗1 < D, y∗2 < D, and y∗1 + y∗2 ≥ min{D,K1 + K2}. (b) The optimal
procurement strategy is as follows.
• Single source exact D from supplier 1, i.e., y∗1 = D and y∗2 = 0, if D ∈ ω1;
• Dual source exact D, i.e., y∗1 > 0, y∗2 > 0, and y∗1 + y∗2 = D, if D ∈ ω2;
• Dual source more than D, i.e., y∗1 > 0, y∗2 > 0, and y∗1 + y∗2 > D, if D ∈ ω3;
• Dual source more than D, utilize 100% of one supplier, e.g., 0 < y∗1 < K1, y∗2 = K2, and
y∗1 + y∗2 > D, if D ∈ ω4;
• Dual source more than D and utilize 100% of both suppliers, i.e., y∗1 = K1 and y∗2 = K2,
and y∗1 + y∗2 ≥ D if D ∈ ω5,
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• Dual source less than D and utilize 100% of both suppliers, i.e., y∗1 = K1 and y∗2 = K2,
and y∗1 + y∗2 < D if D ∈ ω6,
where ωi, i = 1, . . . , 6, defines the demand space:
ω1 : 0 ≤ D ≤ K1 −G−11
(
r − c2
r − c1G2(K2)
)
,
ω2 : K1 −G−11
(
r − c2
r − c1G2(K2)
)
< D ≤ K1 +K2 −
(
G−11 (r − c2) +G−12 (r − c1)
)
,
ω3 : K1 +K2 −
(
G−11 (r − c2) +G−12 (r − c1)
)
< D ≤ K1 +K2 −min(G−11 (r − c2) , G−12 (r − c1))
ω4 : K1 +K2 −min(G−11 (r − c2) , G−12 (r − c1)) < D ≤ K1 +K2 −max(G−11 (r − c2) , G−12 (r − c1)),
ω5 : K1 +K2 −max(G−11 (r − c2) , G−12 (r − c1)) < D ≤ K1 +K2,
ω6 : D > K1 +K2.
Note that not all demand regions will exist for all parameter values. For example, if the
two suppliers are identical, then ω1 will not exist. The above theorem tells us that the firm’s
procurement risk mitigation strategy is intimately related to the supplier’s effective capacity
relative to the magnitude of the demand. When the supplier’s effective capacity is very high
relative to the demand, then the firm will not use any procurement risk mitigation strategy.
The firm simply single sources from the most attractive supplier - the lower cost one if both
suppliers have identical process reliability. As the demand increases, the firm will first switch
to a dual sourcing strategy. Note that as long as the demand is not too high, the firm’s
total procurement quantity will not change, whether it single sources or dual sources. The
risk pooling benefit of dual sourcing is sufficient to mitigate the potential procurement risk.
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As demand becomes sufficiently high, however, the firm not only uses dual sourcing, but also
procures more than the total demand. In this case, the firm needs both dual sourcing and
quantity hedge to help mitigate the supply risk. As demand continues to increase, then the
firm becomes constrained by the supplier’s effective capacity, which makes quantity hedge less
viable. In the extreme case of very large demand, the firm fully utilizes both suppliers’ capacity.
Note that in contrast to sourcing from multiple suppliers, when the firm sources only from
one supplier, then the firm will never source more than D when the demand is deterministic.
In fact, the firm always sources exact D with a single supplier, and may source less than D
when η > 0, i.e., when there is cost risk.
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3.5 Improvement Strategy
Recall that the supplier i’s operational capability is captured by the state variable ui. The firm
may be able to improve the supplier’s process capability by making investment and/or knowl-
edge transfer. Note that the firm’s second stage problem is a special case of the diversification
strategy. In what follows, we consider the firm’s investment problem with a single supplier. An
extension of the investment problem with multiple suppliers is discussed in §3.7.2.
By (3.8),
g(z, u(0)) = max
z≥0
{−mz + Eθ˜ [pi∗ (u(z))]}
= max
z≥0
{−mz + θpi∗ (u(z)) + (1− θ)pi∗ (u(0))} . (3.17)
Instead of optimizing (3.17) over investment effort z directly, it is convenient to work with the
desired level of u(z). Given u(0) and u(z), the amount of improvement effort, z, can be derived
by (3.1),
z = h−1(u(z), u(0)). (3.18)
We can therefore rewrite (3.17) as
g(u(z), u(0)) = max
u(z)≥u(0)
{−mh−1 (u(z), u(0)) + θpi∗ (u(z)) + (1− θ)pi∗ (u(0))} . (3.19)
The following theorem proves that an improvement in the supplier’s process capability will
increase the firm’s procurement quantity from the supplier.
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Lemma 3. The optimal procurement quantity is non-decreasing in the supplier’s process capa-
bility, i.e., given u(z) ≥ u(0), y∗(u(z)) ≥ y∗(u(0)).
Note that the above result holds even if there are multiple suppliers. This lemma tells
us that, everything else being equal, the firm will procure more from the supplier with a
higher process capability. The following lemma further proves that the firm’s expected profit
is increasing in the supplier’s process capability.
Lemma 4. For any given supplier, the firm’s optimal expected revenue is non-decreasing in
the supplier’s process capability.
Note that Lemma 4 is a very general result, which holds with multiple suppliers and general
process capability distributions.
Theorem 21. If the supplier’s marginal reliability improvement is non-increasing in the process
capability, i.e., ∂
2Gi(·,u)
∂u2
≤ 0, then the firm’s optimal profit is a concave function of the supplier’s
process capability u(z), i.e., ∂
2g(u(z),u(0))
∂u(z)2
≤ 0. Furthermore, the firm’s optimal improvement
effort z∗ satisfies
θ
∫ K
K−y∗
(
(φ− F (K − s)) ∂G(s, u(z
∗))
∂u(z∗)
)
ds =
m
h′(u(0), z∗)
. (3.20)
The above theorem establishes that the firm’s expected revenue function is well behaved in
terms of the process improvement efforts.
Corollary 3. The firm’s optimal improvement effort is (a) decreasing in the improvement
cost m, (b) increasing in the improvement success probability θ, (c) decreasing in the unit
procurement cost c, (d) increasing in the unit revenue r, and (e) decreasing in the existing
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capacity K if ∂g(·,u)∂u > 0 and non-decreasing in the existing capacity otherwise.
If the improvement is more likely to succeed then the firm is more likely to engage in more
improvement efforts. When the unit procurement cost is higher, however, the firm is more
likely to reduce its improvement efforts.
3.5.1 Improvement Selection
When the firm has the opportunity to choose with which supplier to make improvement efforts,
it is desirable to understand which supplier the firm should engage. In what follows, we consider
the case where there are two suppliers, but the firm decides to use only one of the suppliers.
Lemma 5. Suppose there are two suppliers which are identical in every aspect except for one
parameter value. If the firm has an opportunity to invest in one supplier, then the firm will
choose to invest in the supplier which the firm would have used as its single-sourcing supplier
without investment.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that if two suppliers are identical except for one parameter, the firm
will always choose the more desirable supplier for its single-sourcing supplier. In other words,
the firm would choose to source from the supplier which has a lower cost c, a lower fraction of
upfront cost η, a lower unit investment cost m, a higher probability of investment success θ, a
larger capacity K, and a higher process capability u(0). The lemma statements can be proved
by contradiction. Suppose c1 < c2 but the firm choose to make investment z∗ in supplier 2.
Since all other parameters are identical, the optimal expected profit pi∗2(z∗) < pi∗1(z∗) because
the ∂pi
∗
∂c > 0. The lemma statement for other parameters can be similarly proved.
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When the two suppliers differ in more than one dimension, however, the firm’s investment
selection strategy is not as straightforward. In other words, it is not necessarily true that
the firm will choose to make investment in the supplier it would have used if there were no
improvement opportunity.
Lemma 6. Suppose there are two suppliers which differ in more than one dimension, e.g., one
supplier is cheaper but less reliable and the other supplier is more expensive but more reliable.
If the firm has an opportunity to invest in one supplier, then the firm may choose to invest
in the supplier which the firm would NOT have used as its single-sourcing supplier without
investment.
The above lemma proves that the opportunity to make improvement efforts can significantly
change the dynamics of the firm’s procurement strategy. In absence of improvement opportu-
nities, the firm may choose to single source from a more reliable supplier because of the higher
supplier reliability. However, if the firm has the flexibility to change supplier reliability, then
the firm may choose to improve the less reliable supplier and then procure from the improved
supplier. In this case, it is worthwhile for the firm to take advantage of the lower cost supplier
by making the initial investment.
Remark 1. Even if the firm finds it optimal to single source from one supplier (given that
the firm has the opportunity to dual source) in the first place, the firm may still want to make
an improvement effort. Therefore, even if the demand risk does not warrant dual sourcing, as
long as the improvement costs are not prohibitively expensive, improvement strategy can be
attractive. In fact, improvement strategy can be strictly preferred to dual sourcing strategy
under low demand risk. (Note that with high demand risk, both dual sourcing strategy and
improvement strategy are more likely to be employed simultaneously.)
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Remark 2. Even if the firm finds it optimal to single source from supplier i, i = 1, 2, the
firm may find it optimal to improve the supplier 3− i and only single source from the supplier
3− i after the improvement efforts. Therefore, the opportunity for improvement can drastically
reverse the firm’s preference of one supplier over the other.
3.6 Comparison of Diversification and Investment Strategies
Note that the general investment strategy (weakly) dominates the diversification strategy if the
firm’s second stage procurement decision is not limited to the supplier in which the firm made
process improvement efforts. Consistent with industry evidence, however, it is of interest to
investigate the attractiveness3 of the two pure strategies: pure diversification strategy versus
pure investment strategy, where the firm selects one supplier to make a process improvement
and then procures solely from this particular supplier.
3.6.1 Pure Strategies
In this section, we focus on the relative benefits of improvement and diversification strategies.
We therefore restrict attention to the case where the two suppliers are identical in every way.
In addition, we note that depending on parameter values, either improvement or diversification
strategy can dominate the other strategy. In what follows, we consider how the firm’s preference
of either improvement or diversification strategy changes as suppliers’ characteristics change.
3Note that we use ‘attractiveness’ to simply indicate the potential preference of one strategy over the other.
For example, we may use the word ‘attractiveness’ to refer to strategy A relative to strategy B, even though
strategy A is never preferred, or attractive, for a given set of parameter values.
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3.6.1.1 Unit Cost
The following lemma partially characterizes how the firm’s preference of diversification strategy
relative to investment strategy changes as the unit procurement cost changes.
Lemma 7. Let pi∗I and pi
∗
D represent two pure strategies: pure investment and pure diversifica-
tion strategies, respectively. If (i) the demand F (·) and reliability G(·) are uniformly distributed
and (ii) the firm pays for only what is delivered, i.e., η = 0, then we have
(a) If the relative benefit of diversification over improvement strategy is decreasing in unit
procurement cost c, then the relative benefit is convex decreasing in c, i.e., ∂(pi
∗
D−pi∗I )
∂c <
0⇒ ∂2(pi∗D−pi∗I )
∂c2
> 0.
(b) If the relative benefit of diversification over improvement strategy is a concave func-
tion of the procurement cost c, then the relative benefit is concave increasing in c, i.e.,
∂2(pi∗D−pi∗I )
∂c2
< 0⇒ ∂(pi∗D−pi∗I )∂c > 0.
The above lemma tells us that the attractiveness of the diversification strategy is either
convex decreasing or concave increasing in the unit procurement cost. In general, one can show
that the firm’s preference is not monotonic with respect to the unit procurement cost. Our
numeric study indicates that the firm is more likely to prefer the diversification strategy when
the unit cost is either very high or very low, and the firm is more likely to prefer the investment
strategy when the procurement cost is moderate.
80
3.6.1.2 Heterogeneity of Suppliers
In this section, we consider how the firm’s preference of diversification strategy relative to
improvement strategy changes as the heterogeneity of the two suppliers becomes more signifi-
cant. The following lemma proves that the diversification strategy becomes less attractive as
the suppliers become more heterogenous, i.e., as they differ more and more in unit cost, total
capacity, and process capability.
Lemma 8. Let pi∗I and pi
∗
D represent two pure strategies: (best) pure investment and pure
diversification strategies, respectively.
• Let δ represent the procurement cost differential, such that supplier 1’s cost is c− δ and
supplier 2’s cost is c+ δ.
• Let δ represent the fraction of procurement cost differential, such that supplier 1’s cost is
η − δ and supplier 2’s cost is η + δ.
• Let δ represent the capacity differential, such that supplier 1’s capacity is K + δ and
supplier 2’s cost is K − δ. Iff (i) there is no probability of complete capacity loss, i.e.,
G(K − δ, u) = 0, or (ii) G(·, u) is uniformly distributed.
• Let δ represent the capability differential, such that supplier 1’s capability is u + δ and
supplier 2’s capability is u− δ.
Then, everything else being equal, pi∗I − pi∗D is increasing in δ.
The intuition behind this lemma lies in the fact that the value of diversification diminishes
as the suppliers differ more and more from each other. As the suppliers differ more and more
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along one dimension, the firm shifts more and more procurement quantity to the more desirable
firm. This, however, increases the supply risk exposure because the other supplier covers an
increasingly smaller fraction of the firm’s total procurement quantity.
3.7 Extensions
In this chapter, we at times restrict attention to deterministic demand in order to gain better
insight into the distribution of procurement risk. In addition, the previous analysis of the
improvement strategy focuses on the pure improvement strategy, i.e., the firm chooses a supplier
for improvement and subsequently procures exclusively from this particular supplier. In this
section, we relax these assumptions and study the more general case.
3.7.1 Procurement Risk with Stochastic Demand
Using (3.11), we have
ES˜1
[
Pr[y˜1 < D˜ − y2]
]
= c2 (1 + η2H2)− c1 (1 + η1H1) + ES˜2
[
Pr[y˜2 < D˜ − y1]
]
, (3.21)
where the Pr(·) is the probability function associated with the demand and Hi is similarly
defined as in (3.16). Note the similarities between (3.16) and (3.21), which show that the firm’s
procurement risk is balanced by the supplier cost differentials. Again, if η1 = η2 = 0, the firm
generate a higher risk exposure from the cheaper supplier. It is important to note, however,
that the procurement quantity placed with the higher risk supplier may strictly be less than
that placed with the lower risk supplier. It follows that a cheaper supplier may not get a higher
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proportion of the firm’s procurement quantity.
3.7.2 Improvement Strategy with Two Suppliers
When there are two suppliers, following similar logic as (3.19), we have
g(~u(z), ~u(0)) = max
~u(z)≥~u(0)
−m
2∑
i=1
h−1 (ui(zi), ui(0)) +
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
q1iq2jpi
∗ (u1((i− 1)z1), u2((j − 1)z2))
 ,
(3.22)
where qk1 = 1 − θk and qk2 = θk for k = 1, 2. The following lemma proves that the firm’s
expected profit function is submodular in (u1(z1), u2(z2)).
Lemma 9. The firm’s expected profit function g(~u(z), ~u(0)) is a submodular function in ~u(z).
Although the above lemma partially characterizes the firm’s profit function as submodular in
operational improvement efforts, and the profit function is individually concave in improvement
efforts, such results do not in general guarantee a global optimum. In fact, the firm’s profit
function is in general not jointly concave in improvement efforts. In what follows, we provide a
sufficient condition such that the firm’s profit function is jointly well-behaved in improvement
efforts.
Theorem 22. If the supplier’s reliability distribution is a concave function of the improvement
efforts, i.e., ∂Gi(·,ui)∂ui ≤ Gi(·, ui), then a sufficient condition for the firm’s optimal profit function
to be jointly unimodal in ~u(z) is the following.
m
h′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
≤ −θ1θ2φiKi, i = 1, 2. (3.23)
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Note that condition (3.23) is readily satisfied. If, for example, h(ui(0), zi) = ui(0) +
√
zi,
then condition (3.23) is equivalent to 2m ≥ θ1θ2φiKi, which can also be readily satisfied. As
another example, if h(ui(0), zi) = ui(0) + ln(1 + zi), then condition (3.23) is equivalent to
meui(zi)−ui(0) ≥ θ1θ2φiKi, which can also be readily satisfied as ui(zi)− ui(0) ≥ 0.
3.8 Numeric Studies
While §3.6 partially characterizes the relative attractiveness of the diversification versus the
improvement strategy, it is important to further investigate the directional change of the firm’s
preference of one strategy over the other under a wide range of system parameters. In particular,
it is desirable to understand under what system conditions the firm is more likely to prefer one
strategy over the other. It is also of interest to investigate the relative benefit of the preferred
strategy. The following is a list of the notations used in our numeric study.
µ: Demand mean
σ: Demand standard deviation
r: Unit revenue
η: Fraction of the unit cost paid for ordered product
θ: The probability that an improvement effort is successful
α: The shape parameter for the capacity loss distribution
c: Unit procurement cost
m: Unit improvement cost
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EK : Expected capacity for a supplier
CVK : Coefficient of variation of the capacity for a supplier
3.8.1 Study Design
In our numeric study, the base case scenario is set up as follows. The demand is normally
distributed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 30. We scale the unit revenue
r = 1, the salvage value v = 0 and the penalty cost p = 0. Recall that scaling r − v + p = 1
does not affect the optimization problem. In addition, we set the fraction of the cost paid for
ordered quantity η1 = η2 = 0, i.e., the firm pays only for what is delivered in the base case
scenario. In addition, for the improvement strategy, we set the probability of success θ = 1.
The rest of the system parameters are set up such that they have low, medium, and high values.
In particular, we set the unit cost c equal to 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9, which gives a newsvendor ratio
of 0.7, 0.4, and 0.1, respectively. Note that, given the base case demand parameter values,
the above newsvendor ratios correspond to effective demand of 116, 92, and 62, respectively.
We set the unit improvement cost m equal to 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively. In view of the
relative demand, we set the expected capacity (EK) for each supplier equal to 60, 90, and 120,
respectively. In addition, we set the coefficient of variation of the expected capacity (CVK)
equal to 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively.
We adopted the Weibull distribution family for the capacity loss distribution. The Weibull
distribution is a very flexible family of distributions that can take on a variety of different
shapes, depending on the shape parameter α and the scale parameter β. Here it is important
to clarify what an improvement entails in this context. Our definition of improvement states
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that, for any x, the probability of obtaining x units of capacity is higher than that before
the improvement. Based on this definition, an improvement corresponds to a reduction in β.
Consequently, given the Weibull family of distribution, an improvement does not affect the
shape of the distribution, but does affect the mean and the variance of the distribution. With
Weibull distribution, both the mean and variance are reduced after an improvement. In fact,
this is a more reasonable representation of process improvement. It is difficult to justify a
reduction in variance but not in the mean as an improvement. For the functional form of the
effect of the improvement effort on the process capabilities, we adopt the log functional form,
i.e., β(m) = β(0)1+log(1+m) . Note that the log functional form has been adopted in the literature,
e.g., Porteus (1986).
For the base case scenario, we set α = 1, i.e., the capacity loss is exponentially distributed.
Given the specification of EK and CVK , the capacity loss parameter for the Weibull distribution,
as well as the capacity upper bound, is completely specified. For example, with EK = 90 and
CVK = .1, we have K = 99 and β = 9. Note that the specification of K and β uniquely depends
on a particular shape parameter value α (besides EK and CVK). Table 3.1 summarizes the
setup of the basic parameter values.
Scenarios µ σ r η θ α c m EK CVK
Low - - - - - - 0.3 0.1 60 0.1
Medium 100 30 1 0 1 1 0.6 0.3 90 0.3
High - - - - - - 0.9 0.5 120 0.5
Table 3.1: Numeric study base case parameter setup
In summary, there are 34 = 81 base case scenarios. When we investigate the directional
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effect of a particular system parameter, we repeat the computation for all 81 scenarios. In
the case where the parameter of interest is used in the definition of the 81 scenarios, we have
33 = 27 scenarios. Note that we set the two suppliers identical in every way and the random
capacity losses are independent of each other. Given this setup, the diversification strategy has
an inherent capacity advantage over the improvement strategy. Our intention, however, is not
to quantify the absolute value of one strategy over the other. Instead, our goal is to understand
how the relative difference between the diversification and investment strategy changes over
different system parameters. From this perspective, whether the firm prefers one strategy over
the other at the starting point is of less concern.
3.8.2 Directional Effects
In this section, we discuss how each individual parameter value affects the attractiveness of the
improvement strategy over the diversification strategy. Note that we use pi∗I and pi
∗
D to denote
the optimal profit for the improvement strategy and the diversification strategy, respectively.
3.8.2.1 Demand volatility
We varied the demand standard deviation σ from 5 to 50, with a step size of 5, and calculated
the optimal expected profit under both the improvement and the diversification strategy. This
gives us a total of 810 observations. As expected, the optimal expected profit for both the
improvement and the diversification strategy decreases in the demand volatility. The relative
attractiveness4 of the improvement strategy over the diversification strategy, defined as (pi∗I −
4Recall that we use ‘attractiveness’ simply to refer to the potential preference of one strategy over the other.
For many parameter values, even though the improvement strategy is never preferred, we nevertheless use the
word ‘attractiveness’ for consistency.
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pi∗D)/pi
∗
D, however, is, on average, a concave function of the demand volatility. See Figure 3.3
5.
Note that the difference6 in the optimal expected profit between the improvement strategy and
the diversification strategy also follows a similar pattern.
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Figure 3.3: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as demand uncertainty increases
We see that the improvement strategy is more likely to be preferred7 when the demand
uncertainty is neither too high nor too low. The intuition is as follows. When the demand
5For presentational clarity, we label, along the vertical axis, the improvement strategy as IMP and the
diversification strategy as DIV in all our figures within this chapter.
6Note that here we use ‘difference’ to indicate the difference in the magnitude of the optimal expected profit
between the two strategies. We use ‘relative difference’ to indicate the percentage difference between the two
strategies.
7Note that Figure 3.3 indicates that the improvement strategy is, on average, never preferred. Such a result is
mainly driven by the inherent capacity advantage of the diversification strategy. Nevertheless, of the 810 cases,
the improvement strategy is preferred in 31.9% of the cases.
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volatility is low, the effective demand (given the newsvendor ratio) is large in most of the cases.
Therefore, available capacity is a more significant driver for the firm’s optimal profit. The
diversification strategy is preferred because of its inherently larger capacity. On the other hand,
when the demand volatility is high, the effective demand is low and therefore the diversification
strategy can safely satisfy the effective demand. The improvement strategy becomes attractive
when demand volatility is moderate, where an improvement in the process capability allows
the firm to adequately satisfy demand with one supplier only. This is particularly true when
the CVK is high, where the diversification strategy is not able to efficiently mitigate the supply
risk.
Note that the effect of the demand uncertainty is also closely linked with the newsvendor
ratio, because an increase in the demand uncertainty may result in either an increase or a
decrease in the effective demand, which in turn affects the trade-off between the capacity
advantage versus the risk disadvantage. One may therefore conjecture that a higher newsvendor
ratio, i.e., a lower procurement cost, will result in the improvement strategy becoming less
attractive as the demand uncertainty increases. This conjecture is indeed correct. Setting the
unit procurement cost c = 0.1, the unit improvement cost m = 0.1, the capacity coefficient of
variation CVK = 0.5, and all other parameter values at the medium base case values, we obtain
Figure 3.4. We can see that the attractiveness of the improvement strategy is strictly decreasing
as the demand uncertainty increases. In this case, an increase in the demand uncertainty results
in a larger effective demand, which makes the improvement strategy more capacity constrained.
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Figure 3.4: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as demand uncertainty increases (with a higher newsvendor ratio)
3.8.2.2 Unit Cost
We varied the unit cost c from 0.1 to 0.9 with a step size of 0.1. This gives a total of 243
observations, which is less than 810 because the unit cost is used in the definition of the base
case scenarios. We observed that, on average, the relative attractiveness of the improvement
strategy over the diversification strategy is concave increasing in the unit cost. See Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as the unit cost increases
We note, however, that the relative attractiveness of the improvement strategy over the
diversification strategy can be strictly concave, especially when the CVK is high, i.e., the
supply risk is high. The intuition for this concave behavior is similar to that of the demand
uncertainty. A low unit procurement cost induces a higher effective demand, where the inherent
capacity advantage of the diversification strategy plays a dominant role. On the other hand,
a high unit cost results in low effective demand, in which case the supply risk is insignificant.
The value of improvement strategy is most apparent when the unit cost is moderate, such that
a reduction in the supply risk may outweigh the benefit of diversification.
Note that Lemma 7 proves that, if demand and supply uncertainty are uniformly dis-
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tributed, the difference in the optimal expected profit between the diversification strategy and
the improvement strategy, i.e., pi∗D −pi∗I , is either convex decreasing or concave increasing. Our
numeric observation confirms this result with more general demand and supply distributions.
Figure 3.6 plots the value difference between the diversification and the improvement strategy.
Note that the parameter values used in Figure 3.6 are such that the unit improvement cost is
0.5, the expected capacity is 90, the CVK is 0.5, and all other parameters are set at the base
case scenarios. Figure 3.6 as well as our numeric observation indicate that the result in Lemma
7 is indeed robust.
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Figure 3.6: Profit difference between the improvement strategy and the diversification strategy
as the unit cost increases
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3.8.2.3 Unit Improvement Cost
We varied the unit improvement cost m from 0.1 to 1 with a step size of .1. This gives a total
of 270 observations. As expected, the optimal expected profit for the improvement strategy is
decreasing in m. What is interesting, however, is that the optimal expected profit is convex
decreasing in m. See Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as the unit improvement cost increases
Therefore, a marginal increase in the unit improvement cost m becomes less critical in the
attractiveness of the improvement strategy as the unit improvement cost increases. Note that
in the limiting case where the unit improvement cost is sufficiently high, then the firm will not
make any improvement and the optimal profit with improvement approaches that of the single
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sourcing case.
3.8.2.4 Fraction of Cost for Ordered Quantity
We varied the fraction of the procurement cost incurred for the quantity ordered, i.e., η, from
0 to 1 with a step size of 0.1. This gives a total of 891 observations. We observed that
attractiveness of the improvement strategy over the diversification strategy is convex increasing
in η. See Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as the fraction of the upfront procurement cost η increases
This convex increasing behavior is consistent across different scenarios, regardless of the
demand and supply uncertainty or the unit procurement cost. This finding has significant
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practical implications: the improvement strategy becomes increasingly attractive as the firm
incurs a higher fraction of upfront procurement cost. In many global sourcing environments,
a firm will typically incur a fraction of the procurement cost upfront, which may include
inspection cost, paperwork cost, and audit cost, etc. Whether these costs are accounted for in
the total procurement cost can significantly influence the attractiveness of the improvement or
diversification strategy.
3.8.2.5 Improvement Success Probability
We varied the improvement success probability θ from 0 to 1 with a step size of 0.1, which
gives a total of 891 observations. As one might expect, the optimal profit under improvement
strategy is increasing in θ. Our numeric observations indicate that the relative attractiveness of
the improvement strategy over the diversification strategy is approximately linear in the success
probability θ. See Figure 3.9. Note that the magnitude of the difference is also approximately
linear in θ.
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Figure 3.9: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification strat-
egy as the probability of improvement success θ increases
3.8.2.6 Expected Capacity
We varied the expected capacity EK from 50 to 150 with a step size of 10. This gives us a total
of 297 observations. On average, the relative attractiveness of the improvement strategy over
the diversification strategy is concave increasing in the expected capacity. See Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification
strategy as the expected capacity increases
This does not imply, however, that for any given system parameters, the relative attrac-
tiveness of the diversification strategy over the improvement strategy is increasing in EK . We
observed that when the unit procurement cost is high, i.e., c = 0.9, and/or the supply uncer-
tainty is high, i.e., CVK = 0.5, the relative attractiveness of the diversification strategy over
the improvement strategy is initially concave increasing in EK , but is convex decreasing in
EK as EK becomes large. See Figure 3.11. Note that we set c = 0.9, m = 0.1, CVK = 0.3,
and all other parameters at the base case scenarios to obtain Figure 3.11. When the expected
capacity is low, an increase in the expected capacity benefits the improvement strategy more
than the diversification strategy because the improvement strategy is more constrained. As
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the expected capacity increases, the marginal benefit to the improvement strategy decreases.
As the expected capacity becomes very high, neither improvement nor diversification strategy
faces significant supply risk and the difference between the two strategies diminishes.
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Figure 3.11: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification
strategy as the expected capacity increases (with higher unit cost)
We note that in the limiting case as the expected capacity grows large, the relative differ-
ence in the optimal expected profit between the diversification strategy and the improvement
strategy will approach zero. The reason is that with sufficiently high capacity, the improve-
ment strategy will degenerate into a single sourcing case where the firm makes no improvement
effort. On the other hand, the diversification strategy will also degenerate into a sole sourcing
case - even though the firm has the option of dual sourcing. Essentially, as EK grows large,
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the supply risk diminishes and sole sourcing becomes optimal.
3.8.2.7 Capacity Coefficient of Variation
We varied the CVK from 0.05 to 0.5 with a step size of 0.05. This gives a total of 270 obser-
vations. We observed that, on average, the relative attractiveness of the improvement strategy
over the diversification strategy is a convex function in the CVK . See Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification
strategy as the capacity coefficient of variation increases
We observed, however, that the relative attractiveness of the improvement strategy over
the diversification strategy is in general not monotonically increasing. In fact, the relative
attractiveness of the improvement strategy over the diversification strategy is monotonically
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increasing only when the expected capacity is low and the unit procurement cost is low. Oth-
erwise, the ratio is initially decreasing and then increasing in the CVK . This indicates that the
attractiveness of the improvement strategy is initially decreasing in CVK when CVK is low, but
then is increasing in CVK as CVK increases. See Figure 3.13, where the figure is obtained by
setting c = 0.6, m = 0.1, EK = 90 and all other parameters at the medium base case scenario.
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Figure 3.13: Relative profit difference of the improvement strategy over the diversification
strategy as the capacity coefficient of variation increases (base case scenario)
Note that the difference in the optimal expected profit between the improvement strategy
and the diversification strategy also follows a similar trend. When the CVK is low, a marginal
increase in the CVK does not affect the diversification strategy as much as the improvement
strategy, because the diversification strategy has sufficient supply capacity. When CVK is high,
however, the improvement strategy becomes much more attractive because the diversification
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strategy can no longer effectively provide sufficient supply, whereas the improvement strategy
can effectively reduce the supply risk.
3.8.3 The Effect of Distributional Shape in Supply Uncertainty
In our numeric study, we assumed a special class of the Weibull family of distribution, i.e.,
exponential distribution, for the supply uncertainty. It is of interest to understand how the
distributional shape of the random shock to the supplier capacity affect the attractiveness
of the improvement versus the diversification strategy. To investigate this effect, we set all
parameter values at the base case scenarios (medium cases) described in §3.8.1 and vary the
shape parameter α from 0.6 to 4.0. Because the density of the Weibull distribution is more
sensitive for α <= 1 and less sensitive for α > 1, we use a step size of 0.1 for α ≤ 1 and a
step size of 0.2 for α > 1. Note that the shape of the Weibull distribution changes significantly
when varying α from 1 to any point greater than 1; the density function becomes unimodal for
α > 1 and approximates normal distribution when α gets larger.
We observed that relative attractiveness of the improvement strategy over the diversification
strategy is in general not monotonic in the shape of the supply uncertainty distribution. See
Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14: The optimal expected profit for the diversification and the improvement strategy
as the supply uncertainty shape parameter α increases
Note that when the unit procurement cost is high, e.g., c = 0.9, then pi∗I − pi∗D approaches
0 as α increases. One may conjecture that, given the shape of the pi∗I and pi
∗
D in Figure 3.14,
with appropriate parameter values pi∗I − pi∗D may cross 0 more than once. Our numeric study
indeed confirms this conjecture. We repeat the above study by setting the unit procurement
cost c = 0.9, the unit improvement cost m = 0.1, and all other parameters at the medium
base case scenarios. We observed that, when the α value is low, i.e., α ≤ 1.5, the improvement
strategy is strictly preferred. As α increases beyond 1.5, however, the diversification strategy
becomes more attractive. As the α value further increases, pi∗I − pi∗D approaches 0, i.e., the firm
is indifferent between the diversification and the investment strategy. In this case, the firm
makes no improvement effort as the supply risk is sufficiently low. In essence, an increase in
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the α value reduces the uncertainty about the capacity loss, but the expected capacity loss
remains the same. When the unit procurement cost is high, the effective demand is lower than
the expected capacity and therefore the supply risk becomes lower. See Figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15: The optimal expected profit for the diversification and the improvement strategy
may cross twice as the supply uncertainty shape parameter α increases
3.8.4 Improvement with Dual Sourcing
It is of interest to understand whether with improvement strategy dual sourcing is still of
significant value and if so, under what conditions dual sourcing is still a valuable option. We
investigate this question using the basic study design described in §3.8.1. This gives us a total
of 81 observations for the improvement strategy with the option of dual sourcing. We then
compare the optimal profit under this hybrid strategy, i.e., improvement with dual sourcing,
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with that of the improvement strategy only. Given our earlier numeric study result, one may
conjecture that the dual sourcing option after the improvement strategy should be of significant
value. This is indeed correct. We observed that the dual sourcing option after the improvement
strategy still gives the firm between 1% and 9% additional benefit. See Figure 3.16. The dual
sourcing option is most valuable when the unit procurement cost is low. The intuition is
that, when the unit procurement cost is low, the effective demand is high and therefore the
improvement strategy alone is more likely to be capacity constrained. In this case, the inherent
benefit of dual sourcing effectively compensates for this capacity shortage.
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Figure 3.16: Relative profit difference of the improvement w/ dual sourcing strategy over the
pure improvement strategy as the unit procurement cost increases
While the dual sourcing option after the improvement strategy can give the firm significant
benefit, it is unclear whether this hybrid strategy is significantly better than the best of the
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improvement and the dual sourcing strategy. To investigate this question, we repeat the above
numeric study, but calculate the relative percentage increase in the optimal profit under the
hybrid strategy over the maximum of the pure improvement and the dual sourcing strategy.
We observe that the benefit of the hybrid strategy is significantly diminished. In fact, we found
that the maximum benefit of the hybrid strategy is less than 0.07% over the maximum of the
pure improvement and the dual sourcing strategy. When the unit procurement cost increases,
the benefit of the hybrid strategy approaches zero. See Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Relative profit difference of the improvement w/ dual sourcing strategy over the
best of the pure improvement or diversification strategy as the unit procurement cost increases
Note that the above finding offers significant managerial insights. If the firm chooses the
best strategy, either the dual sourcing or the improvement strategy, for its particular oper-
ating environment (such as unit cost and demand volatility), then it is of negligible value to
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employ both improvement and dual sourcing strategy. The additional benefit of the combined
strategy is simply not sufficient to warrant its implementation. On the other hand, however,
if the firm’s operating environment is subject to frequent change, then the hybrid strategy of
both improvement and dual sourcing can be of significant value. A caveat, however, is that
the firm may not be able to adopt and switch to alternative strategies frequently, either due
either to operational constraints or strategic considerations. In such cases, the hybrid strategy
can be adopted as a stable strategy, as opposed to switching between dual sourcing and the
improvement strategy as the industry environment changes.
3.8.5 Dual Improvement with Dual Sourcing
In the most general case, the firm may choose to invest in and procure from both suppliers.
It is of interest to understand whether it is worthwhile to make improvement efforts to both
suppliers, and if so, under what conditions the dual improvement strategy is most valuable.
To investigate this problem, we repeat a study similar to that in §3.8.4, but allow the firm
to make improvement to both suppliers. We therefore have a total of 81 observations. We
found that, compared with the single improvement dual sourcing strategy (SID), the dual
improvement dual sourcing strategy (DID) is only marginally better. On average, the DID
strategy is 0.03% better than the SID strategy, with a maximum improvement of 0.12%. We
observed that the DID strategy is relatively more desirable when the CVK is high. This is
as expected because the diversification strategy alone is not efficient when the supply risk is
highly volatile. The SID strategy is an asymmetric strategy and only partially enhances one
supplier’s reliability state. In these situations, the DID strategy provides additional, although
marginal, improvements over the SID strategy. Based on the above numeric observations, it is
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in general not in a firm’s best interest to engage in dual improvement strategy. The finding has
a significant managerial implication: the presence of the improvement opportunity will diminish
the benefit of diversification strategy and along the way, marginalize the supplier which has
not been selected for the improvement effort.
3.9 Conclusion
In this research, we study a firm’s optimal procurement problem when suppliers are unreliable.
We relax the common assumption that the suppliers’ reliability is exogenous and investigate how
the presence of the improvement opportunity influences a firm’s preference of diversification
strategy versus improvement strategy. We use the general stochastic dominance concept to
model the capacity loss to the supplier. We fully characterize the firm’s diversification problem
and the improvement problem. We analytically prove that both the pure improvement strategy
and the improvement with dual sourcing strategy are well behaved in the improvement effort.
In addition, we analytically prove that a firm’s preference of the diversification strategy is
decreasing in the heterogeneity of the supplier characteristics.
We also analytically investigate how a firm’s risk exposure changes as the demand risk
increases. We find that, when the demand risk is low, the firm will use the single sourcing
strategy, even if the firm has the opportunity to dual source. However, if the two suppliers are
identical, then the firm will never use single sourcing strategy. As the demand risk increases,
the firm will use dual sourcing strategy to cope with the demand risk. As the demand risk
further increases, the firm will use both dual sourcing strategy as well as quantity hedge to
cope with the supply risk. Note that the firm will not use quantity hedge unless it uses the
107
dual sourcing strategy.
We found that the firm’s preference of the diversification strategy relative to the improve-
ment strategy is in general not monotonic in the supplier characteristics. We found that a
firm is more likely to prefer the diversification strategy when the procurement cost is very
low or is very high, but the firm is more likely to prefer the improvement strategy when the
procurement cost is moderate. We also found that the volatility of the demand has significant
impact on the attractiveness of the improvement strategy. In extreme cases where the demand
is highly volatile or very stable, then the improvement strategy is less likely to be preferred to
the diversification strategy. On the other hand, the improvement strategy is more likely to be
preferred when the demand volatility is moderate. This result is due to the interplay of the
effective demand and the effective supply.
We found that the distributional shape of the capacity loss has important implications
for the attractiveness of the diversification and improvement strategies. We found that the
improvement strategy is more likely to be preferred when the unit procurement cost is high
and the volatility of the capacity loss is high. A higher unit cost reduces the effect demand,
which mitigates the capacity disadvantage of the improvement strategy. A higher volatility
of the capacity loss results in a higher marginal return for the improvement strategy while
exerting higher pressure on the diversification strategy.
Our numeric study indicates that the improvement strategy is increasingly preferred as the
fraction of the upfront procurement cost increases. If the firm pays only for what is delivered,
then everything else being equal, the diversification strategy is more likely to be preferred.
However, as the firm incurs a higher fraction of the upfront procurement cost, the improvement
strategy becomes more attractive.
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For future research, we conjecture that the improvement strategy is more likely to be
preferred in a multi-period setting, where the benefit of the improvement strategy can be
accrued over multiple periods. It is also of interest to investigate the incentive issues between
suppliers and the buying firm. The buying firm, for intellectual property rights concerns, for
example, may hesitate to invest in a supplier. The buying firm may decide to first learn about
the supplier’s true capacity performance before investing in capacity improvement efforts. On
the other hand, with competing suppliers, each supplier may have its own incentive to improve
its capacity performance.
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Chapter 4
Regulatory Trade Barriers Risk
4.1 Introduction
With accelerating globalization, firms have become increasingly dependent on suppliers across
the globe to maintain competitive advantage. However, this increased dependency on global
suppliers also creates myriads of potential risks in the firm’s supply network. A well imple-
mented supply risk management strategy is essential for firms to capture the advantage of
global sourcing without falling prey to the perils of potential supply risks. Clearly, to develop
effective risk management strategies, firms must consider particular types of risk that they face
in their supply network. In general, the supply risk includes capacity, leadtime, and quality
risk, as well as regulatory risk, geo-political, and foreign exchange risk. Regulatory trade risk
is unique to global sourcing and can pose significant risk to a broad range of firms engaged in
global sourcing. While the World Trade Organization (WTO) consistently promotes free trade
and discourages any regulatory trade barriers, authorities in individual countries or economic
entities have considerable latitude in imposing regulatory trade barriers to protect domestic
markets.
With the WTO’s free trade effort, for example, the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), a frame-
work for international textile trade for the past 30 years, was dismantled in 2005. The expiration
of MFA was heralded as the beginning of an era where firms can freely import and export tex-
tile supplies and products. Within months, however, many countries, including the US and the
EU, invoked the safeguard clause and essentially rectified quantity-based trade barriers. While
these safeguard measures are slated to expire in a few years, it is widely believed that some
forms of trade barriers will be maintained for the foreseeable future.
Many industries, such as paper, chemical, steel, and agriculture, face similar types of trade
barriers. Note that non-quantity based trade barriers, such as antidumping (AD) rules, are
also in widespread use. In fact, Blonigen and Prusa (2001) note that “since 1980 ... more
AD duties are now levied in any one year worldwide than were levied in the entire period of
1947-1970.” Therefore, regulatory trade barriers pose a significant risk to firms operating in
a global environment, and an effective strategy to mitigate such risk is essential for firms to
maintain competitive advantage.
The quantity based trade barriers, commonly known as voluntary export restraints (VER),
are implemented against products by the country of origin. These VERs are usually imple-
mented bi-laterally, where the importing country sets an upper limit on the total amount of
the specific product (for example, a specific product can be classified under the Harmonized
System Codes) that the exporting country can sell for a fixed period of time (usually on an
annual basis). The following is a formal definition of VER from the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
“Voluntary export restraints (VER) are arrangements between exporting and im-
111
porting countries in which the exporting country agrees to limit the quantity of
specific exports below a certain level in order to avoid imposition of mandatory
restrictions by the importing country. The arrangement may be concluded either
at the industry or government level.”
Such quantity restrictions are often targeted against countries that have a compelling advantage
in the specific category of restricted products. While sourcing from these targeted countries
would bring the most economic benefit to the buying firm, such sourcing activity also poses the
most significant risk due to uncertainty around the VER. The suppliers in the targeted country
may not be able to secure a sufficient amount of VER allocation to export the product. Even
if the supplier were able to secure the necessary amount of VER allocation, the associated cost
of obtaining the necessary amount of VER allocation may make it uneconomical to continue
to supply the product.
4.1.1 Mitigation Strategies
Suppose a buying firm in the domestic country, denoted as DOM, is interested in procuring
a particular product globally. Suppose a low cost country, denoted as LCC, is most efficient
at manufacturing the product and is subject to VER control. Note that LCC need not to be
the only country that can supply the product. In fact, suppliers in a medium cost country,
denoted as MCC, which are not subject to VER, can also supply the product, but at a higher
cost because of their higher labor costs or less efficient operations. In the absence of VER,
it is cheaper, on a per-unit basis, for the firm to procure the product from a supplier in the
LCC. However, sourcing solely from LCC brings significant risk to the firm’s supply because
the supplier may fail to obtain a sufficient amount of VER allocation.
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One often used approach to mitigate the VER control is outward processing arrangements
(OPA). Different entities, such as the US, Hong Kong, and the EU, have somewhat different
definitions and procedures of outward processing arrangements. This chapter most closely
follows Hong Kong (for indirect OPA) and the EU (for direct OPA) practices. The following
is a formal definition by the Council of the European Union.
Outward Processing is an EU customs duty relief scheme provided for under Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 and implementing Commission Regulation 2454/93
(amended). It allows Community goods to be temporarily exported from the cus-
toms territory of the Community in order to undergo processing operations or repair
and the compensating products resulting from these operations to be released for
free circulation in the customs territory of the Community with total or partial
relief from import duties. Outward processing enables businesses to take advantage
of cheaper labour costs outside the EC, while encouraging the use of EC produced
raw materials to manufacture the finished products. Goods may be also temporarily
exported to undergo processes not available within the Community.
Therefore, to mitigate the supply risk under quantity based trade barriers, firms may adopt
several different strategies in their supply chain design. Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of
several alternative mitigation strategies.
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Direct Procurement Direct OPA
LCC DOM LCC DOM
LCC LCC
Split Procurement Indirect OPA
DOM
MCC DOMMCC
Figure 4.1: Four mitigation strategies under regulatory quota restrictions
Before we describe in detail each of the four strategies in Figure 4.1, we first list the most
salient features associated with each strategy.
• Direct Procurement: passively accepts full quota risk; incurs the lowest pre-quota, per-
unit procurement cost.
• Split Procurement: partially mitigates the quota risk; the average per-unit procurement
cost is moderate, but less than the domestic procurement cost.
• Direct OPA: completely removes the quota risk; must maintain domestic production to
qualify; have a leadtime advantage due to domestic production.
• Indirect OPA: completely removes the quota risk; the per-unit procurement cost depends
on the third party outward processing arrangements.
The direct procurement strategy is a basic strategy that pursues the cheapest per-unit
procurement cost. While this strategy completely ignores the quota risk, its per-unit cost
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advantage can be so significant that, at times, the cost advantage outweighs the potential
quota risk. On the down side, however, if the quota risk turns out to be significant, the firm
that uses this strategy may find itself having no supply to serve its customers.
An intuitive approach to mitigate the quota related supply risk is to split source from
both LCC and MCC. Since a supplier in MCC is not subject to VER, the firm can partially
guarantee its supply, even if the supplier in LCC fails to obtain the sufficient amount of VER.
The downside of such an approach is that the average procurement cost may be higher. Note
that the strategy of sole sourcing from LCC or MCC can be considered as a special case of the
split sourcing strategy.
An alternative approach to reduce or eliminate the supply uncertainty is to utilize the out-
ward processing arrangement (OPA)1. Many countries, including the US, the EU, and Hong
Kong, have OPAs with other countries. Under OPA, the firm is able to perform certain pro-
duction activity domestically and let suppliers in a VER controlled country perform additional
or full processing. The finished product, subject to specific regulations, will not be subject to
VER control2 or full tariffs. Firms may employ either the direct OPA or indirect OPA approach
to remove the VER control.
To qualify for direct OPA, the buying firm has to 1) maintain a full domestic production line
for the finished product, where the domestic production must be no less than a certain fraction3
of the firm’s total procurement quantity, and 2) utilize domestically sourced raw materials for
1Also known as outward processing trade (OPT) in the EU.
2The product under OPA may subject to additional quantity based restrictions, but such restrictions are
normally satisfied before the product undergoes OPA processing.
3The minimum fraction of the domestic production quantity is regulated by competent authorities on a fixed
time period basis, typically on an annual basis. The minimum fraction is defined relatively to the firm’s total
procurement quantity, such that the fraction of the domestic production must not fall below a threshold of the
firm’s total procurement.
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the LCC outward processed product. See DTI (2006). For example, knitted cotton shirts from
China are subject to VER control for export to the EU. However, a firm based in Poland, for
example, can avoid the VER control by sourcing the fabric from the EU, shipping it to China
for production and importing the finished product back to the EU without being subject to
VER control, as long as the firm maintains a full production line in Poland that satisfies the
minimum production quantity.
Firms do not have to use the direct OPA program from their domestic countries. Instead,
the firm may use third party OPA programs. For example, a firm based in the EU may source
the product from Hong Kong, which has an OPA program with China. While China is under
VER control for export to the EU, Hong Kong is not subject to VER control. Therefore, the
supplier in Hong Kong can split its manufacturing operation between Hong Kong and China
such that the finished product is considered to originate in Hong Kong. The firm in the EU
can, therefore, procure the product without the risk associated with VER, although such an
arrangement typically increases the total procurement cost. “Producing this way costs roughly
35% to 40% more than if we make everything directly in China,” says the managing director of
the TAL Group and vice chairman of the Hong Kong Textile Council, Dr. Harry Lee (Windle,
2005).
In summary, we note that the direct procurement strategy has the highest risk exposure
due to VER. The split procurement strategy can significantly reduce the risk exposure, but
cannot completely eliminate the risk exposure except in the degenerate case where the firm sole
sources from MCC. On the other hand, both the direct and indirect OPA approaches eliminate
the risk exposure, but in different ways. The direct approach requires the firm to maintain a
certain level of domestic production (which incurs a shorter leadtime). Under the direct OPA
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approach, therefore, products are produced both domestically and in the foreign LCC country.
On the other hand, the indirect approach does not maintain any domestic production. Under
the indirect OPA approach, each unit of the product is split processed between the LCC and
the MCC. Therefore, the accounting of the per-unit procurement cost is quite different between
the two OPA strategies. See the model section (§4.3) for details.
4.1.2 List of Acronyms
In closing, we list the acronyms frequently used throughout the chapter.
AD Antidumping Duties
DOM Domestic country
LCC Low cost country that is subject to VER
MCC Medium cost country that is not subject to VER
MFA Multi Fibre Agreement
OPA Outward Processing Arrangement
VER Voluntary Export Restraints
WTO World Trade Organization
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4.2 Literature
To date, research on the implications of trade barriers on the firm’s sourcing strategies is
relatively sparse in the operations management literature. There exists, however, a stream
of literature on global operations, where specific issues, such as global transportation and/or
foreign exchange rate, are explicitly modeled.
Arntzen et al. (1995) study global supply chain management issues at Digital Equipment
Corporation. They developed a large scale mixed-integer program to solve the multiple location
and transportation problem. Their mathematical program explicitly incorporates tariff rules in
different countries. In a similar vein, Munson and Rosenblatt (1997) also use the mixed-integer
linear programming approach to solve global sourcing problems when the local content rule
must be satisfied. Li et al. (2007) study a raw material sourcing problem in the presence of the
local content rule as well as value-added requirements. The focus of all the above-mentioned
papers is to solve practical, large scale optimization problems. In contrast, the purpose of this
chapter is to explore different regulatory-risk mitigation strategies so as to provide managerial
insights.
A recent paper that is also related to local content rules is Kouvelis et al. (2004), which uses
a linear programming model to investigate a global plant location problem. Their mathematical
programming model incorporates global location related constraints, such as subsidy, tariff/tax,
and local content rules. They explore how these global location related constraints influence
the optimal plant locations. Note that the local content rule is a hard constraint on every unit
of product. This is different from some other types of trade barriers, such as quotas, where the
constraint is binding only when the total production exceeds the pre-set limit.
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Because most trade barriers, such as quotas, can also be modeled alternatively as stochastic
cost problems, this research is also related to the stochastic cost (price) models in the operations
literature. In an earlier paper, Kalymon (1971) studies a multi-period purchasing problem
where the future purchasing prices are Markovian. The paper proves that a state-dependent
(s, S) policy is optimal. Similar research that incorporates the stochastic purchasing cost/price
includes O¨zekici and Parlar (1999); Erdem and O¨zekici (2002); Berling and Rosling (2005).
Note that all these papers investigate the form of the optimal purchasing policies for a given
procurement configuration. They do not contrast different mitigation strategies.
This research is also tangentially related to the large stream of literature in contracting
theory. In this stream of research, a typical model involves either the supplier, e.g., (Araman
and O¨zer, 2003), or the buyer, e.g., (Akella et al., 2002; Martinea-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi,
2003; Seifert et al., 2004; Sethi et al., 2004), that designs a portfolio of contracts to manage
supply or demand uncertainties. These papers are related to our research because they consider
the role of the spot market, which provides an instantaneous access to inventories or products at
an expected price premium. Typically, these spot markets exist in commodity market contexts,
where products are standard but prices are subject to significant variation over any period of
time. Here the spot market serves as an emergency source, which will be used if other sources of
supply are insufficient to meet demand. The use of the spot market, however, is not a planned
decision a priori. In this chapter, the use of a supplier in the VER controlled LCC is not a
result of insufficient supply and the procurement quantity is an active decision made by the
firm. In closing, we note that Kouvelis and Li (2006) also consider the existence of spot market
in hedging leadtime risks.
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4.3 Model
Before developing models for each specific strategy, we first discuss higher level modeling con-
siderations and then describe each specific model. One important modeling consideration is
concerned with the key drivers that affect the attractiveness of each different mitigation strat-
egy. The following is a list of high level drivers that may influence a firm’s preference for a
particular strategy.
A1. Landed unit cost. The landed unit cost includes the unit procurement cost, transportation
cost, and tariff.
A2. VER uncertainty. The likelihood that a supplier is able to secure sufficient allocation to
clear VER control.
A3. Demand uncertainty. The level of demand uncertainty at the time of procurement.
A4. Leadtime. The production and transportation leadtime.
A5. Foreign exchange rate. The stability of foreign exchange.
In this chapter, we do not focus on the foreign exchange rate risk. Instead, we focus on
the effect of A1-A4 on the attractiveness of each mitigation strategy. Note that, even in the
absence of the production and transportation leadtime as well as the foreign exchange rate
risk, the relative attractiveness of the indirect OPA structure versus the direct OPA structure
cannot be unambiguously determined. Therefore, with transportation and production leadtime
differences, the direct OPA strategy may be more attractive than the indirect OPA approach.
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We model the four mitigation strategies as the newsvendor type of model, where the firm’s
objective is to maximize its expected profit. The unit procurement cost is assumed to be
exogenous, and the firm’s decision is to determine the optimal procurement quantity. For
the direct procurement and the split procurement strategy, we model the VER uncertainty
as follows. Because the allocation of VER is tradable among the suppliers, any supplier can,
theoretically, obtain sufficient allocation of VER for exportation. However, the unit price of
VER is uncertain. If the price is too high, then it is not economical to ship the finished product.
If the price of VER is acceptable, then the cost of VER is either borne by the supplier or shared
with the buying firm. For simplicity, we assume that the buying firm absorbs the price of VER
and makes the decision of whether to ship the finished product. Intuitively, if the price of VER
is above a certain threshold, the firm will not ship the final product. The firm’s decision of
whether to ship the finished product is based on the realization of the price of VER. In addition,
we assume the firm also observes the realized market demand, because the production leadtime
is much longer than the transportation leadtime. Such an approach allows us to model the
VER uncertainty as a stochastic cost newsvendor type of model. See Figure 4.2.
Observe    and 
Decide whether to ship
z~ X~
Selling SeasonProduction Leadtime0
Figure 4.2: Time line for the stochastic cost model (z˜: Price of VER. X˜: Demand)
Note that the MCC in the split procurement strategy need not to be the same as the MCC
in the indirect procurement strategy. For purely expositional reasons, we assume hereafter that
the two MCCs share similar cost structures.
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4.3.1 Notation
We now introduce the notation for those system parameters common to all four strategies.
Other strategy-specific notation will be introduced, as necessary, when describing a particular
strategy. Let r and p represent the unit revenue and the unit penalty cost, respectively. Let c0,
c1, and c2 represent the unit procurement cost from LCC4, MCC and DOM, respectively. The
unit procurement cost should be interpreted as total landed cost, which includes the production
cost as well as the transportation cost. We assume without loss of generality that c0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2.
Similarly, we use s0, s1, and s2 to represent the unit salvage values within LCC, MCC, and
DOM, respectively. In addition, let y0, y1, and y2 to denote the firm’s procurement quantity
from LCC, MCC and DOM, respectively. We adopt the convention that LCC is a foreign
country subject to quota restrictions. We use MCC to represent the foreign country that is not
subject to quota restrictions.
For the quota related cost, let z˜ represent the unit stochastic quota cost. In addition,
we use G(·) and g(·) to represent the distribution and the density function of the quota cost,
respectively.
On the demand side, let x˜ denote the random seasonal demand. We use F (·) and f(·) to
represent the distribution and the density function of the seasonal demand, respectively. In
addition, we use µ0 and σ0 to denote the mean and the standard deviation of the demand.
In what follows, we characterize each procurement strategy and discuss relevant sensitivity
analysis on the optimal procurement solutions.
4The LCC cost c0 may be slightly different across different strategies. For example, the direct OPA strategy
may incur a higher LCC cost because of the raw material procurement and shipment cost. However, many
suppliers in LCC also source raw materials from overseas. To focus on the main effect of the quota issues, we
assume the LCC unit cost is identical across different strategies.
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4.3.2 Direct Procurement
Using our notational convention discussed earlier, we use r, p, and z˜ to represent the unit
revenue, shortage penalty and stochastic quota cost, respectively. Recall that we use c0 and
y0 to denote the unit procurement cost and the firm’s procurement quantity, respectively.
Note that if the firm salvages the product in LCC (because of the prohibitive quota price, for
example), the unit salvage value is s0. If, however, the firm salvages the product in DOM, the
unit salvage value is s2. We do not make assumptions on the relative magnitude of s0 and s2.
We use x˜ denote the random demand. At the second stage, the firm observes the realized unit
quota cost z as well as the market demand x. In what follows, we first characterize the firm’s
second stage basic decision problem. We then drive the optimal procurement quantity for the
direct procurement strategy.
At the second stage, the firm observes the realized demand x and the unit quota price z.
The firm’s objective is to determine the shipment quantity yˆ0 to maximize its revenue, i.e.,
pi(yˆ0|y0, z, x) = max
0≤yˆ0≤y0
{
rmin(yˆ0, x)− zyˆ0 + s2(yˆ0 − x)+ + s0(y0 − yˆ0)+ − p(x− yˆ0)+
}
,
(4.1)
subject to the condition that
pi(yˆ0|y0, z, x) ≥ −px+ s0y0.
Note that the above condition ensures that, if the firm decides to make the shipment, it is
indeed optimal. In what follows, we analyze four difference cases and derive the firm’s optimal
shipment decision in each case.
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If the realized demand is less than the total procurement quantity, i.e., x ≤ y0, then (4.1)
is increasing in yˆ0 for any yˆ0 ≤ x. In addition, if z ≤ s2 − s0, then (4.1) is increasing in yˆ0 for
any yˆ0 ≤ y0. On the other hand, if z > s2 − s0, then (4.1) is decreasing in yˆ0 for any yˆ0 > x.
Combining these observations, we have
pil(y0, z, x) =

rx− zy0 + s2(y0 − x), z ≤ s2 − s0;
rx− zx+ s0(y0 − x), z > s2 − s0;
−px+ s0y0, abandon shipment.
(4.2)
Note that when the realized demand is less than the firm’s original procurement quantity y0,
the firm may or may not ship the full amount, depending on the realized quota cost as well as
the salvage value s0 and s2. By (4.2), it is optimal to make the shipment if and only if
rx− zx+ s0(y0 − x) ≥ −px+ s0y0 ⇒ z ≤ r + p− s0.
Clearly, the firm’s decision of whether to make the shipment depends only on the system
parameters and the realized quota price. The decision is independent of the size of the realized
demand.
If the realized demand is greater than the original procurement quantity, i.e., x > y0, then
the firm’s profit function is
pih(y0, z, x) =

ry0 − zy0 − p(x− y0), make shipment;
−px+ s0y0, abandon shipment.
(4.3)
When the realized demand is greater than the procurement quantity y0, the firm ships all
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procurement quantity if it is economical to do so. By (4.3), it is optimal to ship if and only if
ry0 − zy0 − p(x− y0) ≥ −px+ s0y0 ⇒ z ≤ r + p− s0.
Note that the optimality condition for the shipment decision is independent of realizations of
x.
Let G(·) and F (·) denote the distribution function of z˜ and x˜, respectively. The firm’s
expected profit with respect to the random quota cost z˜ and stochastic demand x˜ is therefore
pi(y0) = −c0y0 +
∫ s2−s0
0
∫ y0
0
((r − s2)x+ (s2 − z)y0) dF (x)dG(z)
+
∫ r+p−s0
s2−s0
∫ y0
0
((r − s0 − z)x+ s0y0) dF (x)dG(z)
+
∫ r+p−s0
0
∫ ∞
y0
((r + p− z)y0 − px) dF (x)dG(z) +
∫ ∞
r+p−s0
(−pE[x] + s0y0) dG(z).
(4.4)
Theorem 23. With direct procurement strategy, the firm’s profit function is concave in the
procurement quantity. Furthermore, if s2 ≤ s0, then the firm’s optimal procurement quantity
is given by
y∗0 = F
−1
(
r + p− c0 −A− (c0 − s0)B
r + p− s0 −A
)
, (4.5)
where A is the expected unit quota cost, given that it is economical to ship the product, i.e.,
A =
1
G(r + p− s0)
∫ r+p−s0
0
zdG(z),
and B is the odds that the quota cost is higher than the shipment threshold, i.e., B = G(r+p−s0)G(r+p−s0) .
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Otherwise, if s2 > s0, then the firm’s optimal procurement quantity is given by
y∗0 = F
−1
(
r + p− c0 −A− (c0 − s0)B
r + p− s0 −A− C
)
, (4.6)
where C is given by
C =
1
G(r + p− s0)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z).
Substituting the optimal procurement quantity y∗0 into (4.4), we have (for the case of s2 >
s0)
pi(y∗0) =
∫ y∗0
0
xdF (x) ·
(∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)
− pE[x].
(4.7)
Note that if s2 ≤ s0, then the second integration term in the bracket should be dropped.
Corollary 4. With direct procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal procurement quantity is a)
less than that without quota uncertainty and b) decreasing in the unit expected quota cost A.
The above corollary is intuitive as a higher expected quota cost makes larger procurement
quantity increasingly unattractive. From (4.5), it can be seen that the optimal procurement
quantity y∗0 is also decreasing in the odds of the quota cost being higher than the shipment
threshold. In other words, when the quota cost is more likely to exceed the shipment threshold,
the optimal procurement quantity is reduced.
With respect to the firm’s optimal profit, we can establish, by the envelope theorem, the
following sensitivity result.
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Proposition 1. With direct procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal profit is a) decreasing in
the unit procurement cost c0, i.e., ∂c0pi(y
∗
0) = −y∗0, b) decreasing in the unit penalty cost p, c)
increasing in the unit salvage value s0 and s2, and d) increasing in the unit revenue r.
In what follows, we investigate how the characteristics of the unit quota price influence
the firm’s optimal profit. Here we adopt the concept of first order stochastic ordering, which
ranks two random variables by the following relationship. A random variable X1 is said to be
stochastically dominated by the random variable X2, if, for any given value of x, the probability
of X1 being less than x is greater than that of X2 being less than x. In other words, X1 ≤st X2
if G1(x) ≥ G2(x), where Gi(·) is the distribution function of random variable Xi, i = 1, 2.
Given the above stochastic ordering concept, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 24. With direct procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit (weakly)
decreases as the unit quota price stochastically increases .
The above theorem establishes that a stochastically increasing quota price negatively im-
pacts a firm’s optimal profit. When the stochastic increase in the unit quota price becomes
very large, however, such negative impact eventually diminishes because the firm may find it
uneconomical to make the shipment. Therefore, the overall impact of the stochastically in-
creasing quota price must be in a convex form, hence the word ‘weakly’ in the above theorem
statement.
We note that, depending on the particular family of distribution, a stochastically increasing
quota price does not necessarily correspond to a quota price with larger variance. However,
a straightforward interpretation of the stochastically increasing quota price is simply a higher
expected quota price for a given family of distribution functions. For the special case of the
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normally distributed quota price, stochastic dominance can be ordered by the mean parameter
µ (while keeping variance constant). In other words, a stochastically increasing quota price
corresponds to the distribution with a higher µ. The following corollary, therefore, is a direct
consequence of Theorem 24.
Corollary 5. With direct procurement strategy, if the quota price is normally distributed with
parameters N(µ, σ), then, everything else being equal, the firm’s expected optimal profit is
decreasing in the expected quota cost µ.
Since a higher expected quota price µ increases the firm’s overall cost, the optimal expected
profit decreases. As noted earlier, the stochastic dominance concept does not imply the ordering
of the variance. The following theorem investigates the how the variability of the quota price
influences the firm’s optimal expected profit.
Theorem 25. With direct procurement strategy, if the quota price is normally distributed
with parameters N(µ, σ), then, everything else being equal, the firm’s expected optimal profit is
increasing in the quota cost standard deviation σ.
The above theorem tells us that, in the case of normally distributed quota price, an increase
in the quota variance (while keeping the expected quota price constant) actually increases the
firm’s optimal expected profit. Note that this result holds true in general and is not parameter
dependent. This surprising result can be explained as follows. The firm’s downside exposure
to the very high quota price is limited by the firm’s option of not shipping the finished product
and therefore the firm avoids incurring the high quota cost (at a loss). On the other hand, the
upside of a very low quota price benefits the firm significantly. This asymmetry of the limited
downside cost versus the upside benefit makes the firm better off when the quota variance is
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higher.
We note that, in our comprehensive numeric study (see §4.4.2.1 for details), Theorem 25
holds (on average) even with Weibull distributed quota prices. We observed that the firm’s
optimal profit is, on average, convex increasing in the quota price coefficient of variation. For
very low unit production cost c0, however, we observed that the firm’s optimal profit is not
necessarily increasing in the quota price coefficient of variation. With Weibull distribution,
an increase in the coefficient of variation entails a change in both the shape and the scale
parameters. Such simultaneous change in general cannot be ranked by the stochastic ordering
concept.
Furthermore, our numeric study confirmed that Theorem 24 holds in the case of the Weibull
distributed quota price. For lower values of the expected quota price, the optimal expected
profit declines approximately linearly with the expected quota price. The optimal expected
profit eventually becomes independent of the expected quota price.
4.3.3 Split Procurement
In this case, the firm procures from two countries, LCC and MCC, where the LCC is subject to
quota restrictions but the MCC is not subject to quota restrictions. Because both the LCC and
the MCC are foreign countries, we assume they have the same leadtime. Consequently, orders
have to be placed at the same time. To avoid trivial cases, we assume the unit cost from LCC
is less than the unit cost from MCC, i.e., c0 < c1. Recall that we use s0, s1, and s2 to denote
the unit salvage value from LCC, MCC and DOM, respectively. In addition, y0 and y1 denote
the firm’s procurement quantity from the LCC and the MCC, respectively. In what follows,
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we first describe the firm’s profit function conditional on the realizations of the quota price z
and the realized demand x. Then we derive the firm’s expected profit function. Throughout
the rest of this section, we assume that s2 > s1 > s0. For the case of s2 < min(s0, s1), see
Appendix §A3.1 for details. Note the case of s1 > s2 > s0 or s0 > s2 > s1 can be similarly
analyzed.
In the second stage, first consider the case when the realized demand is less than the total
procurement quantity, i.e., x ≤ y0 + y1. Following the analysis from §4.3.2, it is economical to
ship product from LCC if and only if z ≤ r + p − s0. Therefore, if z ≤ r + p − s0, then the
firm’s revenue function is
pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = rmin
(
1∑
i=0
yˆi, x
)
− zyˆ0 − p
(
x−
1∑
i=0
yˆi
)+
+ s2
(
1∑
i=0
yˆi − x
)+
+
1∑
i=0
si(yi − yˆi)
(4.8)
s.t. yˆi ≤ yi, i = 0, 1,
where yˆ0 and yˆ1 are the procurement quantity shipped from LCC and MCC, respectively. Since
pil is increasing in yˆ0 and yˆ1 for
∑1
i=0 yˆi < x, we must have
∑1
i=0 yˆi ≥ x. Therefore, (4.8) can
be simplified as
pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = (r − s2)x− zyˆ0 + s2
1∑
i=0
yˆi +
1∑
i=0
si(yi − yˆi). (4.9)
Note that ∂yˆ0pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = s2− s0− z, and ∂yˆ1pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = s2− s1 > 0. Clearly,
we must have yˆ∗1 = y1, and yˆ∗0 = y0 if z ≤ s2 − s0 and yˆ∗0 = max(x− y1, 0) otherwise.
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Therefore, (4.9) can be further simplified to
pil(y0, y1, x) =

(r − s2)x− zy0 + s2
∑1
i=0 yi, z ≤ s2 − s0;
(r − s2)x+ (s2 − s0 − z)(x− y1)+ + s0y0 + s2y1, otherwise.
(4.10)
If z > r+ p− s0, then it is not economical to ship from LCC, but it remains profitable to ship
from MCC. The firm’s revenue function is
pil(y0, y1, x) = rmin(y1, x)− p(x− y1)+ + s2(y1 − x)+ + s0y0. (4.11)
Note that in this case the optimal amount shipped from MCC is given by yˆ∗1 = y1 which is
independent of the realized demand x or the quota price z.
We now turn our attention to the case where the realized demand is greater than the total
procurement quantity, i.e, x > y0 + y1. Again, it is economical to ship from LCC if and only if
z ≤ r + p− s0. Therefore, if z ≤ r + p− s0, then the firm’s revenue function is
pih(y0, y1, x) = r
1∑
i=0
yi − p
(
x−
1∑
i=0
yi
)
− zy0. (4.12)
Otherwise, if z > r + p− s0, then the firm’s profit function is
pih(y0, y1, x) = ry1 − p(x− y1) + s0y0. (4.13)
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Combining the above derivations, we can derive the firm’s expected profit function. We have
pi(y0, y1) =
∫ s2−s0
0
∫ y0+y1
0
((r − s2)x− zy0 + s2(y0 + y1)) dF (x)dG(z)
+
∫ r+p−s0
s2−s0
(∫ y1
0
((r − s2)x+ s0y0 + s2y1) dF (x)
+
∫ y0+y1
y1
((r − s0 − z)x+ s0y0 + (s0 + z)y1) dF (x)
)
dG(z)
+
∫ r+p−s0
0
∫ ∞
y0+y1
((r + p)(y0 + y1)− px− zy0) dF (x)dG(z)
+G(r + p− s0)
(∫ y1
0
(rx+ s2(y1 − x) + s0y0) dF (x)
+
∫ ∞
y1
(ry1 − p(x− y1) + s0y0) dF (x)
)
−
1∑
i=0
ciyi. (4.14)
Using (4.14), we have
∂y0pi(y0, y1) = F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ F (y0 + y1)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)− (c0 − s0), (4.15)
and
∂y1pi(y0, y1) = (r + p)F (y1) + (F (y0 + y1)− F (y1))
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (F (y0 + y1)− F (y1))
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)− (c1 − s2). (4.16)
Lemma 10. The hessian matrix associated with pi(y0, y1) is symmetric, negative, and diagonal
dominant.
It follows directly from Lemma 10 that the firm’s objective function is jointly concave in
the procurement quantity y0 and y1. To summarize the above analysis, we have the following
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theorem.
Theorem 26. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s profit function is jointly concave in
the procurement quantity ~y = (y0, y1). Furthermore, the firm’s optimal procurement quantity
can be obtained by setting (4.15) and (4.16) equal to zero (for interior solutions).
Note that, in absence of foreign exchange rate risk, the direct procurement strategy can be
viewed as a special case of the split procurement strategy, where it is optimal not to procure
from MCC. The following theorem investigates the sensitivity of the firm’s optimal expected
profit on different parameter values.
Theorem 27. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit is a) decreas-
ing in the unit procurement cost c0 and c1, b) decreasing in the unit penalty cost p, c) increasing
in the unit salvage value s0 and s2, and d) increasing in the unit revenue r.
While the above theorem demonstrates that the sensitivity of the firm’s optimal expected
cost on system parameters is fairly intuitive, it is unclear how the variability of the quota cost
influences the firm’s optimal expected cost. In what follows, we consider the similar stochastic
dominance concept of the quota price as discussed in §4.3.2.
Theorem 28. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit (weakly)
decreases as the quota price stochastically increases.
The above theorem tells us that a stochastically increasing quota price decreases the firm’s
optimal expected cost. This result is consistent with the direct procurement strategy as dis-
cussed in §4.3.2. Again, it is important to realize that the stochastic dominance concept does
not lend itself to the ranking of variances. Analogous to Theorem 25 and Corollary 5, we have
the following theorem when the quota price is normally distributed.
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Theorem 29. With split procurement strategy, if the quota price is normally distributed with
parameters N(µ, σ), then the firm’s optimal expected profit is decreasing in the expected quota
price µ and increasing in the quota standard deviation σ.
Note that Theorems 28 and 29 collectively prove that an increase in the variance of the
quota price does not necessarily hurt the firm, but a stochastically increasing quota price always
hurts the firm’s performance in terms of the optimal expected profit.
In a comprehensive numeric study (see §4.4.2.1 for details), we observed that the results of
Theorem 29 hold true (on average) even with Weibull distributed quota prices. We observed
that, on average, the optimal expected profit is convex increasing in the quota price coefficient
of variation. However, for very low values of the LCC production cost c0, we observed that the
optimal expected profit is not necessarily increasing in the quota price coefficient of variation.
These observations are also consistent with what we observed with the direct procurement
strategy.
Our numeric study also confirms that the result of Theorem 28 holds true in the case of
Weibull distributed quota price. In particular, we observed that the optimal expected profit
is convex decreasing in the expected quota prices. As the expected quota price increases, the
negative impact of the quota price diminishes as the firm shifts more and more production to
the alternative MCC, which is not subject to quota restrictions.
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4.3.4 Split Procurement versus Direct Procurement: Identical or Strict
Dominance
It is intuitive that the split procurement strategy, in absence of fixed cost, dominates the direct
procurement strategy. It is of interest, however, to understand when the split procurement
strategy is identical to the direct procurement strategy and when it strictly dominates the
direct procurement strategy. This helps a firm to select appropriate strategies if fixed costs
come into consideration.
Whether the split procurement strategy strictly dominates the split procurement strategy
is intimately linked with the procurement structure of the split procurement strategy, i.e.,
whether it is optimal to sole source from one country or dual source from both countries.
Remark: The split procurement strategy is identical to the direct procurement strategy if
and only if, in the optimal solution, the firm procures only from LCC. Otherwise, the split
procurement strategy strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy.
The above observation provides a crisp connection between the optimal structure of the
split procurement strategy and whether the split procurement strategy strictly dominates the
direct procurement strategy. Therefore, to determine whether the split procurement strategy
strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy, we simply need to check whether the split
procurement strategy actually procures from MCC at the optimal solution. The following
theorem provides a sufficient condition for the split procurement strategy to strictly dominate
the direct procurement strategy.
Theorem 30. With split procurement strategy, it is optimal not to procure from LCC, i.e.,
y∗0 = 0, if c1 − s2 ≤ c0 − s0.
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Consequently, the split procurement strategy strictly dominates the direct procurement
strategy if c1 − s2 ≤ c0 − s0. Note that the terms c0 − s0 and c1 − s2 are the firm’s overage
cost for LCC and MCC. Theorem 30 tells us that if the overage cost of procuring in MCC is
less than that in LCC, then the firm is better off procuring from MCC only. In this case, the
firm’s decision not to procure from LCC is not influenced by the uncertain quota cost. In other
words, the nature of the quota cost associated with LCC does not influence whether the split
procurement strategy strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy. Note that if s0 = s2,
then the stated condition never holds.
On the other hand, the following theorem provides a sufficient condition under which the
split procurement strategy is identical to the direct procurement strategy.
Theorem 31. With split procurement strategy, it is optimal not to procure from MCC, i.e.,
y∗1 = 0, if the unit production cost in MCC exceeds the following threshold
c1 > c0 + s2 + (r + p− s0)−
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z). (4.17)
Consequently, if (4.17) holds, then the split procurement strategy is identical to the direct
procurement strategy. Therefore, with an incremental fixed cost, the direct procurement strat-
egy strictly dominates the split procurement strategy if condition (4.17) is true. Note that the
above condition is more likely to occur when the quota price is less likely to exceed the r+p−s0
threshold.
We conducted a comprehensive numeric study to further investigate the relative dominance
of the split procurement strategy over the direct procurement strategy. For our numeric study,
we set the parameter values according to the base case scenario (see §4.4.2.1 for details), but
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vary the mean quota cost from 0.1 to 0.5 with a step size of 0.1, the quota cv from 0.3 to 0.7
with a step size of .1, the unit cost c1 from 0.1 to 0.9 with a step size of 0.1, the mean demand
from 40 to 160 with a step size of 30, and the demand coefficient of variation from 0.1 to 0.5
with a step size of 0.1. This gives us in total 5,625 observations.
We observed that in 72.7% of the cases, the split procurement strategy uses only one
country for total procurement quantity. Overall, the firm solely sources from the LCC (MCC)
in 44.6% (28.2%) of cases. Consequently, the split procurement strategy is identical to the direct
procurement strategy in 44.6% of the cases and it strictly dominates the direct procurement
strategy in more than 55% of the cases. This indicates that, even with incremental fixed cost,
the split procurement strategy can still be strictly preferred to the direct procurement strategy.
The above observations are influenced by a number of system parameters. On average, the
firm is more likely to solely source from LCC and less likely to solely source from MCC as
the demand coefficient of variation increases. In other words, the attractiveness of the split
procurement strategy relative to the direct procurement strategy is reduced when the demand
becomes more volatile. The advantage of the cheaper procurement cost from LCC seems to
become more salient when the demand volatility becomes higher. We note that the propensity
for the firm to use both countries in its optimal procurement can increase or decrease in the
demand coefficient of variation. We observed that, on average, the firm is initially more likely
to use both countries as the demand coefficient of variation increases, but then becomes less
likely to do so when the demand coefficient of variation becomes very high.
On the other hand, the firm is significantly less inclined to use LCC and more inclined to use
MCC as the expected quota cost increases. This is intuitive because a higher expected quota
cost increases the effective production cost in LCC. Therefore, the split procurement strategy
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strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy as the expected quota cost increases. We
also observed, however, that the firm is also significantly more likely to use both countries as the
expected quota cost increases. Table 4.1 lists the number of cases when the split procurement
strategy is identical or strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy. In addition, the
last column of the table lists, when the split procurement strategy strictly dominates the
direct procurement strategy, the average percentage increase in the expected profit for the split
procurement strategy over the direct procurement strategy.
Expected quota cost Cases of Identical Profit Cases of Strict Dominance Profit Increase (%)
0.1 756 369 5.05
0.2 625 490 8.11
0.3 500 625 10.66
0.4 375 750 13.33
0.5 250 875 16.10
Total 2,506 3,119 10.65
Table 4.1: Comparison of the split procurement strategy versus the direct procurement strategy
The relative dominance of the split procurement strategy over the direct procurement strat-
egy is also significantly influenced by the unit production cost in LCC. As expected, as the unit
production cost c0 increases, the split procurement strategy is more likely to strictly dominate
the direct procurement strategy. In addition, when the split procurement strategy strictly dom-
inates the direct procurement strategy, its relative advantage (in the expected profit) over the
direct procurement strategy is convex increasing in the unit cost c0. We note that, when the
split procurement strategy strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy, the firm is more
likely to procure from both countries when the unit production cost c0 is moderate. When the
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unit cost c0 is high, the split procurement strategy is more likely to result in the firm solely
sourcing strategy from the medium cost country.
4.3.5 Indirect Outward Processing Arrangement
In this case, the firm sources from MCC, which has an outward processing arrangement with
LCC. The production from MCC is not subject to quota restrictions5 and therefore the firm can
take advantage of the lower production cost in LCC indirectly. Note that any firms in MCC have
to maintain a certain level of domestic production activities in order to qualify for the outward
processing arrangements with LCC. let γ represent the fraction of the value of the processing
carried out in the foreign MCC. In the context of this chapter, γ is the fraction of the processing
cost carried out in MCC, while the MCC and the LCC has certain OPA arrangements. Note
that, in general, the parameter γ is product dependent, even within the same industry6. For the
buying firm, therefore, the procurement cost can be represented by (1−γ)c0+γc1, where c0 and
c1 represent the production cost in LCC and MCC respectively. Note that, from the buying
firm’s perspective, its procurement problem is a fairly straightforward newsvendor problem,
because the buying firm is not actively involved in the outward processing arrangement. In
what follows, we characterize the firm’s procurement problem.
5In certain product categories, MCC may not be entirely free of quota restrictions, but such restrictions can
be significantly less severe than that in LCC. Therefore, from the buying firm’s perspective, the quota risk from
MCC is negligible.
6Specific examples can be found, for example, on http://www.tid.gov.hk/ under the trade circular section.
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Let y denote the procurement quantity from MCC, then the firm’s expected profit is
pi(y1) = −((1− γ)c0 + γc1)y1 + r
(∫ y1
0
xdF (x) +
∫ ∞
y1
y1dF (x)
)
− p
∫ ∞
y1
(x− y1)dF (x) + s2
∫ y1
0
(y1 − x)dF (x). (4.18)
Note that in the above expression, for expositional clarity we implicitly assume that s2 > s1.
The case of s2 < s1 can be similarly analyzed. It is a known result that the firm’s optimal
procurement quantity is of a newsvendor type, i.e.,
y∗1 = F
−1
(
r + p− (1− γ)c0 − γc1
r + p− s2
)
. (4.19)
We note that, by substituting (4.19) into (4.18), we have the firm’s optimal profit as
pi(y∗1) = (r + p− s2)
∫ y∗1
0
xdF (x)− pE[x]. (4.20)
Clearly, the firm’s optimal procurement quantity is influenced by the fraction of the production
activities arranged in LCC.
Lemma 11. With the indirect OPA strategy, a) the optimal procurement quantity is decreasing
in the local processing requirement γ, and b) the optimal expected profit is decreasing in the local
processing requirement γ.
The above lemma (proof omitted) tells us that the indirect OPA becomes less attractive
as the fraction of the production activities in MCC increases. This is as expected because a
higher level of γ represents a higher level of constraint on the system.
In closing, we note that the sensitivity analysis is straightforward and obvious for the
140
indirect OPA strategy and we therefore omit any further sensitivity results for this section.
4.3.6 Direct Outward Processing Arrangement
In this case, the firm procures from two countries, where a complete production line is main-
tained in the domestic country, while additional production capacity is sourced from LCC,
which is subject to quota restriction. To avoid trivial cases, we assume the unit cost from LCC
is less than that in DOM, i.e., c0 < c2. Recall that we use s0 and s2 to denote the unit salvage
value from LCC and the home country, respectively. Note that in order for the firm to qualify
for OPA, the firm has to maintain a certain level of domestic production. Towards this end,
let α represent the fraction of the production quantity carried out in DOM. Note that, under
the direct OPA, the policy may mandate the fraction of domestic production in terms of the
processing value. Such a mandate can be converted into the quantity based requirement and
therefore is mathematically equivalent to directly specifying the quantity requirement.
Recall that we let y0 and y2 denote the firm’s procurement quantity from LCC and the do-
mestic production quantity, respectively. The above domestic production requirement, there-
fore, can be expressed as follows. The firm’s domestic procurement quantity has to be such
that y2 is no less than a certain fraction of the total procurement quantity, e.g., y2y0+y2 ≥ α,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Note that α = 0 corresponds to the case of unrestricted domestic production
level, whereas α = 1 corresponds to pure domestic production case.
With all other strategies, we do not explicitly consider the shipment transit time, because
all these strategies involve similar international shipping. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that the transit times are identical with the earlier three strategies. With direct OPA, however,
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domestic production does not involve international transit times and therefore the leadtime is
shorter than all other strategies. We therefore introduce the notion of leadtime difference,
denoted as ∆L = LA − LB, where LA and LB denote the transit time for LCC and DOM,
respectively. The leadtime difference ∆L may allow the firm to learn more information about
its total demand. Let the starting time be 0; then ∆L is the time at which the firm must decide
its domestic production quantity y2. We use θ˜ to denote the possible information that may be
obtained at time ∆L. Furthermore, we use F∆L|θ˜(·) to denote the updated demand distribution
when the firm makes its domestic production decision at time ∆L. See Figure 4.3.
)(0 ⋅F )(~ ⋅Δ θLF
Selling Season0 LCC Leadtime AL
DOM Leadtime BLLΔ
   
Figure 4.3: Time line for leadtime difference in the direct outward processing arrangement
In what follows, we first describe the firm’s second stage decision problem for domestic
production. We then derive the firm’s first stage expected profit function.
4.3.6.1 Second Stage Problem
In the second stage, the firm’s decision problem is to determine the domestic production quan-
tity y2. In addition, the firm may also adjust the amount of future shipment w0 ≤ y0, depending
on the updated demand distribution. The firm’s second stage problem is therefore a joint op-
timization problem: the firm needs to simultaneously determine w0 and y2. Note that in the
case w0 < y0, the excess amount of y0−w0 can be salvaged at s0. Given the above description,
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the firm’s second stage expected profit function is
piL(w0, y2|y0, θ˜) = −c2y2 + s0(y0 − w0) + r
(∫ w0+y2
0
xdF∆L|θ˜(x) +
∫ ∞
w0+y2
(w0 + y2)dF∆L|θ˜(x)
)
− p
∫ ∞
w0+y2
(x− w0 − y2)dF∆L|θ˜(x) + s2
∫ w0+y2
0
(w0 + y2 − x)dF∆L|θ˜(x),
subject to: w0 ≤ min
(
y0,
1− α
α
y2
)
. (4.21)
We note that s0 implicitly includes the savings in the transportation cost, which is assumed to
be included in the unit cost c0. For expositional clarity, we assume that s0 ≤ s2.
For any given y0 and y2, ∂w0pi(w0, y2|y0) = (r+p−s0)− (r+p−s2)F∆L|θ(w0+y2), which is
increasing in w0 (recall that s0 is assumed to be less than s2). The revenue function pi(w0, y2|y0)
is therefore always (weakly) increasing in w0. Consequently, the constraint in (4.21) must be
binding. In what follows, we consider the binding conditions in each region.
4.3.6.2 Shipment Bounded By OPA Procurement Quantity
If, at optimality, w0 is bounded by y0, then (4.21) can be rewritten (after some algebra) as
piL(w0, y2|y0, θ˜) = −c2y2 + (r + p− s2)
∫ y0+y2
0
xdF∆L|θ˜(x)
− (r + p− s2)(y0 + y2)F∆L|θ˜(y0 + y2) + (r + p)(y0 + y2)− pE∆L|θ˜[x]
subject to: y0 ≤ 1− α
α
y2.
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For any given y0 (and ignoring the constraint), the above expression is a standard newsvendor
model, and the optimal unconstrained y∗2 is given by
y∗2 =
(
F−1∆L|θ
(
r + p− c2
r + p− s2
)
− y0
)+
. (4.22)
Therefore, if the optimal solution of w0 with respect to (4.21) is bounded by y0, then the
optimal y∗2 must satisfy the following. Let kL = F
−1
∆L|θ
(
r+p−c2
r+p−s2
)
.
y∗2 =

kL − y0, y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
α
1−αy0, y0 > (1− α)kL.
4.3.6.3 Shipment Bounded By Domestic Production Quantity
In the case where, at optimality, w0 is bounded by 1−αα y2, then (4.21) can be rewritten (after
some algebra) as
piL(w0, y2|y0, θ˜) = −c2y2 + s0
(
y0 − 1− α
α
y2
)
+ (r + p− s2)
∫ 1
α
y2
0
xdF∆L|θ˜(x)
− (r + p− s2) 1
α
y2F∆L|θ˜
(
1
α
y2
)
+ (r + p)
1
α
y2 − pE∆L|θ˜[x]
subject to: y0 >
1− α
α
y2.
For any given y0 (and ignoring the constraint), the above expression is a standard newsvendor
model, and the optimal unconstrained y∗2 is given by
y∗2 = αF
−1
∆L|θ
(
r + p− αc2 − (1− α)s0
r + p− s2
)
. (4.23)
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Therefore, if the optimal solution of w0 with respect to (4.21) is bounded by 1−αα y2, then the
optimal solution to (4.21) must satisfy the following. Let kH = F−1∆L|θ
(
r+p−αc2−(1−α)s0
r+p−s2
)
.
w∗0 = (1− α)kH , y∗2 = αkH , if y0 > (1− α)kH ;
4.3.6.4 Comparison of the Bounds
For y0 > (1−α)kH , in order to characterize the optimal solution to (4.21), we need to determine
whether w0 should be bounded by y0 or (1−α)kH . Let pi1 denote the resulting revenue function
with w0 = y0 substituted into (4.21). Analogously, let pi2 denote the resulting revenue function
with w0 = (1− α)kH substituted into (4.21). One can show that
pi1 =− c2 α1− αy0 + (r + p− s2)
∫ y0
1−α
0
xdF∆L|θ˜(x)− (r + p− s2)
y0
1− αF∆L|θ˜
(
y0
1− α
)
+ (r + p)
y0
1− α − pE∆L|θ˜[x],
and
pi2 =(1− α)kHs0 + (r + p− s2)
∫ kH
0
xdF∆L|θ˜(x)− pE∆L|θ˜[x].
Note that pi2 is a constant, independent of y0 (for any y0 > (1−α)kH). It can be easily verified
that pi1 = pi2 for y0 = (1− α)kH .
The relative attractiveness of pi1 versus pi2 therefore simply depends on the shape of pi1 for
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y0 > (1− α)kH . Note that
∂y0pi1 =
1
1− α (r + p− αc2)−
1
1− α (r + p− s2)F∆L|θ˜
(
y0
1− α
)
,
which is clearly a concave function of y0. The revenue function pi1 reaches its maximum point
at
y0 = (1− α)F−1
(
r + p− αc2
r + p− s2
)
.
Let kG = F−1
(
r+p−αc2
r+p−s2
)
. Therefore, there exists a unique yˆ0 > (1 − α)kG such that pi1 ≥ pi2
for y0 ≤ yˆ0 and pi1 < pi2 for y0 > yˆ0. Note that yˆ0 must satisfy
y0
1− α
(
r + p− αc2 − (r + p− s2)F∆L|θ˜
(
y0
1− α
))
+ (r + p− s2)
∫ y0
1−α
kH
xdF∆L|θ˜(x) = (1− α)kHs0.
Finally, we note that the derivative of the revenue function pi1 and pi2 with respect to y0
must be bounded by s0 for any given y0, because in the worst case scenario, the firm can
simply salvage y0 at unit value of s0. Because the derivative of pi1 and pi2 at y0 = (1− α)kH is
exactly s0, we know the solution (w∗0, y∗2) at y0 = (1−α)kH is optimal for any y0 > (1−α)kH .
Figure 4.4 depicts the firm’s second stage revenue function as a function of the initial OPA
procurement quantity y0. Note that the bolded line denotes the optimal revenue function.
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Figure 4.4: Second stage profit function as the LCC procurement quantity y0 increases
To summarize the above analysis, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 32. For any given OPA procurement quantity y0, the firm’s second stage optimal
shipment, production, and revenue function is given by the following.
w∗0 =

y0, y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
(1− α)kH , y0 > (1− α)kH .
y∗2 =

kL − y0, y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
α
1−αy0, (1− α)kL < y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
αkH , y0 > (1− α)kH .
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pi∗L(w
∗
0, y
∗
2|y0, θ˜) =

c2y0 + (r + p− s2)
∫ kL
0 xdF∆L|θ˜(x)− pE∆L|θ˜[x], y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
(r + p− αc2) y01−α + (r + p− s2)
∫ y0
1−α
0 xdF∆L|θ˜(x)
−(r + p− s2) y01−αF∆L|θ˜
(
y0
1−α
)
− pE∆L|θ˜[x], (1− α)kL < y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
s0y0 + (r + p− s2)
∫ kH
0 xdF∆L|θ˜(x)− pE∆L|θ˜[x], y0 > (1− α)kH .
(4.24)
The above theorem tells us that the firm will make the full shipment of OPA procurement
quantity y0 as long as y0 is not too high as compared with the updated demand information.
If y0 is too high relative to the updated demand distribution, i.e., y0 > (1 − α)kH , then the
firm will only ship (1− α)kH and salvage the rest at a unit value of s0.
In addition, the firm’s second stage production quantity is increasing in the system param-
eter α, indicating that a more stringent OPA policy indeed leads to a higher level of domestic
production. This higher level of domestic production, however, comes at the expense of the
firm’s expected profit. In the extreme case, when α = 1, the firm does not have any LCC
production y0 and maintains full domestic production. On the other extreme, when α = 0,
the firm maintains, in expectation, no domestic production. Otherwise, the firm can simply
increase its LCC production, with a lower production cost, to compensate for the domestic
production. While the policy constraint α can be effective to maintain domestic production,
it is important to realize that the firm may find the alternative of not using direct OPA more
attractive than being subject to the domestic production requirement. We discuss the relative
attractiveness of different strategies in the numeric studies section.
The following theorem proves that the firm’s second stage problem is well behaved with
respect to the first stage procurement quantity y0.
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Theorem 33. The firm’s second stage optimal revenue function is a concave function of y0.
Given the characterization of the firm’s second stage problem, the firm’s first stage problem
can be expressed as
pi(y0) = −c0y0 + Eθ˜ [piL(w∗0, y∗2|y0, θ)] . (4.25)
Since the expectation operation preserves concavity, by Theorem 33, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 34. With direct OPA, the firm’s expected profit is a concave function of its initial
production quantity y0.
Therefore, there exists a unique y∗0 that maximizes the firm’s expected profit function in
the first stage. We note that this characterization is very general with respect to the forecast
evolution process. This result holds regardless of the particular type of demand updating
process the firm may use.
It is of interest to understand how the leadtime difference ∆L influences the firm’s optimal
expected profit. Because a longer leadtime difference allows the firm to gather more information
about its total demand, one may suspect that a longer ∆L increases the firm’s expected optimal
profit. The following theorem confirms that such intuition is indeed correct.
Theorem 35. With the direct OPA strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit is non-decreasing
in the leadtime difference ∆L.
The generality of the above analysis, however, prevents either implicit or closed form solu-
tions for the optimal procurement level. To further investigate the properties of the optimal
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solution, in what follows we impose a particular type of demand updating process and then
further characterize the firm’s optimal solution.
4.3.6.5 The Martingale Forecast Updating Process
Here we assume the firm has the martingale type of forecast evolution process. In particular,
we adopt the additive martingale process as developed by Graves et al. (1986) and Heath
and Jackson (1994). The martingale process is very flexible to model a variety of forecast
updating processes. Since the martingale forecast updating process is intimately related with
the length of the planning horizon, such a process dovetails well in our context, where the
leadtime difference naturally leads to a valuable time window for the firm to update its demand
forecast. We refer to Graves et al. (1986) for a detailed description of the additive martingale
forecast updating process. For completeness, here we briefly describe the forecasting process
and introduce relevant notations along the way.
Referring to Figure 4.3, the firm has an initial forecast of the total season demand at
time 0, i.e., when the firm makes the decision on OPA production level y0. We denote this
initial forecast as µ0, which is the firm’s best estimate of the total season demand at time 0.
From time 0 until the selling season, denoted as T , the firm makes multiple adjustments to
its initial forecast of the total demand as more information becomes available as time elapses.
We denote a forecast adjustment made at time 0 < t < T as δt, which is a random variable
with mean zero and standard deviation σt. Furthermore, we assume these random adjustments
are independent and normally distributed. With discrete adjustments, the firm’s view of the
total season demand at time 0 is given by µ0 +
∑
t δt. Therefore, at time 0, the total season
demand is normally distributed with parameter µ0 and σ20 =
∑
t σ
2
t , i.e., F0(·) ∼ N(µ0, σ0).
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For mathematical convenience, we assume these adjustments are continuous in time, i.e., δ(t)
is a continuous function of t. Consequently, we have σ20 =
∫ T
0 σ
2(t)dt.
At time ∆L, the firm’s forecast of total demand is the initial forecast of µ0 plus the sum
of forecast adjustments up to time ∆L. We denote this forecast of demand at time ∆L as
µ˜L, which is a normally distributed random variable. For any given realization of µL, the
firm’s view of total season demand is normally distributed with parameter µL and σL, where
σ2L =
∫ T
L σ
2(t)dt. Note that E[µL] = µ0 and σ2L = σ
2
0 −
∫ L
0 σ
2(t)dt < σ20. This is consistent
with an unbiased, gradually improving forecast updating process. As a final note, we use GL(·)
to denote the distribution function of µL, which is normally distributed with mean µ0 and
variance σ2µL =
∫ L
0 σ
2(t)dt.
To summarize, at time 0, the firm’s view of the season demand is described by a normal
distribution with an expected demand of µ0 and variance of σ20. At time ∆L, for any realized
forecast revision process, the firm’s view of the season demand is described again by a normal
distribution, but with an expected demand of µL and variance of σ2L. Note that the realization
of µL can be higher or lower than the original forecast of µ0, but the variance of the demand
at time ∆L is lower than the initial one, i.e., σ2L ≤ σ20.
4.3.6.6 Optimal Procurement Problem with Martingale Forecast Updating
To further characterize the firm’s optimal procurement problem, we substitute the martingale
forecast updating process into (4.24). Recall that kL = F−1∆L|θ
(
r+p−c2
r+p−s2
)
, which can also be
expressed as kL = µL + Φ−1
(
r+p−c2
r+p−s2
)
σL, where Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution
function. Analogously, kH = F−1∆L|θ
(
r+p−αc2−(1−α)s0
r+p−s2
)
, which can also be expressed as kH =
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µL +Φ−1
(
r+p−αc2−(1−α)s0
r+p−s2
)
σL.
piL(w∗0, y
∗
2|y0, µL) =

(r + p− s2)
∫ kL
−∞ xdF∆L|µL(x) + c2y0 − pµL, y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
(r + p− s2)
∫ y0
1−α
−∞ xdF∆L|µL(x) + (r + p− αc2) y01−α
−(r + p− s2) y01−αF∆L|µL
(
y0
1−α
)
− pµL, (1− α)kL < y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
(r + p− s2)
∫ kH
−∞ xdF∆L|µL(x) + s0y0 − pµL, y0 > (1− α)kH .
(4.26)
We note that with normal distribution, it is possible for demand to go negative. However, here
we may assume that the normal distribution parameter values are such that the probability of
negative demand is negligible. By taking advantage of the special structure of the martingale
forecast updating process, we can write out more explicitly the firm’s second stage optimal
profit function, which in turn will help us to characterize the firm’s first stage problem. With
martingale forecast updating, one can prove that (see Lemma A13)
piL(w∗0, y
∗
2|y0, µL) =

−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
− z
2
L
2 + (r − c2)µL + c2y0, y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
−
( y0
1−α−µL√
2σL
)2
+ (r + p− αc2) y01−α
+(r + p− s2)
(
µL − y01−α
)
F∆L|µL
(
y0
1−α
)
− pµL, (1− α)kL < y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
− z
2
H
2 + (r − αc2 − (1− α)s0)µL
+s0y0, y0 > (1− α)kH .
(4.27)
We note that the critical threshold kH may not always exist, regardless of whether the firm’s
forecast updating process is a martingale. With α = 0, i.e., there is no mandatory domestic
production requirement, kH never exists. In this case, the firm maintains, in expectation, no
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domestic production. On the other hand, with α = 1, then kH always exists and the firm’s
LCC production is zero.
Substituting (4.27) into (4.25), we have
pi(y0) = −c0y0 +
∫ ∞
y0
1−α−zLσL
(
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2L
2 + (r − c2)µL + c2y0
)
dGL(µL)
+
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e
−
( y0
1−α−µL√
2σL
)2
+ (r + p− αc2) y01− α
+(r + p− s2)
(
µL − y01− α
)
F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)
− pµL
)
dGL(µL)
+
∫ y0
1−α−zHσL
−∞
(
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2H
2 + (r − αc2 − (1− α)s0)µL + s0y0
)
dGL(µL).
(4.28)
In what follows, we explicitly derive the firm’s first stage optimal procurement problem. One
can show that (see Lemma A14)
∂y0pi(y0) = −c0 + c2GL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
+ s0GL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
+
1
1− α
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
[
(r + p− αc2)− (r + p− s2)F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)]
dGL(µL). (4.29)
Using (4.29), it is straightforward to show that
∂2pi(y0)
∂y20
= − 1
(1− α)2
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
(r + p− s2)F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)
dGL(µL) < 0,
which confirms that the firm’s first stage profit function is concave in y0.
Theorem 36. With additive martingale forecast updating, the firm’s optimal OPA procurement
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quantity y∗0 satisfies
(r + p− c2)GL
(
y∗0
1− α − zLσL
)
− (r + p− αc2 − (1− α)s0)GL
(
y∗0
1− α − zHσL
)
− (r + p− s2)
∫ y∗0
1−α−zLσL
y∗0
1−α−zHσL
F∆L|µL
(
y∗0
1− α
)
dGL(µL) = (1− α)(c0 − c2).
(4.30)
Note that (4.30) can be further simplified as
∫ y∗0
1−α−zLσL
y∗0
1−α−zHσL
GL(µL)dF∆L|µL
(
y∗0
1− α
)
= (1− α) c0 − c2
r + p− s2 . (4.31)
The above theorem tells us that the firm’s optimal OPA procurement quantity depends on
the demand forecast of µL only through its distribution, not any particular realization of µL.
However, the realization of µL significantly influences the firm’s OPA shipment decision as well
as the domestic production decision.
Corollary 6. With additive forecast updating process as described in §4.3.6.5, the firm makes
full shipment of its OPA production if the realized forecast level at time ∆L is sufficiently high,
i.e., µL ≥ y01−α − Φ−1
(
r+p−αc2−(1−α)s0
r+p−s2
)
σL. Otherwise, the firm makes partial shipment of its
OPA production.
By Corollary 6, the firm is more likely to make full shipment of its OPA production if
its domestic unit production cost c2 is cheaper. This may seem counterintuitive, but it is
reasonable because a lower domestic unit production cost will actually reduce the optimal
OPA production quantity. Consequently, it is less likely for the firm to be in a position to
reduce its OPA shipment quantity. It is straightforward to realize that the firm is also more
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likely to make the full shipment of its OPA production if the unit LCC cost c0 is higher and/or
the unit LCC salvage value s0 is lower.
4.3.6.7 Leadtime Sensitivity
While we have proved in Theorem 35 that the firm’s optimal expected profit is non-decreasing
in the leadtime difference ∆L for the direct OPA strategy, it is of interest to understand the
magnitude of the influence induced by the leadtime difference ∆L. Toward this end, we set up
a numeric study according to the base case scenario parameter values (see §4.4.2.1 for details).
We vary the leadtime ∆L from 0 to 5 with a step size of 0.5. Because the impact of the leadtime
difference ∆L is likely to be linked with demand characteristics, we vary the demand mean from
40 to 160 with a step size of 30. We vary the demand coefficient of variation from 0.1 to 0.5
with a step size of 0.1. In addition, we vary the unit production cost c0 from 0.1 to 0.9 with a
step size of 0.1. Therefore, we have in total 2,475 observations.
We observed that, on average, the optimal expected profit is convex increasing in the
leadtime difference ∆L. Clearly, an increase in the leadtime difference ∆L makes the direct
OPA strategy become increasingly attractive to the firm. A key reason that a larger ∆L is
advantageous to the firm is the information learning effect associated with a longer leadtime
difference. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the benefit associated with the leadtime
difference will be sensitive to the inherent demand uncertainties. This intuition turns out to be
correct. Figure 4.5 illustrates the firm’s optimal expected profit as a function of the leadtime
difference ∆L as well as the demand coefficient of variation.
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Figure 4.5: Direct OPA optimal expected profit as the leadtime difference increases
Note that an increase in the leadtime difference becomes increasingly more beneficial to
the firm as the demand uncertainty becomes higher. When demand is highly uncertain, the
inherent option value of having a postponed domestic production becomes much more valuable
to the firm.
4.4 Comparison of Different Strategies
In this section, we investigate how the quota, demand, and cost characteristics affect the rela-
tive attractiveness of each strategy. We note that a firm’s absolute preference for a particular
strategy is influenced by a number of system parameters. Therefore, one can easily create cases
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where one strategy is preferred to another strategy by changing different parameter values. The
more interesting comparison, therefore, lies in the directional change of the relative attractive-
ness of different strategies. In what follows, we first describe the scenario when a parameter
change influences only one strategy. We then investigate the scenario when a parameter change
influences multiple strategies simultaneously.
4.4.1 Parameters Affecting A Single Strategy (Dual Strategies)
When a parameter affects only a single strategy, it is clear that if such a parameter change
improves this single strategy, then, all else being equal, this parameter change must also increase
the relative attractiveness of this single strategy over all other strategies. The following table
summarizes the effect of an increase in the parameter values that affect only a single strategy
(or, in the case of quota characteristics, that affect two strategies). Unless otherwise stated,
all results in Table 4.2 are established analytically in the earlier sections (or when such results
are straightforward to establish analytically).
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Parameter Direct Procurement Split Procurement Indirect OPA Direct OPA
Expected Quota Pricea µ ↓ ↓ - -
Quota Price Varianceb σ ↑ ↑ - -
MCC Production Costc c1 - ↓ ↓ -
Local Production Bound γ - - ↓ -
DOM Production Bound α - - - ↓
Leadtime Difference ∆L - - - ↑
DOM Production Cost c2 - - - ↓
aA more general concept of stochastic dominance also holds.
bFor normally distributed quota price only.
cNote that the MCC production cost does not have to be identical for the split procurement and the indirect
OPA strategies.
Table 4.2: Directional results on parameters affecting a single strategy or dual strategies
The above directional results are fairly intuitive, except that, for the case of normally
distributed quota price, the firm’s optimal expected profit increases in the quota price variance.
This can be explained by the fact that the firm’s downside risk of very high quota price is capped
because the firm can simply salvage the product. On the other hand, the upside benefit of a
very low quota price is very beneficial for the firm. This imbalance of the upside advantage
versus the downside risk makes a more volatile quota price beneficial for the firm.
Based on Table 4.2, we now briefly discuss some straightforward intra-strategy comparisons.
With respect to OPA strategies, because the OPA strategies are not influenced by the mean
and the variance of the quota cost, an increase in the mean or decrease in the variance of
the quota cost makes the OPA strategies more attractive. The comparison between the direct
procurement strategy and the split procurement strategy is also straightforward, because the
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split procurement strategy (weakly) dominates the direct procurement strategy. Thus, any in-
cremental fixed cost toward the split procurement strategy simply makes the split procurement
strategy less attractive. We also note that, even if the leadtime difference ∆L = 0, the direct
OPA strategy is not necessarily dominated by the indirect OPA strategy. It depends on other
system parameters, and in particular, on the relative restrictiveness of the domestic production
bound α and γ.
4.4.2 Parameters Affecting Multiple Strategies
Some important parameters that influence multiple strategies include the LCC unit production
cost and the unit revenue, as well as the demand characteristics. To investigate these parameter
effects, we use a comprehensive numeric study to understand how the relative attractiveness
of each different strategy is influenced by these parameter values. In what follows, we first
describe the numeric study design and then present detailed results.
4.4.2.1 Numeric Study Design
We describe our numeric study in the sequence of cost/revenue parameters, quota parameters,
demand parameters and policy specific parameters. In our description, we introduce parameter
values for the base case scenario as well as the range values for any specific parameters.
For cost/revenue related parameters, we fix the domestic unit production cost at 1, i.e.,
c2 = 1. The LCC unit production cost c0 varies between 0.1 to 0.9, with a step size of 0.1.
This gives us a total of 9 different cost ratios. Both the split procurement and the indirect
OPA strategy involve a MCC, which we assume has a lower production cost as compared
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with the domestic production cost. In addition, we assume the MCC production cost is more
closely aligned with the domestic production cost. Therefore, we fix the MCC production cost
cˆ1 = 0.8, which is at the 80% of the domestic production cost. We note that the MCC involved
in the split procurement strategy is not necessarily the same country involved in the indirect
OPA strategy. For ease of exposition, we assume they have identical costs. Such an assumption
merely shifts the absolute value of a given strategy and does not affect the change in the relative
attractiveness of a particular strategy, which is our primary interest here.
We set the salvage value at 25% of the unit production cost. Therefore, s2 is fixed at 0.25
and s0 varies with c0. Note that the salvage value for the MCC s1 is set at 0.2, which is at 25%
of the MCC production cost c1. For the base case scenario, the unit revenue is set at r = 3.
When the effect of the unit revenue is concerned, we vary the unit revenue from 1 to 5 with a
step size of 1, which gives us a total of 5 values. We set the unit penalty cost at 20% of the
unit revenue. Therefore, in the base case scenario, p = 0.6.
For the quota related parameter values, we chose the Weibull distribution for the quota cost
distribution. The (two-parameter) Weibull distribution has non-negative support and allows
very flexible distribution shapes. Note that the Weibull distribution can be completely specified
by the mean and the coefficient of variation (cv). For the base case scenario, we set the mean
and the cv of the quota price distribution as 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. Note that the base case
scenario corresponds to the unimodal shape (resembles a skewed normal distribution). We vary
the mean of the quota price from 0.1 to 0.5 with a step size of 0.1. Similarly, we vary the cv
of the quota price from 0.3 to 0.7 with a step size of 0.1. Therefore, we have 52 = 25 scenarios
for the quota cost. In all these scenarios, the distribution is of the unimodal type as opposed
to the exponential type. Therefore, the shape effect across these different scenarios is not very
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significant.
For the demand related parameters, we use the normal distribution for the total demand.
For the base case scenario, we set the mean demand equal to 100 with a coefficient of variation
(cv) of .3. This implies that µ0 = 100 and σ0 = 30 for the base case scenario. We vary the
mean demand from 40 to 160 with a step size of 30. In addition, we vary the cv from 0.1 to
0.5 with a step size of 0.1. Thus, we have in total 52 = 25 demand related scenarios.
There are some strategy-specific parameter values that need to be specified. For the direct
OPA strategy, we adopt the linear martingale forecast updating process. In particular, we
set the LCC production leadtime equal to 6, and we set the leadtime difference ∆L equal
to 1. This implies that the leadtime for domestic production is one period shorter than the
LCC production. The standard deviation parameters σµL and σL can be derived from the
demand and leadtime parameter. With the linear martingale process, we have σµL =
√
Lσ and
σL =
√
T − Lσ, where σ = σ0/
√
T . Therefore, for the base case scenario, we have σµL = 12.25
and σL = 27.39. The value of σµL and σL will vary with the demand cv as well as the leadtime
differences.
For the direct OPA policy parameter, we set the domestic production constraint α = 0.5.
(see DTI (2006)). For the indirect OPA approach, we set the “domestic” production constraint
γ = 0.4. In this case, only the essential operation is required to be carried out in the host
country (MCC in figure 4.1).
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4.4.2.2 Demand and Information Characteristics
To investigate the demand characteristics on the firm’s optimal expected profit under different
strategies, we set all parameter values according to the base case scenario, but varying the
mean demand from 40 to 160 with a step size of 30 and the demand cv from .1 to .5 with a
step size of .1. In addition, we vary the LCC unit cost c0 from .1 to .9 with a step size of .1.
We also vary the leadtime difference ∆L from 0 to 5 with a step size of 1. Thus, we have in
total 1,225 observations.
We observed that the optimal expected profits for all four strategies increase approximately
linearly in the expected demand. We also observed that the slope of the increase becomes
steeper as the unit production cost c0 increases. The slope of the increase in the expected
profit, however, is different across different strategies. For a given set of parameter values, a
strategy that starts off as the most preferred strategy will have the steepest slope, i.e., fastest
growth in the expected profit as the expected demand increases. Similarly, a strategy that
starts off as the least preferred strategy will have the shallowest slope, i.e., slowest growth
in the expected profit as the expected demand increases. Consequently, an increase in the
expected demand cannot change the rankings of the four mitigation strategies. An increase
in the expected demand merely magnifies the absolute difference in the optimal expected cost
among the different strategies.
For the demand coefficient of variation, we observed that the optimal expected profits
for all four strategies decrease in the demand cv. The slope of the decline in the optimal
expected profit for different strategies, however, is different. On average, the direct OPA
strategy saw steepest decline in the optimal expected profit as the demand cv increases. On
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the other extreme, the direct procurement strategy saw least decline in the optimal expected
profit as the demand cv increases. On average, the rankings from the steepest decline to the
shallowest decline by strategy is direct OPA, indirect OPA, split procurement, and lastly direct
procurement. Consequently, in contrast to the effect of the expected demand, we observed that
an increase in the demand cv can in fact shift the rankings of the four mitigation strategies.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the average decline in the optimal expected profit for the four strategies
as the demand cv increases.
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Figure 4.6: Optimal expected profits as the demand coefficient of variation increases
It is clear that, on average, as the demand cv increases, the direct procurement strategy
becomes relatively more attractive. In particular, the direct procurement strategy overtakes
the direct OPA strategy as the demand cv becomes large. Note that Figure 4.6 is an illustration
of the average decline in the optimal expected profit as the demand cv increases. It does not
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imply that the indirect OPA strategy is always preferred to all other strategies. In fact, the
split procurement (direct procurement) strategy, for example, can be strictly preferred to all
other strategies when the LCC unit production cost is relatively low. A detailed examination
of the data reveals the following observations.
• The indirect OPA strategy declines faster than the split procurement strategy, except
when the unit quota price is high and the unit production cost from LCC is moderate.
With moderate LCC cost, the split procurement strategy is more likely to procure from
both countries. In this case, the split procurement strategy seems to be more sensitive to
the demand volatility, especially when the quota price is relatively high.
• The indirect OPA strategy always declines faster than the direct procurement strategy.
• The split procurement strategy declines faster than the direct procurement strategy, ex-
cept when the LCC cost is extremely high. With extremely high LCC cost, the optimal
procurement quantity for the direct procurement strategy becomes relatively more sensi-
tive to changes in the demand volatility.
• The direct OPA strategy can decline faster or slower than any of the other strategies,
depending on the leadtime difference ∆L. With a lower leadtime difference, the direct
OPA strategy quickly loses its appeal as the demand cv increases. With a higher lead-
time difference, however, the direct OPA strategy can surpass all other strategies and
become the most appealing strategy as the demand cv increases. Therefore, the leadtime
difference ∆L can significantly influence the attractiveness of the direct OPA strategy as
the demand cv increases.
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4.4.2.3 Cost Characteristics
The LCC unit production cost c0 has a profound impact on the attractiveness of different
strategies. We observed that the optimal expected profits for all four strategies decrease as the
unit production cost c0 increases. All but the split procurement strategy declines approximately
linearly with respect to the unit cost c0. As the LCC unit production cost increases, the relative
attractiveness of different strategies shifts from direct procurement/split procurement strategies
to the indirect OPA strategy and then to the split procurement strategy. See Figure 4.7. Note
it is not the absolute values of the different strategies that makes such a shift interesting, but
rather the relative speed of the change. In fact, the direct OPA strategy becomes steadily more
attractive (except for the split procurement case) as the unit production cost c0 increases,
although with our base case scenario, the direct OPA strategy is never preferred. As discussed
earlier, the appeal of the direct OPA strategy is strongest when the leadtime difference ∆L is
large and the demand volatility is high.
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Figure 4.7: Optimal expected profits as the LCC unit procurement cost increases
On average, the direct procurement strategy declines the fastest with respect to the unit
production cost c0. This is due to the fact that the direct procurement strategy does not
have a MCC production option as the unit cost c0 increases. The direct OPA strategy is
less sensitive to the unit cost c0 as compared with the indirect OPA strategy. The reason is
that, for the direct OPA strategy, the firm can adjust its LCC procurement quantity and its
domestic production quantity (within the constraint α) to cope with the shift in the relative
production cost. Finally, the split procurement strategy becomes independent of the LCC unit
production cost when c0 is very large, since the split procurement strategy simply degenerates
to the single sourcing strategy from the MCC. Note that, if a fixed cost (however small) is
charged to the split procurement strategy, then the direct procurement strategy is preferred to
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the split procurement strategy for a large range of c0 values.
In general, when the unit production cost c0 is low, the sheer cost advantage makes the direct
procurement and the split procurement strategy very attractive. However, as c0 increases to a
moderate level, the indirect OPA strategy can be more appealing since it balances the product
cost without incurring uncertain quota cost. Finally, when the unit production cost c0 is fairly
large, the direct OPA strategy may become more attractive because of the leadtime advantage,
especially when the demand is very volatile.
4.4.3 The Influence of Quota Cost on OPA Policy Bounds
Both the direct and the indirect OPA strategies remove the quota uncertainty, but at the
expense of maintaining domestic (or MCC) production. This disadvantage is mainly reflected
through the policy bound parameters α and γ for the direct and indirect OPA strategies, respec-
tively. Therefore, it is of interest to gauge the upper bound of these two policies’ parameters,
at which both OPA strategies can still achieve at least as much expected profit as the direct
procurement strategy.
To investigate this question, we set up a numeric study using base case scenario parameter
values as described in §4.4.2.1, but varying the expected quota cost from 0.1 to 0.5 with a step
size of 0.1, the unit cost c0 from 0.1 to 0.9 with a step size of 0.1, and the demand cv from 0.1
to 0.5 with a step size of 0.1. We therefore have in total 225 scenarios for each OPA strategy.
For each scenario, we search over the policy parameter values α and γ such that the optimal
expected profit is at least as much as that of the direct procurement strategy.
We observed that adjusting the policy parameter always enables both OPA strategies to
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achieve at least the expected profit achieved by the direct procurement policy. Furthermore,
we observed that in 42% of the cases, the indirect OPA strategy achieved a higher expected
profit than that achieved by the direct procurement strategy, even when the policy parameter
γ is set to 1. On average, these cases achieved 7.12% higher expected profit than that by the
direct procurement strategy. For the direct OPA strategy, we observed that in 33% of the cases
it achieved a higher expected profit than that by the direct procurement strategy, even when
the policy parameter α is set to 1. On average, these cases achieved 4.99% higher expected
profit than that by the direct procurement strategy.
We observed that the upper bound of these policy parameters increases as the expected
quota cost increases, indicating that removing the quota cost becomes more valuable. This also
implies that the policy maker has a wider range of freedom to implement the OPA policies.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the indifference curve for the direct OPA policy bound α and the optimal
expected domestic production quantity. We note that both policy bounds α and γ (not plotted)
is concave increasing in the expected quota cost, indicating more latitudes for the domestic
(MCC) production requirements. This implies that, as the expected quota cost increases, the
policy bounds for the OPA strategies increase in a concave fashion.
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Figure 4.8: Policy bounds as the expected quota cost increases
Figure 4.8 indicates that an increase in the policy bound α indeed achieves the policy’s
purpose, that is, to maintain a higher level of domestic production quantity. However, we note
that the policy bound α is an unstable indifference point, because a slight increase in α will make
the direct procurement strategy more attractive. Consequently, if the policy bound exceeds
these indifference points, then the firm may maintain zero domestic production quantities.
For the indirect OPA strategy, we note that an increase in the policy bound γ is accompanied
by a decrease in the optimal procurement quantity. For the direct OPA strategy, an increase
in the policy bound γ directly increases the costs for every unit procured. Consequently, the
firm finds it optimal to reduce the procurement quantity to mitigate the significant increase in
the procurement cost.
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We now turn attention to the effect of demand volatility on the policy bounds α and γ. We
observed that both policy bounds are decreasing in the demand coefficient of variation. This
implies that the appropriate policy bounds for the OPA strategies should be differentiated by
the demand characteristics. In particular, a higher policy bound can be implemented with a low
demand volatility, but these policy bounds must be reduced when the demand becomes more
volatile. Otherwise the OPA strategies will not be as competitive as the direct procurement
(split procurement) strategy. See Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Policy bounds as the demand coefficient of variation increases
We also note that the policy bounds for α and γ increase in the LCC unit production cost
c0. This indicates that a higher unit production cost at the LCC makes the direct procurement
strategy less attractive and therefore the OPA strategies more attractive, and this in turn
relaxes the policy bound for α and γ. In fact, with very high LCC production cost, both α and
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γ become 1, implying that complete domestic production can be preferred.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we contrast four different strategies for mitigating the supply risk induced by
trade barriers. We characterize the optimal solutions for these strategies and provide managerial
insights on the relative attractiveness of different strategies.
For the direct procurement and split procurement strategy, we prove that the optimal
expected profit is decreasing in the quota cost in terms of the first order stochastic dominance.
In other words, a stochastically increasing quota cost leads to a decrease in the optimal expected
cost. In the special case of the normally distributed quota price, we prove that the firm’s
optimal expected profit is decreasing in the expected quota cost but increasing in the variance
of the quota cost. For the split procurement strategy, we also provide sufficient conditions
when the split procurement strategy strictly dominates the direct procurement strategy. In
our comprehensive numeric study, we observed that the split procurement strategy strictly
dominates the direct procurement strategy in more than 50% of the cases, indicating that the
split procurement strategy can be strictly preferred even if there is an incremental fixed cost
associated with the split procurement strategy.
For the direct OPA strategy, we prove that the firm’s optimal expected profit is non-
decreasing in the leadtime difference ∆L. Furthermore, we investigate the special case of the
martingale forecast updating process for the direct OPA strategy. We characterize the firm’s
optimal procurement decisions under the general martingale process. In our comprehensive
numeric study, we observed that the firm’s optimal expected profit is convex increasing in
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the leadtime difference ∆L. We also observed that the direct OPA strategy can become more
attractive (relative to other strategies) as the demand coefficient of variation increases. A key
advantage of the direct OPA strategy is its leadtime advantage. Our numeric study indicates
that an increase in the leadtime advantage allows more flexible OPA policy bounds, i.e., the
fraction of the domestic production requirement α.
When comparing the four strategies, we observed in our numeric study that an increase
in the expected quota cost shifts the firm’s preference from the direct procurement and split
procurement strategies to the OPA strategies. We also observed that an increase in the mean
demand does not shift the rankings of different strategies, whereas an increase in the demand
coefficient of variation can alter the rankings of different strategies. In particular, we found
that if the leadtime difference ∆L is small, then an increase in the demand cv can make the
direct procurement strategy more attractive than the direct OPA strategy. On the other hand,
when ∆L is large, then an increase in the demand cv can make the direct OPA strategy much
more attractive and can surpass any other strategies.
Figure 4.10 is a schematic summarization of the firm’s preference for the four different
strategies, categorized by the demand coefficient of variation and the relative ratio of the LCC
procurement cost versus the domestic procurement cost. We note that Figure 4.10 does not
imply that, for any system parameters, the optimal strategy will transit as depicted. Instead,
it illustrates possible progressions from one strategy to another. Depending on system param-
eters, a transition may not occur, or a particular strategy may be skipped. For example, as
the demand coefficient of variation increases, the indirect OPA strategy may not necessarily
transit to the direct OPA strategy, depending on the leadtime difference ∆L for the direct OPA
strategy.
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Figure 4.10: Summary of the mitigation strategy preferences by the unit procurement cost and
demand volatility
Referring to Figure 4.10, we first focus on the relative LCC procurement cost. Note that
when the LCC procurement cost is very low, the direct procurement strategy is more likely to
be preferred. As the LCC procurement cost increases, the firm’s preference transits from the
direct procurement to the split procurement strategy, where the firm utilizes both the LCC
and the MCC. As the LCC procurement cost continues to increase, the firm’s preference will
eventually reach the MCC procurement strategy.
When the indirect OPA strategy is preferred and when the LCC procurement cost is very
low, an increase in the LCC cost can shift the firm’s preference to the direct OPA strategy,
because the direct OPA strategy is more flexible in adjusting its procurement quantity from
LCC and from DOM. As the LCC procurement cost continues to increase, the firm can even-
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tually prefer domestic procurement. We note that the firm will always procure from LCC as
long as the LCC cost is lower than the domestic procurement cost. However, as the LCC cost
approaches the domestic procurement cost, the procurement quantity from LCC diminishes.
We now turn attention to the demand volatility. When the firm adopts the split procurement
and/or direct procurement strategy, everything else being equal, an increase in the demand
volatility makes the firm more likely to prefer the direct procurement strategy. Given our base
case scenario parameters, the newsvendor type of critical fractile exceeds 0.5. In this case,
an increase in the demand volatility makes the strategy with lower procurement cost more
attractive. This explains the transition from split procurement to direct procurement strategy.
On the other hand, if the firm adopts the OPA strategies, then an increase in the demand
volatility makes the direct OPA strategy more attractive relative to the indirect OPA strategy.
The leadtime advantage associated with the direct OPA strategy becomes more valuable as the
demand volatility increases, enabling the direct OPA strategy to overtake the indirect OPA
strategy. Note that if the leadtime difference ∆L is relatively small, then no transition will
occur as the demand volatility increases.
We note that in Figure 4.10, a stochastically increasing quota cost will lead to a contraction
in the split procurement and the direct procurement region, and an expansion of the direct
OPA and the indirect OPA strategies. A stochastically increasing quota cost makes the direct
procurement and the split procurement strategy less attractive, because they do not or only
partially mitigate the quota risk.
A further extension of this chapter’s work can be pursued in several directions. The four dif-
ferent mitigation strategies can also be categorized into one-country versus two-country strate-
gies. This distinction can shift the firm’s preference of different strategies when the exchange
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rate risk is considered. Whether the exchange rate risk will influence the firm’s preference,
however, depends to a large degree on how the exchange rate risk is shared between the sup-
plier and the buyer. Another direction would be to explore the strategic incentives between the
supplier and the buying firm under different mitigation strategies. For example, with the direct
procurement and the split procurement strategies, a firm can make different arrangements with
its suppliers to jointly share the quota risk. Such an arrangement may significantly influence a
firm’s preference towards different strategies.
The VER risk is typically correlated with the market demand in the importing country
for the specific controlled product. The higher the market demand, the less likely it is that
a supplier will be able to obtain the necessary VER allocation. It is therefore of interest
to investigate how the possible correlations between the quota risk and the market demand
influence a firm’s preference for different mitigation strategies.
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Chapter 5
Summary
This dissertation research contributes, both academically and managerially, to several impor-
tant aspects of the operational risks associated with global operations. In particular, the
collection of chapters in this research studies three important challenges facing many firms op-
erating in a global environment: leadtime uncertainty, capacity uncertainty, and trade barrier
uncertainty. The insights obtained from this dissertation research are especially valuable and
timely because, among the multitude of operational challenges posed by the proliferation of
global trade, these three are some of the most frequently encountered challenges facing firms
across many industries. A deeper understanding of, and more effective mitigation strategies
toward, these challenges not only helps to advance the operations management field but also
helps our field to be more relevant to practicing managers.
This dissertation also contributes, from a methodological point of view, to operational
risk management in general. In contrast to the classic operations management approach, this
dissertation research systematically takes a risk mitigation approach toward operational risk
management. While many operational risks, such as demand risk and inventory risk, have
been studied since the early days of operations management (see Wagner (1975) for a detailed
list of topics), it is only recently that these operational risks have been systematically studied
from a risk mitigation perspective. A key difference between the risk mitigation perspective
and the classic perspective is the following. With the classic approach, the objective is to find
an optimal policy that minimizes, for example, the long run average system cost with a given
set of system constraints. In contrast, with the risk mitigation perspective, the objective is to
find an optimal strategy that does not necessarily treat the given set of system constraints as
exogenous. Therefore, the risk mitigation perspective gives a richer set of strategic spaces that
both academia and industry may find interesting and relevant. In what follows, we discuss the
specific operational risks addressed in this dissertation and how this work has advanced the
risk mitigation research. For specific operational risks studied in each chapter, we discuss the
contributions from the theoretical, managerial, and technical aspects.
5.1 Leadtime Risk
Leadtime risk is not a new concept, as the leadtime uncertainty has been extensively studied
both in the operations research and the operations management area. What distinguishes this
research from the rest, however, is the unique treatment of leadtime risk. Typically, a leadtime
uncertainty is treated either as a normal variation in the supply system, e.g., Zipkin (2000), or
as a disruptive event, e.g., Kouvelis and Li (2006), but not at the same time. In many practical
situations, however, the nature of the leadtime risk is often linked to the normal variation and
the disruptive event. For example, a shipment might get delayed, and if it is delayed, then the
length of the delay can be uncertain. Such mixed leadtime uncertainty has not, to the best of
our knowledge, been studied before. A surprising consequence is that, everything else being
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equal, the firm may not necessarily prefer a supply leadtime with a lower variance.
Another distinguishing contribution of this chapter is the concept of using demand learn-
ing techniques to mitigate the supply leadtime risk. When the supply leadtime uncertainty
is beyond the buying firm’s control, the firm can use alternative techniques to mitigate such
uncertainty. This indirect mitigation approach opens new opportunities for theoretical investi-
gations beyond the context of this specific chapter. For example, when a risk factor is beyond
a firm’s control, the firm can develop alternative strategies to indirectly minimize its exposure
to the particular risk factor.
This chapter develops several important managerial implications for firms facing supply
leadtime risk. Among other significant managerial insights, we proved that a firm may not
necessarily prefer a leadtime with a lower variance. The firm’s preference depends on the
leadtime distribution. This has important implications for firms that have multiple suppliers
with different leadtime distributions.
In addition, we found that the firm’s optimal timing decision is independent of actual
revisions of the demand forecast (although the firm’s optimal quantity decision does depend on
the actual updates of the demand forecast process). This result has an important managerial
implication: the firm can decide its procurement time in advance of the demand updating
process, but it has to wait until that time to decide the procurement quantity. The very fact
that the firm can decide its procurement time in advance is very beneficial from a planning
perspective. The firm can arrange the future procurement schedule with its suppliers so that
the suppliers can prepare beforehand.
To date, the supply leadtime risk and the demand risk have been studied separately. This
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chapter is the first to integrate the firm’s joint quantity and timing decision under the supply
leadtime risk with the demand updating process. Even the basic, continuous time newsvendor
model with supply leadtime uncertainty only (without demand forecast updating) has not
been previously studied in the literature. In this chapter, we completely characterize the firm’s
optimal procurement quantity and timing decision for both the demand updating case and the
no demand updating case.
In this chapter, we also introduce a continuous time, auto-correlated, unbiased demand
forecast updating process. The multiplicative martingale model of forecast evolution can be
seen as a special case of our model. In addition, the two-period, discrete time forecast updating
process (e.g., Fisher and Raman (1996)) can also be seen as a special case1 of our model.
5.2 Capacity Risk
Random capacity is a frequently encountered risk in global operations. A commonly adopted
approach is to diversify across different suppliers to mitigate the capacity risk. Motivated by
recent industry evidence, this chapter studies an alternative approach of investing in suppliers
to improve their reliability. While process improvement itself has been extensively studied,
e.g., Carrillo and Gaimon (2000), this research has focused on internal or intra-firm process
improvement efforts with an emphasis on the particular approach of the process improvement
techniques. In contrast, this chapter focus on the relative strength of the diversification strat-
egy versus the improvement strategy. This chapter therefore advances potential mitigation
strategies that firms may not have realized before. We found that the mere existence of the
1Note that the demand in Fisher and Raman (1996) is normally distributed, whereas the demand in our
model is lognormally distributed.
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supplier improvement opportunity can significantly change a firm’s allocation of its suppliers.
A distinguishing approach of this chapter is that we do not take supplier reliability as
exogenous. Instead, consistent with the risk mitigation approach as discussed at the beginning
of this chapter, we treat supplier reliability as a benchmark that can be improved upon. This
risk mitigation approach allows a broader consideration of the firm’s potential risk mitigation
strategies. Furthermore, the risk mitigation approach can be applied to a far broader area of
risk issues beyond the capacity uncertainty.
When the firm has the option to improve its suppliers’ reliability, we found that the firm’s
supplier allocation strategy can be profoundly changed. In particular, a firm may choose to
improve a supplier and source from that supplier, which would have never been chosen if there
were no improvement opportunity. This surprising result also has significant implications from
the supplier’s perspective. The chance of a particular supplier being used can be significantly
influenced by the buying firm’s opportunity and willingness to improve supplier reliability.
In addition, we found that the firm’s preference for a particular strategy, either improvement
or diversification, cannot be consistently ranked as the industry environment changes. For
example, as demand volatility increases, the firm may initially prefer the diversification strategy
and then switch to the improvement strategy. This implies that the firm’s strategic decisions
with regard to supplier selection should depend on industry characteristics.
In this chapter, we completely characterize the optimal procurement policies under the
diversification strategy. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first2 to rigorously
characterize the joint quantity decision problem under a general random capacity setting.
2Note that Erdem (1999) studied the joint quantity setting problem. The result in that research is correct,
however, no rigorous proof on the joint unimodal property was given.
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In addition, we use the general stochastic dominance concept to characterize the relative
attractiveness of the diversification versus the improvement strategy. By an innovative approach
of modeling the reliability in a state space fashion, this research lays the foundation for future
extensions in the direction of the multi-period problem.
5.3 Trade Barriers Risk
Regulatory trade barriers are among the most frequently encountered supply risks in global
operations. Surprisingly, little research has been done in the operations management area to
investigate the implications of regulatory trade barriers. This chapter is the first attempt at
investigating the operational implications of a particular type of regulatory trade barriers, i.e.,
voluntary export restraints. While much of the analysis in this chapter is devoted to voluntary
export restraints, many other forms of trade barriers, such as antidumping duties, can be easily
incorporated into our framework.
A significant contribution of this chapter is its consideration of regulatory trade barriers in
the operations management realm. While regulatory trade barriers have been under extensive
investigation from the economics field, the focus of the economics literature is on the policy
issue on the national level. Because regulatory trade barriers can have a profound impact on
a firm’s supply chain, it is essential for the operations management field to study and provide
guidance for firms engaged in global operations. The mitigation strategies discussed in this
chapter serve as the groundwork to inspire future research in this important and relevant area.
By contrasting several different risk mitigation strategies, we provide managerial implica-
tions on the firm’s optimal strategy to reduce or eliminate voluntary export restraints. Without
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such managerial guidance, it is difficult for firms to evaluate, let alone develop, consistent pro-
curement strategies when facing different regulatory trade barriers across different countries.
Our research indicates that the firm’s risk mitigation strategy depends significantly on sev-
eral important industry characteristics, such as demand volatility, unit procurement cost, and
voluntary export restraints volatility.
Our research also has significant policy implications. We found that OPAs are indeed
effective ways for a government to encourage domestic production. However, the attractiveness
of OPAs can be significantly influenced by industry characteristics, such as demand volatility
and the efficiency (in terms of production leadtime) of domestic production. In addition, we
find that the outward processing policy is an unstable one; a slight increase in the outward
processing policy requirement may lead to a complete loss of domestic production.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to model regulatory trade barriers from
the operations management perspective. In addition, we completely characterize a continuous
time, additive martingale model of forecast evolution process in a two-stage, joint optimization
problem with decision dependent constraints. Furthermore, we model the voluntary quota risk
from the uncertain cost perspective, which allows a broader class of regulatory trade barriers
to be treated in a mathematically equivalent form.
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Appendices
A1 Appendices for Chapter 2
A1.1 Derivation of the Forecast Evolution
In what follows, we derive the time-dependent demand forecast given in (2.1). We begin with
a discrete-time model of pre-season and in-season order evolution in which T is divided into
n ≥ 1 periods.
A1.1.1 Pre-Season Orders
Let Xi denote the amount of pre-season orders received up to and including period i. Let ∆i
denote the ratio of pre-season orders in period i. Define
Xi = ∆iXi−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (A-1)
∆i = ∆
φ
i−1ξ
1−φ
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (A-2)
where φ is the autocorrelation parameter, and ξi are independent, identically distributed log-
normal random variables with parameters µ and σ. We initialize X0 = x0 and ∆0 = δ0. Using
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(A-1) and (A-2), it can be shown that
lnXi =
 i∑
j=1
φj
 ln δ0 + (1− φ)
 i∑
j=1
φj−1
 ln ξ1 +
 i−1∑
j=1
φj−1
 ln ξ2 + · · ·
+
 1∑
j=1
φj−1
 ln ξi
+ lnx0. (A-3)
Note that
k∑
j=1
φj−1 =
1− φk
1− φ (A-4)
for any k ≥ 1. Therefore, substitute (A-4) into (A-3),
lnXi =
φ
1− φ
(
1− φi) ln δ0 + (1− φi) ln ξ1 + (1− φi−1) ln ξ2 + · · ·+ (1− φ) ln ξi + lnx0
=
φ
1− φ
(
1− φi) ln δ0 + i∑
j=1
(
1− φi−j+1) ln ξj + lnx0. (A-5)
Note that (A-5) characterizes the cumulative pre-season orders i periods from now, given the
current cumulative pre-season order is x0 and pre-season order ratio is δ0. By (A-5), the mean
and variance of lnXi is given by
E[lnXi] =
φ
1− φ
(
1− φi) ln δ0 + (i− φ1− φ (1− φi)
)
µ+ lnx0. (A-6)
V ar[lnXi] =
i∑
j=1
(
1− φi−j+1)2 σ2 = i∑
j=1
(
1− 2φj + φ2j)σ2
=
(
i− 2 φ
1− φ
(
1− φi)+ φ2
1− φ2
(
1− φ2i))σ2
=
(
i− φ
1− φ
(
1− φi)− φ
1− φ2
(
1− φi) (1− φi+1))σ2 (A-7)
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A1.1.2 In-Season Orders
Let XD represent pre-season orders plus in-season orders. Define
XD = ∆DXn, (A-8)
∆D = ∆φDn ξ
1−φD
D , (A-9)
where φD is the between-season correlation parameter, and ξD is an independent, lognormal
random variable with parameters µD and σD. Using (A-8) and (A-9), it can be shown that
lnXD =
(
φDφ
n +
φ
1− φ (1− φ
n)
)
ln δ0 + φD(1− φ)
n∑
j=1
φn−j ln ξj
+
n∑
j=1
(
1− φn−j+1) ln ξj + (1− φD) ln ξD + lnx0
=
(
φDφ
n +
φ
1− φ (1− φ
n)
)
ln δ0 +
n∑
j=1
(
1− φn−j (φ− (1− φ)φD)
)
ln ξj
+ (1− φD) ln ξD + lnx0 (A-10)
Note that by setting n = 1, we obtain a two-period demand model, where X1 and XD
represent pre-season orders and pre-season plus in-season orders, respectively. In particular,
the in-season orders XD −X1 is correlated with the pre-season orders X1 through parameter
φD.
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By (A-10), the mean and variance of lnXD is given by
E[lnXD] =
(
φDφ
n +
φ
1− φ (1− φ
n)
)
ln δ0+(
n− (1− φn)
(
φ
1− φ − φD
))
µ+ (1− φD)µD + lnx0. (A-11)
V ar[lnXD] =
n∑
j=1
(
1− φn−j(φ− (1− φ)φD)
)2
σ2 + (1− φD)2σ2D. (A-12)
Let A = φ− (1− φ)φD, we have
n∑
j=1
(
1−Aφn−j)2 = n∑
j=1
(
1− 2Aφn−j +A2φ(n−j)2
)
= n− 2A1− φ
n
1− φ +A
2 1−
(
φ2
)n
1− φ2
= n− (1− φn)
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
n
1 + φ
)
. (A-13)
Substitute (A-13) into (A-12),
V ar[lnXD] =
[
n− (1− φn)
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2−
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
(1 + φn)
)]
σ2 + (1− φD)2σ2D.
(A-14)
With the continuous time analog of the above analysis, the total pre-season and in-season
orders XD is lognormally distributed, with n replaced by (T − t) in (A-11) and (A-14). This
leads to the forecast evolution given by (2.1). Without loss of generality, setting δ0 = 1 and
x0 = 1 leads to the initial forecast given by (2.2).
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A1.2 Heuristics
While we can efficiently solve the time-and-quantity optimization problem, it is of interest to
explore the performance of some simple heuristics. In this section we investigate the perfor-
mance of three heuristics: a) the mean demand heuristic; b) the mean leadtime heuristic; and
c) the zero planned leadtime heuristic. Recall that for a given procurement time, the optimal
procurement quantity is easily found using (2.7). Therefore, the heuristics determine a pro-
curement time and then use the optimal procurement quantity given the chosen procurement
time.
In the case of deterministic demand, the expected cost is convex in the procurement time,
and one can show that the optimal procurement time is given by
t∗ = T − L−G−1
(
p
p+ h
− θ
1− θ
h
p+ h
)
,
i.e., a newsvendor-type result is obtained. In the mean demand heuristic, we set the optimal
procurement time using this equation. This mean demand heuristic captures the trade-off
between the holding costs incurred by an early arrival and the tardiness costs incurred by a
late arrival. The mean leadtime heuristic sets the procurement time as t = T−L−(1− θ)E[ω],
i.e., the order is placed such that the expected arrival time coincides with the selling time. The
zero planned leadtime heuristic sets the procurement time as t = T − L. We note that our
mean demand and mean leadtime heuristics generalize the mean demand and mean leadtime
heuristics in Song et al. (2000) to the case of θ > 0.
We explore the performance of the heuristics using the same factorial design described
in §2.6.3. For each problem instance, we calculate the relative increase in the expected cost
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(for a given heuristic) as compared to the optimal cost and we also determine which heuristic
performs best. In Table 5.1, we report the average and maximum relative increases as well as
the percentage of cases in which a particular heuristic performed best. Other than the mean
demand heuristic in the case of no pre-season orders, we see from Table 5.1 that none of the
heuristics perform particularly well on average. In all cases, the worst case performances are
very poor.
Scenario Mean demand Mean leadtime Zero planned leadtime
λ = 0
Average 0.05% 1.54% 7.32%
Max 0.61% 10.11% 101.78%
Cases preferred 96.69% 3.31% 0.00%
λ = 0.5
Average 0.84% 1.90% 4.97%
Max 14.75% 21.86% 94.85%
Cases preferred 63.96% 26.06% 9.97%
λ = 1
Average 5.61% 6.55% 3.88%
Max 51.06% 63.36% 86.43%
Cases preferred 41.78% 24.76% 33.46%
Table 5.1: Average and maximum percentage increase in the expected cost with heuristics.
It is worth qualitatively comparing our no pre-season order results with those of Song et al.
(2000). Recall that Song et al. (2000) did not consider pre-season orders. We note that Song
et al. (2000) use Poisson demand and a negative binomial leadtime distribution in their numeric
study, but we don’t consider this to be a material difference. They observed that “the mean
demand heuristic, although suboptimal, never produced poor results” (p. 294). This conclusion
is not supported in our study. A detailed review of the data uncovered a reason for this seeming
anomaly. The study in Song et al. (2000) considered two possible values of r/c; 1.5 and 2.5.
Our study encompassed a much wider range of r/c values. When the revenue is much higher
than the purchasing cost, i.e., at high r/c values, then the firm’s procurement quantity is large.
A large procurement quantity results in a large inventory cost if the order arrives early, and
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so high r/c values tend to be associated with later procurement times. We observed that the
mean demand heuristic, while capturing some of the earliness effect through the h term, did
not compensate sufficiently for large procurement quantities, and so performed quite poorly for
high r/c values.
More often than not, the optimal procurement time with pre-season orders was later than
that without pre-season orders. Because the zero planned leadtime heuristic results in the
latest procurement time among the three heuristics, its performance was better in the case of
pre-season orders than in the case of no pre-season orders. For high pre-season order volatilities
and high r/c values, the zero planned leadtime heuristic performed well because it is beneficial
for the firm to delay its procurement as long as possible in such settings.
Generally speaking, we advise caution before using any of these heuristics. While one can
find settings where a particular heuristic performs quite well, none of the heuristics are robust.
A1.3 Technical Lemmas
Lemma A1. For θ < 1, define
H(z) = y∗(z)
θ + (1− θ)G(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z)) .
(a) H(0) ≥ H(z¯) = 0. (b) H ′(z) = 0⇒ H ′′(z) < 0. (c) H(z) is unimodal in z if sup (H(z)) >
H(0), and H(z) is non-increasing in z otherwise.
The H(z) function is closely related to v′(z), the derivative of the objective function with
respect to z. Therefore, characterizing H(z) helps us to identify the stationary points of the
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objective function. Part (b) of Lemma A1 states that whenever H ′(z) = 0, then H ′′(z) < 0.
Combining this with part (a) guarantees that H(z) has at most a single peak over [0, z¯]. Part
(c) recognizes the possibility of a corner point.
Proof of Lemma A1. Note that
H ′(z) =
y′(z)(θ + (1− θ)G(z))
(1− θ)(1−G(z)) +
y(z)g(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z))2 . (A-15)
(a) Follows from the fact that H(0) = y∗(0) θ1−θ > 0 and H(z¯) = 0. (b) Note
H ′′(z) =
y′′(z)(θ + (1− θ)G(z))
(1− θ)(1−G(z)) +
2y′(z)g(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z))2+
y(z)g′(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z))2+
2y(z)g2(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z))3 .
At H ′(z) = 0, H ′′(z) can be further simplified to
H ′′(z) =
y′′(z)(θ + (1− θ)G(z)) + 2(1− θ)y′(z)g(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z)) +
y(z)g′(z)
(1− θ)(1−G(z))2 . (A-16)
To determine the sign of H ′′(z) at H ′(z) = 0, we first obtain the expression for y′(z) and y′′(z).
From (2.7), we have
y′(z) =
1
F ′
[
F−1
[
r−c−hA(z)
r−s
]] (− h
r − sA
′(z)
)
= − 1
f(y(z))
h
r − s (θ + (1− θ)G(z)) = −
h(θ + (1− θ)G(z))
(r − s)f(y(z))
(A-17)
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and
y′′(z) = − h(1− θ)g(z)
(r − s)f(y(z)) +
h(θ + (1− θ)G(z))
(r − s)[f(y(z))]2 f
′(y(z))y′(z)
=
h
(r − s)f(y(z))
[
−(1− θ)g(z) + (θ + (1− θ)G(z))f
′(y(z))
f(y(z))
y′(z)
]
. (A-18)
From (A-15), we have
y′(z) = − y(z)g(z)
(1−G(z))(θ + (1− θ)G(z)) (A-19)
at H ′(z) = 0. Combining (A-17) and (A-19), we have
f(y(z)) =
h(1−G(z))[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]2
(r − s)y(z)g(z) .
Therefore,
f ′(y(z)) =
−hg(z)[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]2 + h(1−G(z))2[θ + (1− θ)G(z)](1− θ)g(z)
(r − s)y(z)g(z)
− h(1−G(z))[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]
2
(r − s)[y(z)g(z)]2 [y
′(z)g(z) + y(z)g′(z)].
Hence,
f ′(y(z))
f(y(z))
=
{−hg(z)[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]2 + h(1−G(z))2[θ + (1− θ)G(z)](1− θ)g(z)
(r − s)y(z)g(z)
− h(1−G(z))[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]
2
(r − s)[y(z)g(z)]2 [y
′(z)g(z) + y(z)g′(z)]
}
× (r − s)y(z)g(z)
h(1−G(z))[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]2
= − g(z)
1−G(z) +
2(1− θ)g(z)
θ + (1− θ)G(z) −
y′(z)g(z) + y(z)g′(z)
y(z)g(z)
.
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Now, consider the terms in squared bracket in (A-18), we have
− (1− θ)g(z) + [θ + (1− θ)]G(z)f
′(y(z))
f(y(z))
y′(z)
= −(1− θ)g(z) + {−g(z)[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]
1−G(z) + 2(1− θ)g(z)
− y
′(z)
y(z)
[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]− g
′(z)
g(z)
[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]}y′(z)
= −(1− θ)g(z) +
{
3(1− θ)g(z)− g
′(z)
g(z)
[θ + (1− θ)G(z)]
}
y′(z). (A-20)
From (A-19) we know y′(z) < 0. Combining with the assumption that g′(z) ≤ 0, it follows
that (A-20) is negative. Consequently, (A-18) is negative, i.e., y′′(z) < 0. Therefore, (A-16) is
negative, i.e., H ′′(z) < 0. (c) We show that there exists a unique local maximum if sup(H(z)) >
H(0). Because sup(H(z)) > H(0), there exists a point z∗ such that H(z∗) > H(0) > H(z¯).
Since H(·) is continuous in z, there exists two points za < z∗ < zb such that ∂H(z)/∂z|z=za > 0
and ∂H(z)/∂z|z=zb < 0. Because H ′(z) is also continuous in z, by Intermediate Value Theorem
(Royden, 1988) there exists a point za < zc < zb such that
∂H(z)
∂z |z=zc = 0. It follows from
part (b) that zc is a local maximum. We prove the uniqueness through contradiction. Suppose
H(·) achieves another local maximum at zd. Without loss of generality, assume zc < zd < z¯.
From part (b), H ′(zc + ) < 0 and H ′(zd − ) > 0. By continuity of H ′(·), there exists a point
zc < ze < zd such that H ′(ze) = 0 and H ′′(ze) > 0. But this cannot happen given the results
in part (b). The case of sup(H(z)) ≤ H(0) can be analogously proved by realizing that H(0)
is both a maximum and a corner point of H(z).
Lemma A2. Z = {z : v′(z) = 0}, i.e., Z is the set of stationary points. (a)Z = ∅ if
sup (H(z)) < phE[XD]. (b) Z = {z1} and 0 < z1 < z¯ if H(0) > phE[XD]. (c) Z = {z1, z2} and
0 ≤ z1 ≤ z2 < z¯ if H(0) ≤ phE[XD] and sup (H(z)) ≥ phE[XD].
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Lemma A2 tells us that v(z) has zero, one, or two stationary points, depending on how the
H(·) function compares to the ratio of the tardiness penalty cost and the unit holding cost.
Proof of Lemma A2. Substitute y∗(z) into (2.9), we have
∂v(z)
∂z
= h
(
θ + (1− θ)
∫ z
0
g(ω)dω
)
y∗(z) +
(
h
(
θz + (1− θ)
∫ z
0
(z − ω)g(ω)dω
)
− (r − c)
)
∂y∗(z)
∂z
+ (r − s)
∫ y∗(z)
0
∂y∗(z)
∂z
f(ξ)dξ + p(1− θ)E[XD]
∫ ∞
z
−g(ω)dω
= hy∗(z)
(
θ + (1− θ)
∫ z
0
g(ω)dω
)
+
(
hA(z)− (r − c) + (r − s)
∫ y∗(z)
0
f(ξ)dξ
)
∂y∗(z)
∂z
− p(1− θ)E[XD]
∫ ∞
z
g(ω)dω
= hy∗(z) (θ + (1− θ)G(z))− p(1− θ)E[XD](1−G(z)). (A-21)
Therefore, ∂v(z)∂z = 0 ⇔ H(z) = phE[XD]. (a) Follows directly from the fact that sup(H(z)) <
p
hE[XD]. (b) Follows from part (c) of Lemma A1 and the fact that H(0) >
p
hE[XD]. (c)
Follows analogously from part (b).
Lemma A3. v(t, xt, δt) (see (2.6)) is separable in (xt, δt) and t, i.e., there exists two real valued
functions v1(·) and v2(·) such that v(t, xt, δt) = v1(xt, δt) · v2(t).
Proof of Lemma A3. First we write out the explicit expression for v(t, xt, δt)
v(t, xt, δt) =(hA(T − L− t)− (r − c))y∗(t) + (r + pB(T − L− t))xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
+ (r − s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
(y∗(t)− ξ)ft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ. (A-22)
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Because Ft(y∗(t)|xt, δt) = r−c−hA(T−L−t)r−s , (A-22) can be simplified to
v(t, xt, δt) = (hA(T − L− t)− (r − c)) y∗(t) + (r + pB(T − L− t))xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
+ (r − s)y∗(t)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ − (r − s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
=(hA(T − L− t)− (r − c)) y∗(t) + (r + pB(T − L− t))xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
+ (r − s)y∗(t)r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s − (r − s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
=(r + pB(T − L− t))xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
− (r − s)
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ.
(A-23)
Note
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ
=
1√
2piψσ(t)
∫ y∗(t)
0
exp
(
−(ln ξ − ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)− lnxt)
2
2ψσ(t)
)
dξ
=
exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + lnxt + 12(ψσ(t))
)√
2piψσ(t)
√
pi
2
√
ψσ(t) · erfc
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + lnxt + ψσ(t)− ln y∗(t)√
2 (ψσ(t))
)
=
1
2
xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)(
1− erf
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) + lnxt + ψσ(t)− ln y∗(t)√
2 (ψσ(t))
))
=
1
2
xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)(
1 + erf
(
ln y∗(t)− ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)− lnxt√
2 (ψσ(t))
−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
))
,
(A-24)
where we have used the fact
∫ y
0
exp
(
−(ln ξ −M)
2
2S
)
dξ = exp(M +
S
2
)
√
pi
2
√
S · erfc
(
M + S − ln y√
2S
)
.
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Combining (2.7) and (2.11), we have
erf
(
ln y∗(t)− ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)− lnxt√
2ψσ(t)
)
≡ 2r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s − 1.
Define
k(t) =
ln y∗(t)− ψµ(t)− ψδ(t)− lnxt√
2ψσ(t)
= erf−1
(
2
r − c− hA(T − L− t)
r − s − 1
)
, (A-25)
and substitute (A-25) into (A-24), we have
∫ y∗(t)
0
ξft(ξ|xt, δt)dξ =12xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
))
.
(A-26)
Substitute (A-26) into (A-23), we have
v(t, xt, δt) = xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
·(
r + pB(T − L− t)− 1
2
(r − s)
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
)))
. (A-27)
By (A-27), v(t, xt, δt) is separable in (xt, δt) and t, i.e., v(t, xt, δt) = v1(xt, δt) · v2(t), where
v1(·, ·) is just the first two terms and v2(·) is the rest of terms in (A-27) respectively.
Lemma A4. E [χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] is independent of t, where
χ(t,Xt,∆t) = Xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
.
Proof of Lemma A4. First consider t = 0. Recall without loss of generality, we scale x0 = 1
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and δ0 = 1.
E [χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] = x0 exp
(
ψµ(0) + ψδ(0) +
1
2
ψσ(0)
)
= exp
(
ψµ(0) +
1
2
ψσ(0)
)
,
which is a constant. Now, consider an arbitrary t > 0.
E [χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] =E
[
Xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
) ∣∣∣x0, δ0]
=exp
(
ψµ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
E [Xt exp (ψδ(t)) |x0, δ0] .
Note that Xt exp (ψδ(t)) is lognormally distributed and therefore ln(Xt exp (ψδ(t))) is nor-
mally distributed. In what follows, we first derive the mean and variance parameter for
ln(Xt exp (ψδ(t))) and then derive the expectation of Xt exp (ψδ(t)). Using (A-2), we have
ln∆n = φn ln δ0 + (1− φ)
 n∑
j=1
φj−1 ln ξn−j+1
 .
Therefore,
E[ln∆n] = φn ln δ0 + (1− φ)
 n∑
j=1
φj−1µ
 = φn ln δ0 + (1− φn)µ.
The continuous time analog is
E[ln∆t] = φt ln δ0 + (1− φt)µ. (A-28)
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Using (A-28), we have
E[ln(Xt exp (ψδ(t)))] = E[lnXt] + E[ψδ(t)]
=
(
t− φ
1− φ
(
1− φt))µ+ [φDφT−t + φ1− φ (1− φT−t)
] (
1− φt)µ
=
(
φD
[
φT−t − φT ]+ t− φ
1− φ
[
φT−t − φT ])µ. (A-29)
Now consider the following discrete case,
lnXi + ψδ(i) =
i∑
j=1
(1− φi−j+1) ln ξj +
(
φDφ
n−i +
φ
1− φ(1− φ
n−i)
)
ln∆i
=
i∑
j=1
(1− φi−j+1) ln ξj +
(
φDφ
n−i +
φ
1− φ(1− φ
n−i)
)
(1− φ)
i∑
j=1
φi−j ln ξj
=
i∑
j=1
(
1− φi−j [φ− (1− φ)φDφn−i − φ(1− φn−i)]) ln ξj .
Therefore,
V ar[lnXi + ψδ(i)] =
(
i− (1− φi)φn−i
[
φ
1− φ − φD
] [
2− φn−i (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
i
1 + φ
])
σ2.
The continuous time analog is
V ar[lnXt + ψδ(t)] =
(
t− (1− φt)φT−t
[
φ
1− φ − φD
] [
2− φT−t (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
t
1 + φ
])
σ2.
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Therefore,
E [χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] = exp
(
ψµ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
+
(
φD
[
φT−t − φT ]+ t− φ
1− φ
[
φT−t − φT ])µ
+
1
2
(
t− (1− φt)φT−t
[
φ
1− φ − φD
] [
2− φT−t (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
t
1 + φ
])
σ2
)
= exp
(
ψµ(0) +
1
2
ψσ(0)
)
,
which is independent of t.
Lemma A5. Define η(t) = erf (γ(t)), where γ(t) = k(t) − ρ(t) and ρ(t) =
√
1
2ψσ(t). If
φ = φD = 0, then
(i) A sufficient set of condition for η′′′(t) ≤ 0 is C1 ∩ ((C2 ∩ C3) ∪ (C4 ∩ C5)),
(ii) A sufficient set of condition for η′′′(t) ≥ 0 is C1 ∩ ((C2 ∩ C6) ∪ (C4 ∩ C7)),
where
C1 : r + s− 2c ≤ 0
C2 : γ′′ (T − L) ≤ 0
C3 : 2γ (0)2 − 1− ρ
′′′ (T − L)− k′′′ (0)
2γ′ (T − L)3 − 3
γ (T − L) γ′′ (T − L)
γ′ (0)2
≤ 0
C4 : γ′′ (0) ≥ 0
C5 : 2γ (0)2 − 1− ρ
′′′ (T − L)− k′′′ (0)
2γ′ (0)3
− 3γ (0) γ
′′ (T − L)
γ′ (0)2
≤ 0
C6 : 2γ (T − L)2 − 1− ρ
′′′ (0)− k′′′ (T − L)
2γ′ (0)3
− 3 γ (0) γ
′′ (0)
γ′ (T − L)2 ≥ 0
C7 : 2γ (T − L)2 − 1− ρ
′′′ (0)− k′′′ (T − L)
2γ′ (T − L)3 − 3
γ (T − L) γ′′ (0)
γ′ (T − L)2 ≥ 0
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Proof of Lemma A5. Applying φ = φD = 0, we have
ρ′(t) = −σ
2
4
(
(T − t)σ2 + σ2D
2
)− 1
2
< 0,
ρ′′(t) = −σ
4
16
(
(T − t)σ2 + σ2D
2
)− 3
2
< 0,
ρ′′′(t) = −3σ
6
64
(
(T − t)σ2 + σ2D
2
)− 5
2
< 0,
ρ′′′′(t) = −15σ
8
256
(
(T − t)σ2 + σ2D
2
)− 7
2
< 0.
In addition, r ≤ 2c− s⇒ k(t) ≤ 0. Therefore,
k′(t) =
1
erf ′(k(t))
2h
r − sA
′(T − L− t) = 1
erf ′(k(t))
2h
r − s (θ + (1− θ)G(T − L− t)) > 0,
k′′(t) = − 1(
erf ′(k(t))
)2 erf ′′(k(t))k′(t) 2hr − sA′(T − L− t)− 1erf ′(k(t)) 2hr − s(1− θ)g(T − Lt)
= 2k(t)
(
k′(t)
)2 − 1
erf ′(k(t))
2h
r − s(1− θ)g(T − L− t) < 0,
k′′′(t) = 2
(
k′(t)
)3 + 4k(t)k′(t)k′′(t) + 1(
erf ′(k(t))
)2 erf ′′(k(t))k′(t) 2hr − s(1− θ)g(T − L− t)
= 2
(
k′(t)
)3 + 4k(t)k′(t)k′′(t)− 2k(t)k′(t)
erf ′(k(t))
2h
r − s(1− θ)g(T − L− t) > 0,
k′′′′(t) = 6
(
k′(t)
)2
k′′(t) + 4(k′(t))2k′′(t) + 4k(t)(k′′(t))2 + 4k(t)k′(t)k′′(t)
−
(
2(k′(t))2 + k(t)k′′(t)
erf ′(k(t))
+
4(k(t)k′(t))2
erf ′(k(t))
)
2h
r − s(1− θ)g(T − L− t)
= 10
(
k′(t)
)2
k′′(t) + 4k(t)(k′′(t))2 + 4k(t)k′(t)k′′′(t)
− 1
erf ′(k(t))
(
2(k′(t))2 + k(t)k′′(t) + 4(k(t)k′(t))2
) 2h
r − s(1− θ)g(T − L− t) < 0.
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Note
η′′′(t) = erf ′ (k(t)− ρ(t))
(
k′′′(t)− ρ′′′(t) (n1)
− 6 (k(t)− ρ(t)) (k′(t)− ρ′(t))(k′′(t)− ρ′′(t)) (n2)
+ 4(k(t)− ρ(t))2(k′(t)− ρ′(t))3 (n3)
− 2(k′(t)− ρ′(t))3
)
. (n4)
The lemma statements follow by appropriately bounding (n1)− (n4) terms. The derivation is
rather tedious and therefore is omitted here. The details are available upon request.
Lemma A6. (a) ι′(t) ≤ 0, where ι(t) = T−t−(1− φT−t) ( φ1−φ − φD)(2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1+φT−t1+φ ).
(b) κ′(t) ≤ 0, where κ(t) = T − t− (1− φT−t) ( φ1−φ − φD).
Proof of Lemma A6. Here we provide proof for part (a). The simpler case of part (b) can be
analogously proved. Note that
ι′(t) = −1−
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)[
φT−t lnφ
(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
T−t
1 + φ
)
+
(
1− φT−t) (φ− (1− φ)φD) φT−t lnφ1 + φ
]
= −1−
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
φT−t lnφ
[
2− 2 (φ− (1− φ)φD) φ
T−t
1 + φ
]
. (A-30)
Clearly, if φ1−φ − φD ≤ 0 then ι′(t) < 0. Now consider the case of φ1−φ − φD > 0. By (A-30),
ι′′(t) = 2
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
φT−t ln2 φ
[
1− 2
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
φT−t
1− φ
1 + φ
]
. (A-31)
Therefore, ι′′(t) ≥ 0 if and only if the terms in the squared bracket in (A-31) is non-negative.
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Let v(t) = 1 − 2
(
φ
1−φ − φD
)
φT−t 1−φ1+φ . Then v
′(t) = 2
(
φ
1−φ − φD
)
φT−t lnφ1−φ1+φ < 0. Thus, if
v(T ) > 0 then we know v(t) > 0 for any t. But v(T ) = 1− 2
(
φ
1−φ − φD
)
1−φ
1+φ > 0 because
1− φ > −2(1− φ)φD ⇒ φ− 2(1− φ)φD < 1⇒ 2(φ− (1− φ)φD) < 1 + φ
⇒ 2φ− (1− φ)φD
1 + φ
< 1⇒ 2
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
1− φ
1 + φ
< 1⇒ v(T ) > 0.
Therefore, we have proved that ι′′(t) ≥ 0, which indicates that ι′(t) is increasing in t. Hence, if
we prove that ι′(T ) < 0 then it follows ι′(t) < 0 for any t. Note that
ι′(T ) = −1−
(
φ
1− φ − φD
)
lnφ
[
2− 2 (φ− (1− φ)φD) 11 + φ
]
.
It follows that
∂ι′(T )
∂φD
= 2 lnφ
[
1− 2 (φ− (1− φ)φD) 11 + φ
]
= 2 lnφ v(T ) < 0.
Therefore, if ι′(T ) < 0 at φD = 0 then ι′(T ) < 0 for any φD. Substitute φD = 0 into ι′(T ), we
have
ι′(T ) = −1− φ
1− φ lnφ
[
2− 2 φ
1 + φ
]
= −1− 2 φ
1− φ2 lnφ.
The lemma statement follows if v(φ) = φ
1−φ2 lnφ > −12 . Note
v′(φ) =
1 + φ2
(1− φ2)2
[
lnφ+
1− φ2
1 + φ2
]
.
Note the terms in the squared bracket in the above expression, denote as g(φ), is increasing in
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φ because
g′(φ) =
1
φ
− 2φ 1
1 + φ2
− 2φ 1− φ
2
(1 + φ2)2
=
1
φ
(
1− φ2
1 + φ2
)2
≥ 0.
Therefore, if g(φ) ≤ 0 at φ = 1 then g(φ) ≤ 0 at for any φ. Clearly, g(φ|φ = 1) = 0. Thus, we
have v′(φ) ≤ 0. Therefore, v(φ) is lower bounded at φ = 1. Note
lim
φ→1
v(φ) =
ln 1
1− 1 = 0 · ∞ ⇒ limφ→1 v(φ) = limφ→1
d lnφ
dφ
d(1−φ2)
dφ
= lim
φ→1
− 1
2φ2
= −1
2
.
Lemma A7. Define
η(t) = erf(k(t)− ρ(t)),
where ρ(t) =
√
1
2ψσ(t). If η
′′′(t) < 0, then (a) If η′′(T − L) ≥ 2pr−s(1 − θ)g(0), then M(t) is a
concave function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. (b) If η′′(0) ≤ 2pr−s(1 − θ)g(T − L), then M(t) is a
convex function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. (c) Otherwise, let 0 < ts < T − L denote the unique
solution to η′′(t) = 2pr−s(1−θ)g(T −L− t). Then, M(t) is a concave function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ ts
and a convex function of t for ts < t ≤ T − L.
Lemma A8. Define
η(t) = erf(k(t)− ρ(t)),
where ρ(t) =
√
1
2ψσ(t). If η
′′′(t) ≥ 0, then (a) If η′′(0) ≥ 2pr−s(1 − θ)g(T − L), then M(t) is a
concave function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. (b) If η′′(T − L) ≤ 2pr−s(1 − θ)g(0), then M(t) is a
convex function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. (c) Otherwise, let 0 < ts < T − L denote the unique
solution to η′′(t) = 2pr−s(1− θ)g(T −L− t). Then, M(t) is a convex function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ ts
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and a concave function of t for ts < t ≤ T − L.
Lemma A7 and A8 tells us that M(t) can be concave and/or convex in different regions of
t, depending on relative parameter values.
Proof of Lemma A7. Recall
η(t) = erf(k(t)− ρ(t)),
where ρ(t) =
√
1
2ψσ(t). We have
η′(t) =
[
erf ′(k(t)− ρ(t))] [k′(t)− ρ′(t)] ,
η′′(t) =
[
erf ′(k(t)− ρ(t))] [−2(k(t)− ρ(t))(k′(t)− ρ′(t))2 + k′′(t)− ρ′′(t)] ,
η′′′(t) =
[
erf ′(k(t)− ρ(t))][k′′′(t)− ρ′′′(t)− 6(k(t)− ρ(t))(k′(t)− ρ′(t))(k′′(t)− ρ′′(t))
+ 2(k′(t)− ρ′(t))3 (2(k(t)− ρ(t))2 − 1) ].
Note that, for t ≤ T − L,
B′′(T − L− t) = (1− θ)g(T − L− t) ≥ 0,
B′′′(T − L− t) = −(1− θ)g′(T − L− t) ≥ 0.
Therefore, (1 − θ)g(T − L − t) is convex increasing in [0, T − L]. By assumption η′′(t) is
monotonically decreasing in [0, T −L]. The lemma statements follow by realizing that B′′(T −
L− t) and η′′(t) cross at most once.
Proof of Lemma A8. Analogous to the proof of Lemma A7.
203
A1.4 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let
c(y) = (hA(T −L−t)−(r−c))y+(r−s)E[(y−XD)+|xt, δt]+(r + pB(T − L− t))E[XD|xt, δt].
One can show that c(y) is convex in y, and
c′(y) = hA(T − L− t)− (r − c) + (r − s)Ft(y|xt, δt). (A-32)
Setting (A-32) = 0 obtains the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2. When h = 0, v′(z) ≤ 0. The result then follows directly by realizing that
v(z) is constant for z ≥ ωˆ.
Proof of Theorem 3. First we show that z∗ ≥ 0. It is necessary and sufficient to show that
v(0) ≤ v(−) for any  > 0. From (2.9),
v(0) = (hA(0)− (r − c))y∗(0) + (r − s)E[(y∗(0)−XD)+] + pB(0)E[XD]
= −(r − c)y∗(0) + (r − s)E[(y∗(0)−XD)+] + pB(0)E[XD]
≤ −(r − c)y∗(0) + (r − s)E[(y∗(0)−XD)+] + pB(−)E[XD]
= −(r − c)y∗(−) + (r − s)E[(y∗(−)−XD)+] + pB(−)E[XD]
= v(−).
Next we show that z∗ ≤ z¯. By assumption, ωˆ ≥ z¯. By definition, y∗(z¯) = 0. Because y∗(z) is
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non-increasing in z, y∗(z) = 0 for any z ≥ z¯. It follows directly from (2.9) that v(z¯) ≤ v(z¯ + )
for any  > 0.
Proof of Theorem 4. Please see the proof of Theorem 10 which proves a more general case.
Proof of Theorem 5. (i)For θ = 1, A(z) = z+ and B(z) = z−. By Theorem 3, z∗ ≥ 0. By (2.9),
v′(z) > 0 ⇒ z∗ = 0. (ii)(a) Note that Z = ∅ ⇔ v′(z) ≤ 0. Hence, v(z) ≤ v(z − ) for any
 > 0. (b) In this case v(·) is maximized at z1. Because H(z) is unimodal or non-increasing,
the optimal z∗ ∈ {0, z¯}. Let v(∅) represent the non-participation cost, i.e., the maximum cost
when the firm decides not to procure/sell. But v(z¯) = pB(z¯)E[XD] > 0 = v(x∅). Therefore
v(z¯) cannot minimize E[v(·)]. It follows directly that v(0) < v(z¯), i.e., z∗ = 0. (c) Note that v(·)
is minimized at z1 and maximized at z2. It follows that v(z1) < v(z¯) < v(z2), i.e., z∗ = z1.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let D(z∗) denote (A-21) being set to 0, i.e.,
D(z∗) = hy∗(z∗) (θ + (1− θ)G(z∗))− p(1− θ)E[XD](1−G(z∗)). (A-33)
Because 0 < z∗ < z¯, Z = {z1, z2}. From part (c) of Lemma A1, z∗ = z1 and ∂D(z
∗)
∂z∗ > 0.
(a) By the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂z
∗
∂p = −
(
∂D(z∗)
∂z∗
)
/
(
∂D(z∗)
∂p
)
. But it follows di-
rectly from (A-33) that ∂D(z
∗)
∂p ≤ 0. Hence ∂z
∗
∂p ≥ 0. (b) Following similar logic, ∂D(z
∗)
∂c =
h (θ + (1− θ)G(z∗))
(
∂y∗(z∗)
∂c
)
. But ∂y
∗(z∗)
∂c = − 1f(y∗(z∗))(r−s) < 0. Hence, ∂z
∗
∂c ≥ 0. (c) Analo-
gous to part (b), we have ∂y
∗(z∗)
∂s =
r−c−hA(z)
f(y∗(z∗))(r−s)2 > 0. Hence,
∂z∗
∂s ≤ 0. (d) Following similar
logic, ∂y
∗(z∗)
∂r =
c−s+hA(z)
f(y∗(z∗))(r−s)2 > 0. Hence,
∂z∗
∂r ≤ 0. (e) The result follows from the fact that
∂z∗
∂L = 0.
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Proof of Theorem 7. All the desired results can be proved through application of the envelope
theorem on (2.9).
Proof of Theorem 8. Note that for θ = 1, the optimal planned leadtime z∗ = 0. From (2.9),
we have
v(z∗|θ = 1) = min
y
{
(hA(0)− (r − c))y + (r − s)E[(y −XD)+] + pB(0)E[XD]
}
= min
y
(−(r − c)y + (r − s)E[(y −XD)+]) .
Suppose that the optimal planned leadtime for an given θ < 1 is z′. By Theorem 3, z′ ≥ 0.
Therefore, A(z′) ≥ 0 and B(z′) ≥ 0. It follows that v(z∗|θ = 1) ≤ v(z′|θ < 1).
Proof of Theorem 9. Because XD = 1 with probability 1, (2.9) can be simplified to
v(z) = min
z≥0
{hA(z)− (r − c) + pB(z)} . (A-34)
Note
∂v(z)
∂z
=hθ + h(1− θ)G(z)− p(1− θ)(1−G(z)), (A-35)
∂2v(z)
∂z2
=h(1− θ)g(z) + p(1− θ)g(z).
By (A-35), we have
z∗ = G−1
[
p− h θ1−θ
p+ h
]
. (A-36)
Note z∗ is decreasing in θ and z∗ is interior if θ ≤ θ¯ = pp+h . Substitute (A-36) into (A-34) and
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drop the term (r − c), we have
v˜(z∗) = hθz∗ + h(1− θ)z∗
∫ z∗
0
g(ω)dω − h(1− θ)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
+ p(1− θ)
∫ ∞
z∗
ωg(ω)dω − p(1− θ)z∗
∫ ∞
z∗
g(ω)dω
= z∗ [hθ + h(1− θ)G(z∗)− p(1− θ)(1−G(z∗))]
+ p(1− θ)
∫ ∞
z∗
ωg(ω)dω − h(1− θ)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
= (1− θ)
[
pE[ω]− (p+ h)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
]
. (A-37)
Note
∂v˜(z∗)
∂θ
= −
[
pE[ω]− (p+ h)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
]
− (1− θ)(p+ h)z∗g(z∗)∂z
∗
∂θ
= −
[
pE[ω]− (p+ h)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
]
+
hz∗
1− θ (A-38)
because ∂z
∗
∂θ = − h(p+h)g(z∗)(1−θ)2 . Furthermore,
∂2v˜(z∗)
∂θ2
= (p+ h)z∗g(z∗)
∂z∗
∂θ
+
h
1− θ
∂z∗
∂θ
+
hz∗
(1− θ)2 = −
h2
(p+ h)(1− θ)3g(z∗) < 0.
Therefore, the optimal expected cost is a concave function of θ. From (A-38), we have
−
[
pE[ω]− (p+ h)
∫ z∗
0
ωg(ω)dω
]
+
hz∗
1− θ∗ = 0
⇒ θ∗ = 1− hz
∗
pE[ω]− (p+ h) ∫ z∗0 ωg(ω)dω . (A-39)
If the optimal θ∗ satisfying (A-39) is less than or equal to zero, then the cost function would
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be strictly decreasing in θ. This implies that if the leadtime distribution function satisfies
pE[ω]− hz∗ |θ=0≤ (p+ h)
∫ z∗|θ=0
0
ωg(ω)dω
then the optimal expected cost is strictly decreasing in θ. Otherwise the optimal expected cost
is a concave function of θ, initially increasing in θ and then decreasing in θ.
Proof of Theorem 10. By Lemma A3, v(t, xt, δt) can be written as v(t, xt, δt) = χ(t, xt, δt) · v˜(t),
where
χ(t, xt, δt) = xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
,
v˜(t) =
(
r + pB(T − L− t)− 1
2
(r − s)
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
)))
.
In taking the expectation of v(t, xt, δt) over xt and δt, we have J(x0, δ0) = E[v(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] =
E[χ(t,Xt,∆t) · v˜(t)|x0, δ0] = E[χ(t,Xt,∆t)] · v˜(t) because v˜(t) is independent of (xt, δt). By
Lemma A4, E[χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] is independent of t. The theorem statement then follows.
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Proof of Theorem 11. (a) By (A-27), for any given time t,
∂v(t, xt, δt)
∂σ
= xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
·(
(T − t)− (1− φT−t)( φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
T−t
1 + φ
))
σ·(
r + pB(T − L− t)− 1
2
(r − s)
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
)))
− 1
2
xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
(r − s)∂ erf (I)
∂σ
≥ xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
·(
(T − t)− (1− φT−t)( φ
1− φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1 + φ
T−t
1 + φ
))
σ·
(r + pB(T − L− t)− (r − s)) > 0,
where I = k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
and we have used the fact that erf(·) ≤ 1 and
∂ erf (I)
∂σ
= − erf ′(I)
(
(T − t)− (1− φT−t) ( φ1−φ − φD)(2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1+φT−t1+φ ))σ
2
√
2(ψσ(t))
.
Therefore, applying envelope theorem at t∗ obtains the desired result. (b) Can be analogously
proved as in (a).
Proof of Theorem 12. Note that ∂ψµ(t)∂λ = (F − 1)µN < 0, where
F =
T − t− (1− φT−t) ( φ1−φ − φD)
T − (1− φT )
(
φ
1−φ − φD
) .
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Note that by Lemma A6, F ≤ 1. Similarly, ∂ψσ(t)∂λ = (G− 1)σ2N < 0, where
G =
T − t− (1− φT−t) ( φ1−φ − φD)(2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1+φT−t1+φ )
T − (1− φT )
(
φ
1−φ − φD
)(
2− (φ− (1− φ)φD) 1+φT1+φ
) .
By (A-27), for any given time t,
∂v(t, xt, δt)
∂λ
= xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)(
∂ψµ(t)
∂λ
+
1
2
∂ψσ(t)
∂λ
)
·(
r + pB(T − L− t)− 1
2
(r − s)
(
1 + erf
(
k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
)))
− 1
2
xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)
(r − s)∂ erf (I)
∂λ
≤ 0,
where I = k(t)−
√
ψσ(t)√
2
and we have used the fact that erf(·) ≤ 1 and
∂ erf (I)
∂λ
= − erf ′(I)
∂ψσ(t)
∂λ
2
√
2(ψσ(t))
≥ 0.
Therefore, applying envelope theorem at t∗ obtains the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 13. Rearranging terms in (A-27), we have
v(t, xt, δt) =
1
2
(r − s)xt exp
(
ψµ(t) + ψδ(t) +
1
2
ψσ(t)
)(
r + s
r − s +M(t)
)
=
1
2
(r − s)χ(t, xt, δt)
(
r + s
r − s +M(t)
)
.
By Lemma A4, E [χ(t,Xt,∆t)|x0, δ0] is independent of t. Therefore, to determine the optimal
order time t∗, it is sufficient to investigate the properties of M(t).
Proof of Theorem 14. (i) Note that erf(·) is bounded between (−1, 1). By (2.14), it pays to
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order earlier if the accrued tardiness cost from time 0 to T−L exceeds 2. The theorem statement
then follows directly. (ii) For t > T − L, we prove (2.14) is concave in t for T − L ≤ t ≤ T
if the respective conditions are met. Because ∂
2B(T−L−t)
∂t2
= 0 for t > T − L, we only need to
consider erf(·) in (2.14). Note
∂ erf(·)
∂t
=
1
4
erf ′(·) σ
2√
1
2ψσ(t)
,
∂2 erf(·)
∂t2
=
σ4
8ψσ(t)
erf ′′(·) + erf ′(·) 1√
1
2ψσ(t)

=
σ4
8ψσ(t)
erf ′(·)
[
−2 erf−1
(
2
r − c
r − s − 1
)
+
√
2 (ψσ(t) + 1)√
ψσ(t)
]
. (A-40)
Thus, (2.14) is concave in t if (A-40) is non-negative for all T −L ≤ t ≤ T . Consider the terms
in squared bracket in (A-40), we have
∂[·]
∂t
=
σ2√
2ψσ(t)
(
−1 + 1
ψσ(t)
)
, (A-41)
and
∂2[·]
∂t2
=
σ4
(2ψσ(t))
3/2
(
−1 + 3
ψσ(t)
)
, (A-42)
By (A-41) and (A-42), ∂
2[·]
∂t2
> 0 whenever ∂[·]∂t = 0. Thus, the terms in squared bracket in (A-40)
is unimodal in t, where is minimum point is obtained by setting (A-41) equal to zero. This
minimum point exists if and only if σ2D ≤ 1 and (T −L)σ2+σ2D > 1, which corresponds to case
(b) of the theorem statement. If at this minimum point (A-40) is positive, thenM(t) is concave
in t. Theorem statement follows by substituting ψσ(t) = 1 into (A-40) and set (A-40) > 0,
recognizing that Φ(x) = 12
(
1 + erf
(
x√
2
))
. Part (a) and (c) can be analogously proved.
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Proof of Corollary 1. Part (a) follows directly from Theorem 14. (b) As a special case, by
setting θ = 1 one can easily construct examples where the optimal procurement time t > T −L.
Details of example are available upon request.
Proof of Theorem 15. Note that the functional form of M(t) is characterized by Lemma A8.
(i) In this case M(t) is a concave function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. The theorem statement
follows. (ii) In this case M(t) is a convex function of t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − L. The theorem
statement follows by recognizing that M(t) can be convex increasing or decreasing. (iii) M(t)
is convex in t for 0 ≤ t ≤ ts and concave in t for ts ≤ t ≤ T − L.
Proof of Theorem 16. Analogous to Theorem 15. We note, however, this theorem does not
require assumption that G(·) is uniform, because in this case we only need G′′(·) ≤ 0 for
Lemma A7 to hold.
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) and (ii) follows directly from Theorem 15 and 16.
Proof of Theorem 17. (a) When θ = 1, the supply leadtime is constant and equals to L. Conse-
quently, we have t∗N ≥ T −L and t∗P ≥ T −L. By Theorem 3, however, t∗N ≤ T −L. Therefore,
we have t∗N = T − L. In addition, by Theorem 15 and 16, t∗P can be T . Combining the above
result, we have t∗P ≥ t∗N . (b) When h = 0, we have t∗N ≤ T − L − zˆ by Theorem 2. Recall
zˆ = min{ωˆ, z¯}. But one can show that t∗P ≥ T − L − zˆ. Hence, t∗P ≥ t∗N . (c) We prove this
by an example. Assume the delay ω follows a Weibull distribution with the shape parameter
α = 0.85 and expectation E[ω] = 2. Set unit cost c = 2.1. In addition, we set r = 7, p = .7,
s = 2, h = .14, L = 2, T = 6, θ = .5, φ = φD = .05. We set expected demand equal to 100
and the demand CV equal to .8. Note that α = 0.85⇒ G′′(·) ≤ 0. For the no pre-season order
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case, by definition in Lemma A1, H(0) = y∗(0) θ1−θ = 331.07. Since
p
hE[XD] = 500 > H(0) and
supH(z) = 2, 387.56 > phE[XD], by part (c) of Lemma A2, z
∗ = z1. By evaluating equation
(A-21), we obtain z1 = 0.41 and hence the optimal order time t∗N = T − L − z1 = 3.59. For
the pre-season order case, consider equation (2.14). For 0 ≤ t < L, k(t) −
√
1
2ψσ(t) is strictly
decreasing in t. Combining with the fact that B(T − L − t) is linear in t, one can verify that
B(−L) = 3, B(0) = 1, so that t > T −L cannot be optimal. For t ≤ T −L, note B(·) is convex
increasing in t and limt→−∞B(·) = 0, and erf(k(t)−
√
1
2ψσ(t)) is monotonically increasing in
t and limt→−∞ erf(·) = −1. As both functions are continuous and bounded, by an exhaustive
numeric search we obtain t∗P = 3.55 < t
∗
N .
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A2 Appendices for Chapter 3
A2.1 Technical Lemmas
Lemma A9. The profit function (3.4) can be simplified into a more compact form as (3.5).
Proof of Lemma A9. Using (3.4), we have
p˜i(~y, ~u) = r
(∑
k
y˜k −
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+)
+ v
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
− p
(
D˜ −
∑
k
y˜k
)+
−
∑
k
C˜(yk)
= r
∑
k
y˜k − (r − v)
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
− p
(
D˜ −
∑
k
y˜k
)+
−
∑
k
C˜(yk)
= r
∑
k
y˜k − (r + p− v)
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
+ p
((∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
−
(
D˜ −
∑
k
y˜k
)+)
−
∑
k
C˜(yk)
= (r + p)
∑
k
y˜k −
∑
k
ck(ηkyk + (1− ηk)y˜k)− (r + p− v)
(∑
k
y˜k − D˜
)+
− pD˜.
(A-43)
Substitute ψk and φk into (A-43), we have (3.5).
Lemma A10. (a) For a given i, ∇yipi(~y)|yi=0 > 0 if and only if φi+ ψiGi(Ki) > E~S
[
F
(∑
k 6=i y˜k
)]
.
(b) ∇yipi(~y)|yi=Ki ≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma A10. Omitted.
Lemma A11. Let δ represent the capacity differential, such that supplier 1’s capacity is K+ δ
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and supplier 2’s cost is K − δ, where K is the base capacity level. Then,
∂pi∗(·)
∂δ
= φ1G1(K + δ, u1) + ψ1 −G2(K − δ, u2)E[F (y˜∗1)]
− φ2G2(K − δ, u2)− ψ2 +G1(K + δ, u1)E[F (y˜∗2)]. (A-44)
Proof of Lemma A11. Setting n = 2 and applying envelope theorem to (3.6), we have
∂pi(~y, ~u)
∂δ
=
2∑
k=1
φk
∂E~S [y˜k]
∂δ
−
∂E~S,D
[(∑2
k=1 y˜k − D˜
)+]
∂δ
. (A-45)
First note that for supplier 1, we have
∂E~S [y˜1]
∂δ
= ∇δ
(∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
y∗1dG1(r1, u1) +
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
(K + δ − r1)dG1(r1, u1)
)
= y∗1g1(K + δ − y∗1) +
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
dG1(r1, u1)− y∗1g1(K + δ − y∗1)
= G1(K + δ, u1)−G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1). (A-46)
Analogously, for supplier 2, we have
∂E~S [y˜2]
∂δ
= − (G2(K − δ, u2)−G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)) . (A-47)
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Furthermore,
∂E~S,D
[
(
∑2
k=1 y˜k−D˜)
+
]
∂δ =
∇δ
[∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗1+y∗2
0
(y∗1 + y
∗
2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ y∗1+K−δ−r2
0
(y∗1 +K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
∫ ∞
K−δ
∫ y∗1
0
(y∗1 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ K+δ−r1+y∗2
0
(K + δ − r1 + y∗2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ K−r1+K−r2
0
(K − r1 +K − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
∫ ∞
K−δ
∫ K+δ−r1
0
(K + δ − r1 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ ∞
K+δ
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗2
0
(y∗2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ ∞
K+δ
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ K−δ−r2
0
(K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
]
. (A-48)
The above can be written out term by term (label as T1− T8) as
T1 =−
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
[∫ y∗1+y∗2
0
(y∗1 + y
∗
2 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗1+y∗2
0
(y∗1 + y
∗
2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
T2 =
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
[
−
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ y∗1+K−δ−r2
0
dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)−
∫ y∗1
0
(y∗1 −D)dF (D)g2(k − δ, u2)
+
∫ y∗1+y∗2
0
(y∗1 + y
∗
2 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ y∗1+K−δ−r2
0
(y∗1 +K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
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T3 =
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
[∫ y∗1
0
(y∗1 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ ∞
K−δ
∫ y∗1
0
(y∗1 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
T4 =
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
[∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ K+δ−r1+y∗2
0
dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)
−
∫ K+δ−r1+y∗2
0
(K + δ − r1 + y∗2 −D)dF (D)g2(k − δ − y∗2, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗2
0
(y∗2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ, u1)
−
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗1+y∗2
0
(y∗1 + y
∗
2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
T5 =
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
[
−
∫ K+δ−r1
0
(K + δ − r1 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ, u2)
+
∫ K+δ−r1+y∗2
0
(K + δ − r1 + y∗2 −D)dF (D)g2(k − δ − y∗2, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ K−δ−r2
0
(K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ, u1)
−
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ y∗1+K−δ−r2
0
(y∗1 +K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
T6 =
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
[∫ ∞
K−δ
∫ K+δ−r1
0
dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)
+
∫ K+δ−r1
0
(K + δ − r1 −D)dF (D)g2(k − δ, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
−
∫ ∞
K−δ
∫ y∗1
0
(y∗1 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ − y∗1, u1).
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T7 =−
∫ ∞
K+δ
∫ y∗2
0
(y∗2 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
−
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
∫ y∗2
0
(y∗2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ, u1).
T8 =
∫ ∞
K+δ
[
−
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ K−δ−r2
0
dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)
+
∫ y∗2
0
(y∗2 −D)dF (D)g2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
]
dG1(r1, u1)
−
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
∫ K−δ−r2
0
(K − δ − r2 −D)dF (D)dG2(r2, u2)g1(K + δ, u1).
Combining all the above eight terms T1− T8 together, we have ∂E~S,D
[
(y˜∗1+y˜∗2−D˜)
+
]
∂δ =
−
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (y∗1 +K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
F (K + δ − r1 + y∗2)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
+
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
∫ ∞
K−δ
F (K + δ − r1)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
−
∫ ∞
K+δ
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)dG1(r1, u1)
=−G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (y∗1 +K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)
+G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (K + δ − r1 + y∗2)dG1(r1, u1)
+G2(K − δ)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (K + δ − r1)dG1(r1, u1)
−G1(K + δ)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2). (A-49)
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Substitute (A-46), (A-47) and (A-49) into (A-45), we have
∂pi(~y, ~u)
∂δ
= φ1(G1(K + δ, u1)−G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1))− φ2 (G2(K − δ, u2)−G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2))
−G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (y∗1 +K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)
+G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (K + δ − r1 + y∗2)dG1(r1, u1)
+G2(K − δ)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (K + δ − r1)dG1(r1, u1)
−G1(K + δ)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2). (A-50)
Note by (3.9), we have
φ1G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1) = −ψ1 +G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1)
∫ K−δ−y∗2
0
F (y∗1 + y
∗
2)dG2(r2, u2)
+G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (y∗1 +K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)
+G1(K + δ − y∗1, u1)
∫ ∞
K−δ
F (y∗1)dG2(r2, u2), (A-51)
and
φ2G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2) = −ψ2 +G2(K − δ − y∗2, u2)
∫ K+δ−y∗1
0
F (y∗1 + y
∗
2)dG1(r1, u1)
+G2(K + δ − y∗1, u2)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (y∗2 +K + δ − r1)dG1(r1, u1)
+G2(K + δ − y∗1, u2)
∫ ∞
K+δ
F (y∗2)dG1(r1, u1). (A-52)
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Substitute (A-51) and (A-52) into (A-50), we have
∂pi(~y, ~u)
∂δ
= φ1G1(K + δ, u1) + ψ1 −G1(K + δ − y∗1)G2(K − δ)F (y∗1)
− φ2G2(K − δ, u2)− ψ2 +G2(K − δ − y∗2)G1(K + δ)F (y∗2)
−G2(K − δ, u2)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
F (K + δ − r1)dG1(r1, u1)
+G1(K + δ, u1)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
F (K − δ − r2)dG2(r2, u2)
= φ1G1(K + δ, u1) + ψ1 −G2(K − δ)E [y˜∗1]
− φ2G2(K − δ, u2)− ψ2 +G1(K + δ)E [y˜∗2] .
A2.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that the first part of the lemma statement is true if and only if
∇yiyipi(~y, ~u)−∇yiyjpi(~y, ~u) ≤ 0. Using (3.12) and (3.13), and realizing that
Gi(Ki − yi)Gj(Kj − yj)E~S
f
yi + yj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k

= Gi(Ki − yi)E~S
Gj(Kj − yj)f
yi + yj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k

≤ Gi(Ki − yi)E~S
f
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 ,
we have that a sufficient condition for∇yiyipi(~y, ~u)−∇yiyjpi(~y, ~u) ≤ 0 is φi−E~S
[
F
(
yi +
∑
k 6=i y˜k
)]
≥
0. This condition is guaranteed as long as ~y is an interior solution, which implies that
∇ipi(~y) ≥ 0. The second part of the lemma statement can be analogously proved.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Setting (3.11) equal to zero, we have φi − E~S
[
F
(
yi +
∑
k 6=i y˜k
)]
> 0.
Substitute this condition into (3.12), we have ∇yiyipi(~y) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 19. We prove the theorem by induction on the number of suppliers. Note
that the proof here is in the same spirit to the proof of Proposition 2 in Aydin and Porteus
(2005).
First note that if there is a single supplier, (a) follows directly from Lemma A10. (b) is
true by Lemma A10 and Lemma 2, which proves that pi(·, ~u) is unimodal in y1.
Now suppose there are two suppliers such that both y1 and y2 are decision variables. At a
given y1, pi(~y, ~u) reduces to a function of one variable. By the induction assumption, at any given
y1, there exists a unique y∗2(y1) such that ∇yipi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u) ≤ 0 and yi∇yipi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u) = 0.
Note that y∗2(y1) maximizes pi(·, ~u) at y1. Instead of maximizing the pi(·, ~u) function directly,
we can maximize the induced function pi(y1, y∗2(y1)). By envelope theorem,
∂pi(y1, y∗2(y1))
∂y1
= ∇y1pi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u).
Therefore,
∂2pi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u)
∂y21
= ∇y1y1pi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u) +∇y1y2pi(y1, y∗2(y1))
∂y∗2(y1)
∂y1
. (A-53)
Setting (3.11) equal to zero and applying implicit function theorem, we have
∂y∗2(y1)
∂y1
= −C2
L2
, (A-54)
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where
C2 = G2(K2 − y2)G1(K1 − y1)f (y1 + y2) ,
L2 = g2(K2 − y2)
(
φ2 − E~S [F (y˜1 + y2)]
)
+G2(K2 − y2)E~S [f (y˜1 + y2)] .
Substitute (3.12), (3.13) and (A-54) into (A-53), we have
∂2pi(y1, y∗2(y1), ~u)
∂y21
= −L1 + C
2
2
L2
. (A-55)
Note that pi(·, ~u) is unimodal if and only if −L1L2 + C22 < 0. If y∗2 = 0 then the above reduces
to a single variable problem. If y∗2 > 0, then by (3.11) and (3.12) L2 > C2. Analogously, we
have L1 > C2. The theorem statement then follows directly.
Proof of Lemma 3. Setting (3.11) equal to zero and applying implicit function theorem, we
have (note that we have suppressed the dependence of u(·) on the improvement efforts and
simply write ui)
∂y∗i (ui)
∂ui
= −
∂Gi(Ki−y∗i ,ui)
∂ui
(
φi − E~S
[
F
(
y∗i +
∑
k 6=i y˜k
)])
−gi(Ki − y∗i )
(
φi − E~S
[
F
(
y∗i +
∑
k 6=j y˜k
)])
−Gi(Ki − y∗i )E~S
[
f
(
y∗i +
∑
k 6=j y˜k
)]
Note at optimality if y∗i > 0 then φi−E~S
[
F
(
y∗i +
∑
k 6=j y˜k
)]
> 0. In addition, ∂Gi(Ki−y
∗
i ,ui)
∂ui
>
0 by definition. Combine these together, we must have ∂y
∗
i (ui)
∂ui
≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (3.6), we have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂ui
= φi
∂E~S [y˜i]
∂ui
−
∂E~S,D
[(∑n
k=1 y˜k − D˜
)+]
∂ui
. (A-56)
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Note that
∂E~S [y˜i]
∂ui
= y∗i
∂Gi(Ki − y∗i , ui)
∂ui
+
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
(Ki − ri)d∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
= y∗i
∂Gi(Ki − y∗i , ui)
∂ui
+ (Ki − ri)∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
∣∣∣Ki
Ki−y∗i
−
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
d(Ki − ri)
=
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri. (A-57)
In addition, we have
∂E~S,D
[
(
∑n
k=1 y˜k−D˜)
+
]
∂ui
=
E~S
[∫ Ki−y∗i
0
∫ y∗i+∑k 6=i y˜k
0
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)d∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
+
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∫ Ki−ri+∑k 6=i y˜k
0
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)d∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
+
∫ ∞
Ki
∫ ∑
k 6=i y˜k
0
∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)d∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
]
= E~S
[
∂Gi(Ki − y∗i , ui)
∂ui
∫ y∗i+∑k 6=i y˜k
0
yi +∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)
+
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
∫ Ki−ri+∑k 6=i y˜k
0
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)∣∣∣Ki
Ki−y∗i
−
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
d
∫ Ki−ri+∑k 6=i y˜k
0
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)

− ∂Gi(Ki, ui)
∂ui
∫ ∑
k 6=i y˜k
0
∑
k 6=i
y˜k −D
 dF (D)]
= E~S
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dri]. (A-58)
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Substitute (A-57) and (A-58) into (A-56), we have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂ui
= φi
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri − E~S
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dri]
≥ φi
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri − E~S
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
y∗i +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dri]
= φi
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri − E~S
[
F
y∗i +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
]∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri
=
φi − E~S
[
F
y∗i +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
]∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri ≥ 0. (A-59)
Note that (A-59) follows from the fact that ∂Gi(ri,ui)∂ui ≥ 0, and φi−E~S
[
F
(
y∗i +
∑
k 6=i y˜k
)]
≥ 0
by (3.11).
Proof of Theorem 20. When η1 = η2 = 0, (3.14) can be simplified to
G1(K1 − y1, u1)
(
φ1 − ES˜2 [F (y1 + y˜2)]
)
= 0,
G2(K2 − y2, u2)
(
φ2 − ES˜1 [F (y2 + y˜1)]
)
= 0. (A-60)
(a) For any interior solution, it is clear that y∗1 + y∗2 ≥ D, because otherwise (A-60) is strictly
positive. The theorem statement follows since y∗1 + y∗2 is upper bounded by K1 + K2. In
addition, both y∗1 and y∗2 are strictly less than D because otherwise one or both conditions in
(A-60) is (are) strictly negative. (b) We prove the theorem statement by considering different
regions of the demand. First note that when y1 + y2 = D, both equations in (A-60) are
strictly positive. We must have φ1G1(K1 − y1) = φ2G2(K2 − y2), unless φ1G1(K1 − D) ≥
φ2G2(K2) ⇒ D ≤ K1 − G−11
(
r−c2
r−c1G2(K2)
)
. The theorem statements then follow directly.
Note that if φ1G1(K1) < φ2G2(K2), the above condition can be similarly derived as D ≤
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K2 − G−12
(
r−c1
r−c2G1(K1)
)
. Next we consider the case when y1 + y2 > D. Using (3.14), the
optimal procurement quantity is given by
y∗1 = D − (K2 −G−12 (r − c1)), y∗2 = D − (K1 −G−11 (r − c2)). (A-61)
For y1 + y2 > D to hold, therefore, we must have D > K1 +K2 −G−11 (r − c2)−G−12 (r − c1).
However, for (A-61) to be interior solution, we must have
φ1 −G2(K2 − (D −K1)) ≤ 0⇒ D ≤ K1 +K2 −G−12 (r − c1),
φ2 −G1(K1 − (D −K2)) ≤ 0⇒ D ≤ K1 +K2 −G−11 (r − c2).
Therefore, we must have D ≤ K1+K2−min(G−11 (r− c2), G−12 (r− c1)) for firm to dual source
without hitting the capacity limit from one of the suppliers. Note that when the firm utilize
the fully capacity of one supplier, the total procurement quantity y∗1 + y∗2 > D. Otherwise,
suppose y∗1 < K1 and y∗2 = K2, then we have y∗1 + K2 = (D − K2 + G−12 (r − c1)) + K2 =
D+G−12 (r− c1) > D. The case of both suppliers’ capacities are fully utilized can be similarly
proved. The last region in the theorem statement follows directly from the above analysis.
Proof of Theorem 21. Using (3.19), we have
∂g(u(z), u(0))
∂u(z)
= −m∂h
−1 (u(z), u(0))
∂u(z)
+ θ
∂pi∗ (u(z))
∂u(z)
, and
∂2g(u(z), u(0))
∂u(z)2
= −m∂
2h−1 (u(z), u(0))
∂u(z)2
+ θ
∂2pi∗ (u(z))
∂u(z)2
. (A-62)
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Let h′ (u(0), z) = ∂h(u(0),z)∂z and h
′′ (u(0), z) = ∂
2h(u(0),z)
∂z2
, we have
∂2h−1 (u(z), u(0))
∂u(z)2
= − 1
(h′ (u(0), z))2
h′′ (u(0), z)
h′ (u(0), z)
. (A-63)
Substitute (A-63) and (A-59) into (A-62), and applying appropriate assumptions (T1-T3), we
have ∂
2g(u(z),u(0))
∂u(z)2
≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 9. It is necessary and sufficient to show that ∂
2g(~u(z),~u(0))
∂ui(z)∂uj(z)
≤ 0. Using (A-59),
we have (suppressing the dependence of u(·) on the improvement efforts)
∂2pi∗(~u)
∂ui∂uj
= −∂ujE~S
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dri]
= −E~S
[
∂Gj(Kj − y∗j , uj)
∂uj
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri + y∗j + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k
 dri
+
∂Gj(rj , uj)
∂uj
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +Kj − rj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k
 dri
∣∣∣∣∣
Kj
Kj−y∗j
−
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
∂Gj(rj , uj)
∂uj
d
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +Kj − rj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k
 dri

− ∂Gj(Kj , uj)
∂uj
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k
 dri]
= −E~S
[∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(rj , uj)
∂uj
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
f
Ki − ri +Kj − rj + ∑
k 6=i,j
y˜k
 dridrj].
(A-64)
Note that (A-64) is non-positive because both ∂Gi(·,uj)∂uj ≥ 0 and
∂Gi(·,ui)
∂ui
≥ 0. The lemma
statement then follows because ∂
2g(~u1,~u0)
∂ui∂uj
is a positive, linear combination of ∂
2pi∗(~u)
∂ui∂uj
.
Proof of Theorem 22. We will rewrite (A-59) in a more amenable form. First note that with
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two suppliers, we have
E~S
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
Ki − ri +∑
k 6=i
y˜k
 dri]
= Gj(Kj − y∗j , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F
(
Ki − ri + y∗j
)
dri
+Gj(Kj , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F (Ki − ri) dri
+Gj(rj , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dri
∣∣∣Kj
Kj−y∗j
−
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
Gj(rj , uj)d
[∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dri
]
=
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
F (Ki − ri) dri
+
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
Gj(rj , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
f (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dridrj . (A-65)
Substitute (A-65) into (A-59), we have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂ui
=
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
[φi − F (Ki − ri)] ∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri
−
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
Gj(rj , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
f (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dridrj . (A-66)
Using (3.22) and the fact that ∂
2pi∗(u1(z1),u2(z2))
∂ui(zi)
2 ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2, we have
∂2g(~u(z), ~u(0))
∂ui(zi)
2 = m
h′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
+ θiθj
∂2pi∗ (ui(zi), uj(zj))
∂ui(zi)
2 + θi(1− θj)
∂2pi∗ (ui(zi), uj(0))
∂ui(zi)
2
≤ m h
′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
, i = 1, 2; j = 3− i, (A-67)
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and
∂2g(~u(z), ~u(0))
∂ui(zi)∂uj(zj)
= θiθj
∂2pi∗ (u1(z1), u2(z2))
∂ui(zi)∂uj(zj)
= −θ1θ2
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
∂Gj(rj , uj)
∂uj
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
f (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dridrj
≥ −θ1θ2
∫ Kj
Kj−y∗j
Gj(rj , uj)
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
f (Ki − ri +Kj − rj) dridrj
≥ −θ1θ2
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
[φi − F (Ki − ri)] ∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri, i = 1, 2; j = 3− i. (A-68)
Subtract (A-68) from (A-67), we have
∂2g(~u(z), ~u(0))
∂ui(zi)
2 −
∂2g(~u(z), ~u(0))
∂ui(zi)∂uj(zj)
≤ m h
′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
+ θ1θ2
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
[φi − F (Ki − ri)] ∂Gi(ri, ui)
∂ui
dri
≤ m h
′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
+ θ1θ2φi
∫ Ki
Ki−y∗i
Gi(ri, ui)dri
≤ m h
′′ (ui(0), zi)
(h′ (ui(0), zi))3
+ θ1θ2φiKi, i = 1, 2; j = 3− i.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for g(~u(z), ~u(0)) to be jointly unimodal in ~u(z) is given by
(3.23).
Proof of Corollary 3. Let
L = θ
∫ K
K−y∗
(
(φ− F (K − s)) ∂G(s, u(z
∗))
∂u(z∗)
)
ds− m
h′(u(0), z∗)
.
We have
∂L
∂z
= θ
∫ K
K−y∗
(
(φ− F (K − s)) ∂
2G(s, u(z∗))
∂u(z∗)2
)
∂u(z∗)
∂z∗
ds+
m
h′(u(0), z∗)2
h′′(u(0), z∗) < 0.
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The corollary statements (a) through (d) follow directly by applying implicit function theorem
on (3.20). For part (e), note that
∂L
∂K
= θ
[
−
∫ K
K−y∗
(
(f(K − s)) ∂G(s, u(z
∗))
∂u(z∗)
)
ds+ φ−
(
φ− F (y∗)∂G(K − y
∗, u(z∗))
∂u(z∗)
)]
= θ
[∫ K
K−y∗
∂G(s, u(z∗))
∂u(z∗)
dF (K − s) + F (y∗)∂G(K − y
∗, u(z∗))
∂u(z∗)
]
= −θ
∫ K
K−y∗
F (K − s)∂g(s, u(z
∗))
∂u(z∗)
ds.
The corollary statements then follows.
Proof of Lemma 6. We prove the lemma statement by constructing a particular example. Sup-
pose there are two suppliers which differ in cost and reliability, such that c1 < c2 and u1 < u2.
As a special case, let u2 =∞, i.e., the supplier 2 is perfectly reliable. Furthermore, we assume
the demand is deterministic, denote as D. For simplicity, we assume η1 = η2 = 0 and θ = 1.
All other parameters are assumed to be identical.
Given the above assumptions, the firm’s expected profit function, given the firm sources
from supplier i, i = 1, 2, is φiESi [y˜i] − ESi [(y˜i − D)+]. It is straightforward to show that
y∗i = min{D,K}, i = 1, 2. Therefore, the firm’s optimal expected profit function is simply
φiESi [min{D,K}] if the firm procures from supplier i, i = 1, 2. In what follows, we consider
the case where D ≤ K. The analysis of D > K can be similarly carried out. Using (A-76), we
have
φiESi [D] = (r − ci)
∫ K
K−D
Gi(s, ui(0))ds. (A-69)
If there is no improvement opportunity, then the firm will choose to procure from supplier 2 if
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and only if
(r − c2)
∫ K
K−D
G2(s, u2(0))ds > (r − c1)
∫ K
K−D
G1(s, u1(0))ds. (A-70)
Substitute the assumption that u2(0) =∞ into (A-70), we have
(r − c2)D > (r − c1)
∫ K
K−D
G1(s, u1(0))ds. (A-71)
Since D >
∫K
K−DG1(s, u1(0))ds, it is easy to find parameter values such that c1 < c2 but (A-71)
holds. In other words, the firm prefers to procure from supplier 2 as opposed to supplier 1,
because the reliability gain of supplier 2 out weights the cost savings from supplier 1. However,
if the firm has opportunity to make improvement, it will either make no improvement and
continue to procure from supplier 2, or it will make improvement from supplier 1 and procure
from supplier 1 afterwards. In particular, using (3.20), the optimal process capability after
improvement is given by
u1(z∗) = u1(0) +
r − c1
2m
∫ K
K−D
∂G1(s, u1(z∗))
∂u1(z∗)
ds. (A-72)
To facilitate intuition, we further assume that G(·, u) is uniformly distributed with support
greater than or equal to K. We can then obtain closed form solution as
u1(z∗) = u1(0) +
1
2m
1
2
(r − c1)(K2 − (K −D)2). (A-73)
Let ∆ denote the LHS - RHS of (A-71), then if the optimal expected revenue after improvement
on supplier 1 is greater than ∆ then the firm will procure from supplier 1 after improvement
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effort. Substitute (A-73) into (3.19), we have
g∗ = − 1
4mu21(0)
[
1
2
(r − c1)(K2 − (K −D)2)
]2
+
[
u1(0) +
1
2m
1
2
(r − c1)(K2 − (K −D)2)
]
·
1
2m
1
2
(r − c1)(K2 − (K −D)2).
(A-74)
If g∗ minus the right hand side of (A-71) is greater than ∆, then the lemma statement is true.
Note this can be simplified to
1
2m
(
1− 1
2u21(0)
)[
1
2
(r − c1)(K2 − (K −D)2)
]2
> ∆,
which can be easily satisfied if u1(0) >
√
2
2 and m is small.
Proof of Lemma 7. By envelope theorem,
∂(pi∗D − pi∗I )
∂c
= −2(ηy∗D + (1− η)E[y∗D]) + (ηy∗I + (1− η)E[y∗I ]) = −2E[y∗D] + E[y∗I ]. (A-75)
Note that
E[y∗D] =
∫ K−y∗D
0
y∗DdG(r, uD) +
∫ K
K−y∗D
(K − r)dG(r, uD)
= y∗DG(K − y∗D, uD) + (K − r)G(r, uD)|KK−y∗D −
∫ K
K−y∗D
G(r, uD)d(K − r)
=
∫ K
K−y∗D
G(r, uD)dr. (A-76)
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Substitute (A-76) into (A-75), and realizing y∗I ≥ y∗D (submodular property),
∂(pi∗D − pi∗I )
∂c
= −2
∫ K
K−y∗D
G(r, uD)dr +
∫ K
K−y∗I
G(r, uI)dr
=
∫ K
K−y∗D
(−2G(r, uD) +G(r, uI))dr +
∫ K−y∗D
K−y∗I
G(r, uI)dr.
Now, using (A-76),
∂2(pi∗D − pi∗I )
∂c2
= −2∂E[y
∗
D]
∂c
+
∂E[y∗I ]
∂c
= −2G(K − y∗D, uD)
∂y∗D
∂c
+G(K − y∗I , uI)
∂y∗I
∂c
. (A-77)
Applying implicit function theorem to (3.14), we have
∂y∗D
∂c
= − η + (1− η)G(K − y
∗
D, uD)
g(K − y∗D, uD)[φ− E[F (y∗D + y˜∗D)]] +G(K − y∗D, uD)E[f(y∗D + y˜∗D)]
.
Setting η = 0, the above equation can be simplified to
∂y∗D
∂c
= − 1
E[f(y∗D + y˜
∗
D)]
= − 1
f(·) .
Substitute the above function into (A-77), we have
∂2(pi∗D − pi∗I )
∂c2
= − 1
f(·) (−2G(K − y
∗
D, uD) +G(K − y∗I , uI)) . (A-78)
Both claims 1 and 2 follow directly.
Proof of Lemma 8. We first prove that the optimal expected revenue is increasing in cost re-
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lated δ. Using (3.7), and substitute c1 = c− δ and cc = c+ δ, we have
pi∗(~u)
∂δ
= ∇δ
(
2∑
i=1
ψiy
∗
i +
2∑
i=1
φiE[y˜∗i ]
)
= η(y∗1 − y∗2) + (1− η) (E[y˜∗1]− E[y˜∗2]) . (A-79)
Using (3.9), we have, at optimality, that
G(K − y∗1)(φ1 − E[F (y∗1 + y˜∗2)]) + ψ1 = 0,
G(K − y∗2)(φ2 − E[F (y∗2 + y˜∗1)]) + ψ2 = 0.
By assumption, φ1 ≥ φ2 and ψ1 ≤ ψ2, it follows that y∗1 ≥ y∗2. Further more, because the two
suppliers are identical in reliability, y∗1 ≥ y∗2 ⇒ E[y˜∗1] ≥ E[y˜∗2]. Substitute into (A-79), we have
pi∗(~u)
∂δ ≥ 0.
We next prove that pi
∗(~u)
∂δ is increasing in u1. By Lemma 3,
∂y∗1
∂u1
≥ 0. Because pi∗(·) is a
submodular function in (y∗1, y∗2) by Lemma 1, it follows that
∂y∗2
∂u1
≤ 0. (Note this can also be
directly verified by applying implicit function theorem to (3.9).) Combine the above together,
we have pi
∗(~u)
∂δ is increasing in u1. Setting n = 1 in (3.22), we have
∂pi∗I
∂δ
= ∇δg∗(u1, u0) = θ1
∂pi∗
(
u1
∗)
∂δ
+ (1− θ1)
∂pi∗
(
u0
∗)
∂δ
≥ ∂pi
∗ (u0∗)
∂δ
= ηy∗1 + (1− η)E[y˜∗1]
≥ η(y∗1 − y∗2) + (1− η) (E[y˜∗1]− E[y˜∗2])
=
∂pi∗D
∂δ
.
Note the y∗1 differs in the above equation for the pure investment and pure diversification case
233
because the capability level is different and the number of suppliers are also different. Because
y∗ is increasing in capability and the diversification function is a submodular function, we must
have y∗I > y
∗
D.
We now prove that the optimal expected revenue is increasing in η related δ. Using (3.7),
and substitute η1 = η − δ and η2 = η + δ, we have
pi∗(~u)
∂δ
= ∇δ
(
2∑
i=1
ψiy
∗
i +
2∑
i=1
φiE[y˜∗i ]
)
= c (y∗1 − y∗2 − E[y˜∗1] + E[y˜∗2])
= c
(
y∗1 − y∗2 −
(∫ K−y∗1
0
y∗1dG(r, u) +
∫ K
K−y∗1
(K − r)dG(r, u)
)
+
(∫ K−y∗2
0
y∗2dG(r, u) +
∫ K
K−y∗2
(K − r)dG(r, u)
))
= c
(
y∗1 − y∗2 −
(
G(K − y∗1, u)y∗1 + (K − r)G(r, u)
∣∣∣K
K−y∗1
+
∫ K
K−y∗1
G(r, u)dr
)
+
(
G(K − y∗2, u)y∗2 + (K − r)G(r, u)
∣∣∣K
K−y∗2
+
∫ K
K−y∗2
G(r, u)dr
))
= c
(
y∗1 − y∗2 −
∫ K
K−y∗1
G(r, u)dr +
∫ K
K−y∗2
G(r, u)dr
)
. (A-80)
Using (3.9), one can easily prove that y∗1 ≥ y∗2. We can therefore rewrite (A-80) as
pi∗(~u)
∂δ
= c
(
y∗1 − y∗2 −
∫ K−y∗2
K−y∗1
G(r, u)dr
)
≥ c
(
y∗1 − y∗2 −
∫ K−y∗2
K−y∗1
dr
)
= 0. (A-81)
Next we show that ν − ∫KK−ν G(r, u)dr is an increasing function of ν. Note that
∇ν
(
ν −
∫ K
K−ν
G(r, u)dr
)
= 1−G(K − ν, u) ≥ 0. (A-82)
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Intuitively, as δ increases, y∗1 increases and y∗2 decreases (for diversification case). Therefore,
the marginal benefit of δ is increasingly beneficial. (this can be easily proved). However, for
the investment case, the increase in δ may also cause a change in optimal investment level u′.
So how does optimal u change with η? By first order condition, this should be negative = −c
We now prove the capacity related δ. Setting all parameters identical and by Lemma A11,
we have
∂pi∗(·)
∂δ
= φ (G(K + δ, u)−G(K − δ, u))−G(K − δ, u)E[F (y˜∗1)] +G(K + δ, u)E[F (y˜∗2)].
We prove that the above expression is always non-negative by showing (1) the above expression
is equal to zero when δ = 0, and (2) the derivative of the above expression is non-negative.
For part (1), it is easy to see that at δ = 0 the above expression equals to zero. For part
(2), note
∂2pi∗(·)
∂δ2
= φ (g(K + δ, u) + g(K − δ, u))− g(K + δ, u)E[F (y˜∗2)] +G(K + δ)
∂E[F (y˜∗2)]
∂δ
− g(K − δ, u)E[F (y˜∗1)]−G(K − δ)
∂E[F (y˜∗1)]
∂δ
. (A-83)
Note that
∂E[F (y˜∗2)]
∂δ
= −
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
f(K − δ − r2)dG(r2, u), (A-84)
and
∂E[F (y˜∗1)]
∂δ
= −
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
f(K + δ − r1)dG(r1, u), (A-85)
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Substitute (A-84) and (A-85) into (A-83), we have
∂2pi∗(·)
∂δ2
= g(K + δ, u)(φ− E[F (y˜∗2)]) + g(K − δ, u)(φ− E[F (y˜∗1)])
−G(K + δ)
∫ K−δ
K−δ−y∗2
f(K − δ − r2)dG(r2, u)
+G(K − δ)
∫ K+δ
K+δ−y∗1
f(K + δ − r1)dG(r1, u). (A-86)
Let x1 = K + δ − r1 and x2 = K − δ − r2, and substitute into (A-86), we have
∂2pi∗(·)
∂δ2
= g(K + δ, u)(φ− E[F (y˜∗2)]) + g(K − δ, u)(φ− E[F (y˜∗1)])
−G(K + δ)
∫ y∗2
0
f(x2)g(K − δ − x2, u)dx2
+G(K − δ)
∫ y∗1
0
f(x1)g(K + δ − x1, u)dx1. (A-87)
If g(·) is uniformly distributed, then (A-87) is non-negative.
We now prove that pi∗D is increasing in revenue related δ. Using (A-59), we have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂δ
= φ
∫ K
K−y∗1
∂G(r1, u1)
∂u1
dr1 − E~S
[∫ K
K−y∗1
∂G(r1, u1)
∂u1
F (K − r1 + y˜∗2) dr1
]
− φ
∫ K
K−y∗2
∂G(r2, u2)
∂u2
dr2 + E~S
[∫ K
K−y∗2
∂G(r2, u2)
∂u2
F (K − r2 + y˜∗1) dr1
]
=
∫ K
K−y∗1
∂G(r1, u1)
∂u1
(
φ− E~S [F (K − r1 + y˜∗2)]
)
dr1
−
∫ K
K−y∗2
∂G(r2, u2)
∂u2
(
φ− E~S [F (K − r2 + y˜∗1)]
)
dr2.
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Let x = K − r, we have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂δ
=
∫ y∗1
0
∂G(K − x, u1)
∂u1
(
φ− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗2)]
)
dx
−
∫ y∗2
0
∂G(K − x, u2)
∂u2
(
φ− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗1)]
)
dx
≥
∫ y∗2
0
∂G(K − x, u1)
∂u1
(
φ− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗2)]
)
dx
−
∫ y∗2
0
∂G(K − x, u1)
∂u1
(
φ− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗1)]
)
dx
=
∫ y∗2
0
∂G(K − x, u1)
∂u1
(
E~S [F (x+ y˜
∗
1)]− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗2)]
)
dx ≥ 0. (A-88)
Note the inequalities follow from the fact that u1 > u2 ⇒ y∗1 ≥ y∗2.
Now, for the pure investment strategy, we must have
∂pi∗(~u)
∂δ
=
∫ yˆ∗1
0
∂G(K − x, uˆ1)
∂uˆ1
(φ− F (x)) dx
≥
∫ y∗1
0
∂G(K − x, uˆ1)
∂uˆ1
(
φ− E~S [F (x+ y˜∗2)]
)
dx. (A-89)
Therefore, as δ increases, the pure investment strategy is increasingly preferred to diversification
case.
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A3 Appendices for Chapter 4
A3.1 Split Procurement Strategy with s2 ≤ min(s0, s1)
In the second stage, first consider the case when the realized demand is less than the total
procurement quantity, i.e., x ≤ y0 + y1. Following the analysis from §4.3.2, it is economical to
ship product from LCC if and only if z ≤ r + p − s0. Therefore, if z ≤ r + p − s0, then the
firm’s revenue function is
pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = rmin
(
1∑
i=0
yˆi, x
)
− zyˆ0 − p
(
x−
1∑
i=0
yˆi
)+
+ s2
(
1∑
i=0
yˆi − x
)+
+
1∑
i=0
si(yi − yˆi)
(A-90)
s.t. yˆi ≤ yi, i = 0, 1,
where yˆ0 and yˆ1 are the procurement quantity shipped from LCC and MCC, respectively.
For the case of s2 < min(s0, s1), it is optimal for the firm to ship just as much as the realized
demand x, because the firm can realize higher salvage value for any left over quantities. Since
pil is increasing in yˆ0 and yˆ1 for
∑1
i=0 yˆi < x, we must have
∑1
i=0 yˆi = x. Substitute yˆ1 = x− yˆ0
into (A-90),
pil(yˆ0, yˆ1, y0, y1, x) = (r − s1)x+ (s1 − s0 − z)yˆ0 +
1∑
i=0
siyi. (A-91)
Note that pil(yˆ0, x) is linear in yˆ0, therefore, yˆ∗0 = min(y0, x) if z ≤ s1−s0 and yˆ∗0 = max(x−y1, 0)
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otherwise. Therefore, (A-91) can be simplified to
pil(y0, y1, x) =

(r − s1)x+ (s1 − s0 − z)min(y0, x) +
∑1
i=0 siyi, z ≤ s1 − s0;
(r − s1)x+ (s1 − s0 − z)(x− y1)+ +
∑1
i=0 siyi, otherwise.
(A-92)
If z > r+ p− s0, then it is not economical to ship from LCC, but it remains profitable to ship
from MCC. The firm’s revenue function is
pil(y0, y1, x) = rmin(y1, x)− p(x− y1)+ + s1(y1 − x)+ + s0y0. (A-93)
Note that in this case the amount shipped from MCC is given by yˆ1 = min(y1, x).
We now turn our attention to the case where the realized demand is greater than the total
procurement quantity, i.e, x > y0 + y1. Again, it is economical to ship from LCC if and only if
z ≤ r + p− s0. Therefore, if z ≤ r + p− s0, then the firm’s revenue function is
pih(y0, y1, x) = r
1∑
i=0
yi − p
(
x−
1∑
i=0
yi
)
− zy0. (A-94)
Otherwise, if z > r + p− s0, then the firm’s profit function is
pih(y0, y1, x) = ry1 − p(x− y1) + s0y0. (A-95)
Combining the above derivations, we can derive the firm’s expected profit function for any
given s0, s1. Note that if s0 ≥ s1, then at the second stage, it is optimal for the firm to try to
ship as much of product from MCC as possible. Otherwise if s0 < s1 then at the second stage,
as long as the unit quota price is not too high, it is optimal for the firm to try to ship as much
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of product from LCC as possible. First consider the case of s0 < s1, we have
pi(y0, y1) =
(∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)
)
+
(∫ r+p−s0
s1−s0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
− (r + p− s1)G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+ y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
+
∫ y0+y1
0
(
(r − s1)x+
1∑
i=0
siyi
)
dF (x) +
∫ ∞
y0+y1
(ry1 − p(x− y1)) dF (x)−
1∑
i=0
ciyi.
(A-96)
For the case of s0 ≥ s1, we have
pi(y0, y1) =
(∫ r+p−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
− (r + p− s1)G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+ y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
+
∫ y0+y1
0
(
(r − s1)x+
1∑
i=0
siyi
)
dF (x) +
∫ ∞
y0+y1
(ry1 − p(x− y1)) dF (x)−
1∑
i=0
ciyi.
Note that the s0 ≥ s1 case is similar to that of the s0 < s1 case. In what follows, we focus on
the more general case, i.e., the s0 < s1 case. Using (A-96), we have
∂y0pi(y0, y1) = F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (F (y0 + y1)− F (y0))
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)− (c0 − s0), (A-97)
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and
∂y1pi(y0, y1) = (r + p− s1)F (y1)− (F (y0 + y1)− F (y1))
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (F (y0 + y1)− F (y1))
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)− (c1 − s1). (A-98)
Lemma A12. The hessian matrix associated with pi(y0, y1) is symmetric, negative, and diag-
onal dominant.
Proof of Lemma A12. The second order derivative with respect to y0 and y1 follows from (A-97)
and (A-98).
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y20
= −f(y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (f(y0 + y1)− f(y0))
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z), (A-99)
and
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y21
= −(r + p− s1)f(y1)− (f(y0 + y1)− f(y1))
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (f(y0 + y1)− f(y1))
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z). (A-100)
In addition, we have
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y0y1
= −f(y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ f(y0 + y1)
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z). (A-101)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y20
< 0, ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y21
< 0, and ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y0y1
< 0. Therefore,
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the Hessian matrix is negative and symmetric. In addition, it is easy to verify that the Hessian
matrix is also diagonal dominant. This entails showing that
−(r + p− s1) +
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z) ≤ 0.
Note that the above equation can be simplified as follows.
−
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s1)dG(z)−
∫ ∞
r+p−s0
(r + p− s1)dG(z)
+
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)
=
∫ r+p−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ ∞
r+p−s0
(r + p− s1)dG(z)−
∫ s1−s0
0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)
=
∫ r+p−s0
s1−s0
(s1 − s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ ∞
r+p−s0
(r + p− s1)dG(z) < 0.
It follows directly from Lemma A12 that the firm’s objective function is jointly concave in
the procurement quantity y0 and y1. To summarize the above analysis, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem A1. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s profit function is jointly concave in
the procurement quantity ~y = (y0, y1). Furthermore, the firm’s optimal procurement quantity
can be obtained by setting (A-97) and (A-98) equal to zero (for interior solutions).
Theorem A2. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit is a) de-
creasing in the unit procurement cost c0 and c1, b) decreasing in the unit penalty cost p, c)
increasing in the unit salvage value s0 and s1, and d) increasing in the unit revenue r.
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Proof of Theorem A2. The theorem statements can be obtained by applying envelope theorem
to (A-96). Part a) follows directly. For part b), note that
∂ppi(y0, y1) = −G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)−
∫ ∞
y0+y1
(x− y1)dF (x) < 0.
For part c), note that
∂s0pi(y0, y1) = −G(s1 − s0)
(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)
)
−
∫ r+p−s0
s1−s0
dG(z)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+ y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0) +
∫ y0+y1
0
y0dF (x)
> G(s1 − s0)
∫ y0+y1
0
y0dF (x)−
∫ r+p−s0
s1−s0
dG(z)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+ y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
> G(s1 − s0)
∫ y0+y1
0
y0dF (x)−G(s1 − s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+ y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
> y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0) > 0.
In addition, we have
∂s1pi(y0, y1) = G(s1 − s0)
(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)
)
+
∫ r+p−s0
s1−s0
dG(z)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
0
(−x+ y1)dF (x)
= G(s1 − s0)
(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)
)
+G(s1 − s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
+
∫ y1
0
(y1 − x)dF (x)−
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
= G(s1 − s0)
(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)−
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
)
+
∫ y1
0
(y1 − x)dF (x).
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But one can easily verify that, regardless of whether y0 ≥ y1 or y0 < y1,
∫ y0
0
xdF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y0
y0dF (x)−
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x) > 0,
which proves the part c) of the theorem statement. As for part d), note that
∂rpi(y0, y1) = G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x) + y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
+
∫ y0+y1
0
xdF (x) +
∫ ∞
y0+y1
y1dF (x) > 0.
This proves the theorem statements.
Theorem A3. With split procurement strategy, the firm’s optimal expected profit (weakly)
decreases as the quota price stochastically increases.
Proof of Theorem A3. From the proof of Theorem 24, we know that, for any given two random
variables Z1 ≤st Z2,
∫ A
0
(A− z1)dG1(z1) ≥
∫ A
0
(A− z2)dG1(z2). (A-102)
Therefore, to prove the theorem statement, it is sufficient to prove that
y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0) (A-103)
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satisfies (A-102). But (A-103) can be simplified as
y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)− s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
= y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1),
which clearly satisfies condition (A-102). The theorem statement follows directly.
Theorem A4. With split procurement strategy, if the quota price is normally distributed with
parameters N(µ, σ), then the firm’s optimal expected profit is decreasing in the expected quota
price µ and increasing in the quota standard deviation σ.
Proof of Theorem A4. Follows similar approach to the proof of Theorem 25 and Corollary
5.
A3.2 The Exchange Curve Between Leadtime Difference ∆L and Domestic
Production Bound α
One distinctive advantage of the direct OPA strategy is its ability to postpone the domestic
production to better match demand and supply. This leadtime advantage, however, is balanced
by the policy constraint of the domestic production quantity fraction α. It is of interest to un-
derstand the exchange curves between the leadtime difference ∆L and the domestic production
requirement α. Toward this end, we designed a numeric study to compute the exchange curve.
We use the base case parameter values for our numeric study, but varying the LCC unit cost
c0 from 0.1 to 0.9 with a step size of 0.1, the demand cv from 0.1 to 0.5 with a step size of 0.1.
We then vary the leadtime difference ∆L from 1 to 5. For each ∆L, we search the value of α
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that gives a target profit of 200 (the average profit in our base case scenario). We therefore
have 225 observations in total.
Note that the exchange curve may not be always feasible. In fact, in 17.3% of cases, we
observed that it is not possible to achieve the average profit even when the α value equals to
zero. Of these 17.3% of cases, the average achievable expected profit is 6.5% less than the
target profit level of 200.
Because an increase in the leadtime difference level ∆L makes the direct OPA strategy more
advantageous, it is intuitive that the exchange curve is increasing in the leadtime difference ∆L.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the exchange curve between the leadtime ∆L and the policy parameter
α, stratified by the demand coefficient of variation levels.
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Figure 5.1: Exchange curve as the demand coefficient of variation increases
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Figure 5.1 shows that the policy parameter value α is convex increasing in the leadtime
difference. As the firm’s domestic production has shorter leadtimes, the OPA policy has in-
creasingly more latitude in setting the α value without compromise the competitiveness of the
OPA strategy. However, this latitude is significantly influenced by the demand volatility. As
the demand volatility increases, the policy parameter value α is significantly reduced, indicat-
ing that a more relaxed OPA policy is required to achieve similar competitiveness. We do note,
however, that a shorter leadtime for the domestic production can mitigate the negative impact
of the demand volatility on the policy parameter α. Figure 5.2 illustrates the exchange curve
stratified by the unit cost c0.
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Figure 5.2: Exchange curve as the LCC unit procurement cost increases
Note that a higher level of c0 makes the feasible α level significantly constrained. However,
such observation should not be construed as a lack of competitiveness for the direct OPA
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strategy as c0 increases. These exchange curves are created at an average expected profit for
the direct OPA strategy. As the unit cost c0 increases, the non-OPA strategies may decline
faster than that of the direct OPA strategy.
A3.3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 23. It is straightforward to show that
pi′(y0) =− c0 + F (y0)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − z)dG(z) + s0F (y0)
∫ r+p−s0
s2−s0
dG(z)
+ F (y0)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0G(r + p− s0), (A-104)
and
pi′′(y0) = −f(y0)
(∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)
< 0.
The firm’s revenue function is therefore concave in the procurement quantity and the optimal
procurement quantity y∗0 can be obtained by setting (A-104) equal to zero (for the interior
solution).
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition statements can be obtained by applying the envelope
theorem to (4.4). Part a) is straightforward. For part b), we have
∂ppi(y∗0) = G(r + p− s0)
∫ y∗0
0
xdF (x)− E[x] < 0.
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For part c), note that (4.4) can be rewritten as
pi(y0) = y0
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)− (c0 − s0)y0 − pE[x]
−
∫ y0
0
(y0 − x)dF (x)
(∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)
It follows that
∂s0pi(y
∗
0) = y
∗
0G(r + p− s0)−
∫ y∗0
0
(y∗0 − x)dF (x) (−G(r + p− s0) +G(s2 − s0)) ≥ 0,
and
∂s2pi(y
∗
0) =
∫ y∗0
0
(y∗0 − x)dF (x)G(s2 − s0) ≥ 0.
Finally, for part d), we have
∂rpi(y∗0) = G(r + p− s0)
(
y∗0 −
∫ y∗0
0
(y∗0 − x)dF (x)
)
> 0.
Proof of Theorem 24. Using (4.4), we can re-write the firm’s revenue function as
pi(y0) =
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
(∫ y0
0
xdF (x) + y0F (y0)
)
+
∫ y0
0
(y0 − x)dF (x)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)− (c0 − s0)y0 − pE[x]. (A-105)
To prove the theorem statement, it is suffice to prove that, given two distribution function
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G1(·) ≥ G2(·), then pi(y|G1(·)) ≥ pi(y|G2(·)) holds. Note that
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z) = (r + p− s0 − z)G(z)|r+p−s00 −
∫ r+p−s0
0
−G(z)dz =
∫ r+p−s0
0
G(z)dz.
It follows that, if G1(·) ≥ G2(·), then
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG1(z) ≥
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG2(z)⇒ pi(y0|G1(·)) ≥ pi(y0|G2(·)).
Note that in the above derivation, the integrating term
∫ s2−s0
0 (s2−s0−z)dG(z) can be similarly
incorporated when s2 > s0.
Proof of Theorem 25. By (A-105) in the proof of theorem 24, the firm’s expected profit function
depends on the variance of the quota price only through the following term.
V =
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z).
Substitute the normal distribution with parameters (µ, σ) into the above equation, we have
V =
∫ r+p−s0
−∞
(r + p− s0 − z) 1
σ
√
2pi
e
−
(
z−µ√
2σ
)2
dz.
A caveat with the normal distribution is that there are possibilities for negative quota prices,
which cannot happen in reality. Therefore, the parameter values of µ and σ have to be setup
in a way such that the probability of the quota prices becoming negative is negligible. Note
that the above equation can be simplified as
V =
σ√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
+
1
2
(r + p− s0 − µ)
(
1 + erf
(
r + p− s0 − µ√
2σ
))
.
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Therefore, we have
∂σV =
1√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
+
1√
2pi
(
r + p− s0 − µ
σ
)2
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
− 1
2
(
r + p− s0 − µ
σ
)2 2√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
=
1√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
> 0.
The theorem statement then follows directly by the envelope theorem. We note that the
integration term
∫ s2−s0
0 (s2 − s0 − z)dG(z) can be similarly incorporated when s2 > s0.
Proof of Corollary 5. The theorem statement follows directly from Theorem 24. For concrete-
ness, however, we provide an alternative proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 25, the
firm’s expected profit function depends on the mean of the quota price only through
V =
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z).
In the case of the normal distribution with parameters (µ, σ), we have
V =
σ√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
+
1
2
(r + p− s0 − µ)
(
1 + erf
(
r + p− s0 − µ√
2σ
))
.
Therefore, we have
∂µV =
r + p− s0 − µ
σ
√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
− 1
2
(
1 + erf
(
r + p− s0 − µ√
2σ
))
− r + p− s0 − µ
σ
√
2pi
e
−
(
r+p−s0−µ√
2σ
)2
= −1
2
(
1 + erf
(
r + p− s0 − µ√
2σ
))
< 0.
The theorem statement then follows directly by the envelope theorem. We note that the
integration term
∫ s2−s0
0 (s2 − s0 − z)dG(z) can be similarly incorporated when s2 > s0.
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Proof of Lemma 10. The second order derivative with respect to y0 and y1 follows from (4.15)
and (4.16).
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y20
= −f(y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z) + f(y0 + y1)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z),
(A-106)
and
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y21
= −(r + p)f(y1)− (f(y0 + y1)− f(y1))
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ (f(y0 + y1)− f(y1))
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z). (A-107)
In addition, we have
∂2pi(y0, y1)
∂y0y1
= −f(y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)
+ f(y0 + y1)
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z). (A-108)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y20
< 0, ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y21
< 0, and ∂
2pi(y0,y1)
∂y0y1
< 0. Therefore,
the Hessian matrix is negative and symmetric. In addition, it is easy to verify that the Hessian
matrix is also diagonal dominant. This entails showing that
−(r + p) +
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z)−
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z) ≤ 0,
which is obviously true.
Proof of Theorem 27. The theorem statements can be obtained by applying envelope theorem
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to (4.14). Part a) follows directly. For part b), note that
∂ppi(y0, y1) = −G(r + p− s0)
∫ ∞
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)−G(r + p− s0)
∫ ∞
y0+y1
(x− y0 − y1)dF (x) < 0.
For part c), note that
∂s0pi(y0, y1) =
∫ r+p−s0
s2−s0
(∫ y1
0
y0dF (x) +
∫ y0+y1
y1
(y0 + y1 − x)dF (x)
)
dG(z) +G(r + p− s0)y0 > 0.
In addition, we have
∂s2pi(y0, y1) =
∫ s2−s0
0
∫ y0+y1
0
(y0 + y1 − x)dF (x)dG(z) +
∫ ∞
s2−s0
∫ y1
0
(y1 − x)dF (x)dG(z) > 0.
As for part d), note that
∂rpi(y0, y1) = G(r + p− s0)
(∫ y0+y1
0
xdF (x) + (y0 + y1)F (y0 + y1)
)
> 0.
This proves the theorem statements.
Proof of Theorem 28. From the proof of Theorem 24, we know that, for any given two random
variables Z1 ≤st Z2,
∫ A
0
(A− z1)dG1(z1) ≥
∫ A
0
(A− z2)dG1(z2). (A-109)
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Note that (4.14) can be simplified as
pi(y0, y1) =
∫ s2−s0
0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)y0F (y0) +
(∫ r+p−s0
s2−s0
(s2 − s0 − z)dG(z)
)∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x)
− (r + p− s2)G(r + p− s0)
∫ y0+y1
y1
(x− y1)dF (x) + y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z)
+ s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0) +
∫ y0+y1
0
((r − s2)x+ s0y0 + s2y1) dF (x)
+
∫ y0+y1
y1
((r − s2)x+ s0y0 + s2y1) dF (x) +
∫ ∞
y0+y1
(ry1 − p(x− y1)) dF (x)−
1∑
i=0
ciyi.
(A-110)
Therefore, to prove the theorem statement, it is sufficient to prove that
y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0) (A-111)
satisfies (A-109). But (A-111) can be simplified as
y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1)− s0y0F (y0 + y1)G(r + p− s0)
= y0F (y0 + y1)
∫ r+p−s0
0
(r + p− s0 − z)dG(z) + s0y0F (y0 + y1),
which clearly satisfies condition (A-109). The theorem statement follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 29. Follows similar approach to the proof of Theorem 25 and Corollary 5.
Proof of Theorem 30. The stated result can be obtained by substituting the condition of c1 −
s2 ≤ c0 − s0 into the equation arrays of (4.15) and (4.16).
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Proof of Theorem 31. The proof can be obtained by setting (4.16) to be less than zero at y1 = 0
(in which case the optimal y∗0 satisfies (4.15) for an interior solution) .
Proof of Theorem 33. From Theorem 32, pi∗L(w
∗
0, y
∗
2|y0, θ˜) is continuous in y0. Furthermore,
pi∗L(w
∗
0, y
∗
2|y0, θ˜) is linear in y0 for y0 ≤ (1 − α)kL and y0 > (1 − α)kH . For (1 − α)kH < y0 ≤
(1−α)kH , pi∗L(w∗0, y∗2|y0, θ˜) is concave in y0. Because the upper and lower limit at y0 = (1−α)kL
are identical and equal to c2, and the upper and lower limit at y0 = (1−α)kH are also identical
and equal to s0, the theorem statement follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 35. Suppose the leadtime differences are such that LA < LB. For any given
y0 and any realizations of θ˜, the optimal expected profit, pi∗LA(w
∗
0A, y
∗
2A|y0, θ˜) ≤ pi∗LB (w∗0A, y∗2A|y0, θ˜) ≤
pi∗LB (w
∗
1B, y
∗
2B|y0, θ˜) because, for LB, the firm can simply act on decisions made at time LA
and achieve at least the same optimal expected profit. Since for any given y0, we have
pi∗LA(·|y0) ≤ pi∗LB (·|y0), in expectation we have pi(y∗0A|LA) ≤ pi(y∗0B|LB).
Lemma A13. With martingale forecast updating process, the firm’s second stage optimal profit
function is given by
piL(w∗0, y
∗
2|y0, µL) =

−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
− z
2
L
2 + (r − c2)µL + c2y0, y0 ≤ (1− α)kL;
−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
−
( y0
1−α−µL√
2σL
)2
+ (r + p− αc2) y01−α
+(r + p− s2)
(
µL − y01−α
)
F∆L|µL
(
y0
1−α
)
− pµL, (1− α)kL < y0 ≤ (1− α)kH ;
−(r + p− s2) σL√2pie
− z
2
H
2 + (r − αc2 − (1− α)s0)µL
+s0y0, y0 > (1− α)kH .
(A-112)
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Proof of Lemma A13. Note that
∫ kL
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
exp
(
−
(
kL − µL√
2σL
)2)
+ µL
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
kL − µL√
2σL
))
, (A-113)
where erf(·) is the standard error function. But
F∆L|µL(y) =
∫ y
−∞
1
σL
√
2pi
e
−
(
x−µL√
2σL
)2
dx =
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
y − µL√
2σL
))
. (A-114)
Substitute (4.23) into (A-114), we have
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
kL − µL√
2σL
))
=
r + p− c2
r + p− s2 . (A-115)
Substitute (A-115) into (A-113), we have
∫ kL
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
exp
(
−
(
kL − µL√
2σL
)2)
+ µL
r + p− c2
r + p− s2 . (A-116)
Notice that
kL − µL
σL
= Φ−1
(
r + p− c2
r + p− s2
)
,
which is a constant, independent of µL and σL. In fact, this is the standard newsvendor service
level, which is influenced only by the revenue and cost parameter values. Let zL = Φ−1
(
r+p−c2
r+p−s2
)
and substitute K into (A-116), we have
∫ kL
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
e−
z2L
2 + µL
r + p− c2
r + p− s2 . (A-117)
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Analogously, we have
∫ kH
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
e−
z2H
2 + µL
r + p− αc2 − (1− α)s0
r + p− s2 , (A-118)
where zH = Φ−1
(
r+p−αc2−(1−α)s0
r+p−s2
)
.
Note that
∫ y0
1−α
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
exp
(
−
( y0
1−α − µL√
2σL
)2)
+ µL
1
2
(
1 + erf
( y0
1−α − µL√
2σL
))
.
(A-119)
But
F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)
=
1
2
(
1 + erf
( y0
1−α − µL√
2σL
))
. (A-120)
Substitute (A-120) into (A-119), we have
∫ y1
1−α
−∞
xdF∆L|µL(x) = −
σL√
2pi
exp
(
−
( y1
1−α − µL√
2σL
)2)
+ µLF∆L|µL
(
y1
1− α
)
. (A-121)
The lemma statement follows by substituting (A-117), (A-118), and (A-121) into (4.26).
Lemma A14. With martingale forecast updating under the direct OPA strategy, the derivative
of the firm’s revenue function with respect to OPA procurement quantity y0, i.e., ∂y0pi(y0), is
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given by
∂y0pi(y0) = −c1 + c2GL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
+ s0GL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
+
1
1− α
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
[
(r + p− αc2)− (r + p− s2)F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)]
dGL(µL).
(A-122)
Proof of Lemma A14. Using (4.28), we have
∂y0pi(y0) = −c1 +
∫ ∞
y0
1−α−zLσL
c2dGL(µL) +
∫ y0
1−α−zHσL
−∞
s0dGL(µL)
−
[
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2L
2 + (r − c2)
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
+ c2y0
]
gL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
1
1− α
+
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e
−
( y0
1−α−µL√
2σL
)2
2
y0
1−α − µL√
2σL
1√
2σL
1
1− α
+ (r + p− αc2) 11− α − (r + p− s2)
1
1− αF∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)
+(r + p− s2)
(
µL − y01− α
)
F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)
1
1− α
]
dGL(µL)
+
[
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2L
2 + (r + p− αc2) y01− α − (r + p− s2)zLσLF∆L|µL= y01−α−zLσL
(
y0
1− α
)
−p
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)]
gL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
1
1− α
−
[
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2H
2 + (r + p− αc2) y01− α − (r + p− s2)zHσLF∆L|µL= y01−α−zHσL
(
y0
1− α
)
−p
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)]
gL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
1
1− α
+
[
−(r + p− s2) σL√
2pi
e−
z2H
2 + (r − αc2 − (1− α)s0)
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
+ s0y0
]
gL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
1
1− α.
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Simplifying the above expression, we have
∂y0pi(y0) = −c1 + c2GL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)
+ s0GL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)
+
1
1− αgL
(
y0
1− α − zLσL
)[
(r + p− c2)zLσL − (r + p− s2)zLσLF∆L|µL= y01−α−zLσL
(
y0
1− α
)]
+
1
1− αgL
(
y0
1− α − zHσL
)[
− (r + p− αc2 − (1− α)s0)zHσL
+(r + p− s2)zHσLF∆L|µL= y01−α−zHσL
(
y0
1− α
)]
+
1
1− α
∫ y0
1−α−zLσL
y0
1−α−zHσL
[
(r + p− αc2)− (r + p− s2)F∆L|µL
(
y0
1− α
)]
dGL(µL).
(A-123)
Note that
F∆L|µL(kL) =
∫ kL
−∞
1
σL
√
2pi
e
−
(
x−µL√
2σL
)2
dx =
∫ µL+zLσL
−∞
1
σL
√
2pi
e
−
(
x−µL√
2σL
)2
dx (A-124)
Substitute µL = y01−α − zLσL into (A-124), we have
F∆L|µL= y01−α−zLσL
(
y0
1− α
)
= F∆L|µL(kL) =
r + p− c2
r + p− s2 . (A-125)
Following similar logic, we have
F∆L|µL= y01−α−zHσL
(
y0
1− α
)
= F∆L|µL(kH) =
r + p− αc2 − (1− α)s0
r + p− s2 . (A-126)
The lemma statement follows by substituting (A-125) and (A-126) into (A-123).
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